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ABSTRACT 
Zionism is still an on-going movement. Its militancy is 
on the increase and its expansionism has not yet been 
contained. The Palestinian people are still victims of the 
worst kind of oppression emanating from a state which is 
overtly theocratic in nature. It is an anathema that the so-
called civilized world should tolerate tVie worst kind of 
tyranny and violation of human rights. The present day 
behaviour of Zionists and of the major world powers 
can be understood only if one sees the phenomena in 
retrospect. The Russian pogroms of 1880s seem to set in 
motion a process which led ultimately to the UH debates, a 
prelude to the formation of Israel. 
An attempt has been made here to discuss Zionist 
activities directed towards the establishment of a Jewish 
state. The focus is on the first half of the twentieth 
century. During this period Zionists organised and developed 
strategic contacts with key figures in Great Britain, the 
United States and the Soviet Union - the powers which were 
most important in deciding the issue. The concerted effort 
of the Zionists to promote tVie cause of Israel in these 
countries and finally in the United Nations General 
Assembly, proved to be highly successful. The U.N. Partition 
Resolution of 1947 marks the culmination of this process. 
"The word 'Zionism' appeared at the end of the 
nineteenth century to designate a cluster of different 
movements, the common element of which was the project of 
giving world Jewry a spiritual, territorial or state centre, 
usually located in Palestine" Naturally the Zionist idea 
took many forms particularly in its formative period, and it 
is not surprising that sometimes its strands negated each 
other. 
"Zionism' as a concept or ideology has been understood 
from many angles. For some it is a permanent national 
calling of all Jewry. Therefore it is justified and 
beneficial. For others, it is subservient to universal 
values, and whether these values are taken from Judaism, 
liberal humanism or from international proletarianism. For 
those who believe in universal human values and 
international proletarianism, Zionism is harmful and they 
consider it to be capitalism in its imperialist stage. 
The western thinking and efforts lent a helping hand 
to the growth of Zionism. Two European developments in the 
second half of the nineteenth century created a congenial 
atmosphere for the imperialist conceived Zionist idea. The 
first was direct and indirect impact of the intellectual and 
political growth of European chauvinist nationalism. The 
pogroms in Russia in 1881 were the second European 
development which provided impetus to the Zionist idea. On 
account of these pogroms there was a mass exodus of Jews to 
other countries of Eastern and Western Europe. This was a 
vital reason for the failure of Haskalah (Assimilationist) 
movement. It was substituted by the movement of "Lovers of 
Zion" which was inspired by Leo Ptnsker's pamphlet, 'Auto 
Emancipation. Societies were formed in Jewish centres to 
chalk out a programme for the settlement of Jews in 
Palestine and to revive the Hebrew language. 
If it was in Eastern Europe that conditions were ripe 
for Zionist movement and it was the 'Pale of Settlement that 
continuously provided the membership of the movement, it was 
only in Westeim Europe that conditions were congenial for a 
strategic political concept of Jewish nationalism. The 
concept of political Zionism evolved in Vienna, Theodor 
H*;i-al, provided the political and organisational leadership 
of the new movement. Herzl was the most important and chief 
dispenser of the Jewish political and social ideas. It has 
been rightly said that Zionism as a true political movement 
and as an international force was to all intents and 
purposes Herzl's intention and creation. 
The fundamental concepts regarding Herzl's thought and 
Zionist outlook are in his Der Judenstaat. The very first 
sentence of Judenstaat reads, "The idea which I have 
developed in this pamphlet is a very old one: It is the 
restoration of the Jewish state". Hersl has enumerated his 
plan in this thirty page pamphlet. He says: "My plan is 
simple in design but complicated in execution". The plan 
consisted of two parts: Assumption of responsibility for 
Jewish national officers by a political body to be called 
"the Society of Jews", and management of both the exodus of 
the Jews and their resettlement by a technical body to be 
called the Jewish Company. The first was to contact the 
relevant governments and seek to obtain their consent for 
the attainment of Jewish sovereignty over a neutral piece of 
land, and then administer the territory as a provisional 
government. The second was to take form of a chartered 
company established in London under English law. The company 
would have to be provided with handsome working capital and 
would provide land, housing and employment in the new 
country. 
Hersl had indeed pondered over Eres Israel as the most 
adequate land for Jews to settle. He mentioned, "It is more 
and more to the interest of the civilised nations and of 
civilisations in general that a cultural station be 
established on the shortest route to Asia Palestine is this 
station and we Jews are the bearers of culture who are ready 
to give our property and our lives to bring about this 
creation", 
Herzl justified the choice of Palestine on the vague 
and spurious historical claim. He wrote, "Palestine is our -
memorable historic home. The very name of Palestine would 
attract our people with a force of mai^velous potency'. 
However, the primary purpose of Der Judenstaat was 
tactical to make the issue public and to draw new allies. 
After the publication of the pamphlet he wrote: 
The Essay I have published has gained me the 
greatest of hatreds and the warmest of 
friendships... the discussion is now open and, 
it seems, will soon reach the parliament. 
The idea of calling a general assembly of Zionists was 
a second major step taken up by Herzl. On March 7, 1897, a 
decision to convene a Zionist Congress was taken during a 
two day conference of a group of lovers of Zion from Berlin. 
Hersl was there with his associates from Austria to chalk 
out a plan for a cooperative working relationship with the 
Berlin circle. 
The first Zionist Congress held at Bal Basle was an 
unprecedented event. The Congress opened on Sunday morning, 
24 August 1897 and continued for three days, after which it 
constituted' a number of organisations to promote its aims 
and objectives. The key provision of the Congress states, 
"The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a 
home in Palestine secured by Public Law". A reading of 
Heral's diaries reveal that the term "public law" refers to 
nothing but the patronage of the imperialist powers. He 
envisaged that the European powers would back Zionism for 
one of the three main motives; 
1. Imperialist self interest; 
2. Ridding themselves of Jews and antisemitism (in west 
European case avoiding the influx of Jewish immigrants from 
Eastern Europe), and 
3. Using organised Jewish influence to combat 
revolutionary movements and other internal factors. 
Four means were adopted to obtain t?iis objective: 
(i) The programmatic encouragement of the settlement of 
Palestine with Jewish agricultural workers, labourers and 
artisans. 
(ii) The unification and organisation of all Jewry into 
local and general groups in accordance with tVie laws of 
respective country. 
(iii) The strengthening of Jewish self-awareness and 
national consciousness. 
(iv) The preparation of activity for obtaining the consent 
of the various governtnents, necessary for the fulfilment of 
the aims of Zionism. 
The first president of the Zionist Congress Theodor 
Herzl started translating the programmes of Basle Congress 
into action. However Zionism did not gain any recognition at 
the begining of the World War I. 
The great conception of Heral, ttie gigantic enthusiasm 
of the Basle Congress and the untiring efforts of the 
founder of political Zionism appeared to have fiszled out by 
the begining of the World War I. It appears that if the war 
had not taken place with all its schemes on the part of the 
Allied Powers, and the situation created during and after 
the war, political Zionism would have died out. The War, the 
intensified imperialist drive in West Asia and the winning 
over of the West European Jews and many others, who were 
reluctant at the beginning, brought a new batch of East 
European Jewish leaders, less imaginative but more pragmatic 
than Hersl, to the forefront. They furthered the idea of 
Herzl and through a long, concerted and internationally 
orchestrated propaganda and effort, ultimately achieved 
Israel, which appeared to be ans^ c^ 9<^ ffi5ibie proposition at 
the beginning. 
No. 
The diplomatic initiative, administrative preparation 
and right use of money power provide the historical 
explanation of the creation of Israel. Three leaders played 
the most crucial role. Weizmann was a past master as far as 
sophisticated manipulation was concerned. Ben Gurion was a 
genius at mass conversion to Zionism and settlement, and 
Jabontinsk, of expansionist design and armed strategy. These 
three pragmatic approaches lay at the root of evolution of 
Zionism Weizmann resorted to the teclmique of "gradualism" 
and developed it into a political technique. For Weismana 
the Balfour Declaration was only a begining. From 1917 
onwards he attempted ceaselessly to circumvent its 
restrictive clauses but never openly challenged them. He 
maintained the same strategy towards Churchill Vfliite Paper. 
In the same way he accepted the partition plan, its limited 
territorial concessions which could be expanded in time. 
David Bin Gurion attached great importance to the 
concept of "ingathering". Gurion insisted that Zionism 
demanded immigration to Israel and allegiance to a single 
Jewish nationality, this reflected a horizon too limited 
for the Jews of the world. His narrow thinking that 
Zionists in the diaspora were under obligation to assist the 
state of Israel unconditionally was said to be reactionary. 
To an emancipated Jew and the modern man the premise of 
"ingathering" was retrogressive. 
Nevertheless the Zionist like Weizsmann, Ben Gurion, 
Juda Magnes and Abba Hi1lei Silver, who happened to be the 
pivotal actors on behalf of Zionism, activated other actors, 
whom we may call the secondary actors, particularly U.K., 
U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and ultimately through them reached 
the United Nations. 
The struggle over Palestine had already emerged during 
World War I. On account of the exigencies of War the British 
calculated that a public expression of support for the 
principle of a Jewish national home in Palestine would 
prompt the World Zionist Organisation to mobilise American 
Jews in support of the United States' entry into the war on 
the side of the Allied powers. The second reason was, the 
German Jews might shift their allegiance. The third reason 
was that the Russian Jews might persuade Russia not to 
abandon the conflict. There was another contradictory pledge 
given to the Arabs. Sir Henry McMahon had been authorised to 
conduct a correspondence with Sharif Hussein encouraging him 
to revolt against the Turks which would be later rewarded in 
Arab independence. 
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After World War I Great Britain became the mandatory 
power over Palestine. The Palestine Mandate was doomed to 
failure from its very inception. The British never succeeded 
in rallying to their support either the Jews or the Arabs. 
The latter never recognized the Balfour Declaration, or 
Britain's rights to impose it on Palestine. The Jews' 
cooperation when given was conditional on a "Zionist" 
interpretation of that declaration, and their support was 
withdrawn in 1939, when in their view the British reneged on 
their international obligations to the Jewish people. By 
1945, with both parties to the conflict determined to 
implement their own blue print for Palestine in the world 
order, the Mandate had indeed become intractable. 
The foreign secretary, Earnest Bevin, pursued the 
solution of a "binational state" in the hope that concerted 
action with the United States might guarantee Jewish 
minority, alienating the Arab majority, thereby allowing 
Britain to remain on good terms with the Arab World 
generally. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry of 1946 
was such an attempt by Britain to convince the Americans of 
the inequity of creating a white settler minority in 
Palestine. However, the Zionist influence in the United 
States and the American Suspicion of British imperialism, 
frustrated Bevin's objective. The British were unable to 
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persuade the Americans to check expansionist Zior.st aims 
that appeared to jeopardize Britains position in ohe . Middle 
East. 
The policy of the United States centered on the 
perspective of its President. The whole American political 
system is dominated by the President. The President can 
ignore the advice of Viis secretaries and other experts in 
the context of his domestic politics. On the crucial issue 
of Palestine the domestic compulsions proved to be more 
compelling for the President than the almost objective 
advice of' the Secretaries of State and Defense. This 
situation was ably exploited by the Zionists who through 
their influence mechanism and electoral weight could mould 
President's thinking and have the decision in their favour. 
WViile the American foreign policy experts were closer to 
their British colleagues in opposing Zionist aspirations, 
the President repeatedly overruled their diplomatic-
advisors, 
Roosevelt was apparently moved by a naive belief that 
tVie Balfour Declaration had "promised" Palestine to the 
Jews, and that the Arabs had to be bought off. Far more 
significant were Truman's decisions. There has been erratic 
shifts in United States policies on Palestine, particularly 
after the question was placed on the agenda of tY j. United 
Nations General Assembly, The State Department a d the WViite 
House were both writing the policies, each with a different 
constituency in mind. State was responding chiefly to 
pressures of the cold war as it also bore upon the Middle 
East, and the White House, chiefly to domestic pressures 
built up by the American Zionists. So long as the president 
did not personally intervene State went its own way. Thus 
the American position before the General Assembly's Ad hoc 
Committee on Palestine in the fall of 1947 was developed 
essentially by State, and the pressures on friendly 
delegations before the final vote in the plenary Assembly by 
the Wliite House wViich virtually worked on the dictates of 
the Zionist lobby. Furthermore, the way United States policy 
towards Palestine was forced through the United Nations in 
1947, not only denegrated the status of United Nations but 
also United States lost face in its dealings with the United 
Nations. 
The Soviet policies towards Palestine were determined 
by an interplay between an internal "Jewish factor" and the 
perceived requirements of the Soviet interests in the Middle 
East as a whole in the context of the super power struggle. 
After the Jewish diaspora of 70 A,D, Russia had been 
the largest home of the Jews. Among the Russian Jewry 
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Zionism as an idea and as a movement predate. Herzl's 
Judenstaat and the emergence of the World Zionist 
Organisation. The Christian Czars hated the Jews and the 
incipient Zionism alike. With the commencement of Revolution 
in 1917 Zionism was declared as an reactionary ideology. 
The British support to the Jewish National Home in Palestine 
through the Balfour Declaration provided added impetus to 
Communist anathema towards Zionism. The Declaration was 
aimed to deflect or subvert the support of the Jews for the 
revolution at a critical moment, but was also considered a 
vehicle of British imperialism and as a means to keep in 
check the revolutionary Arab masses. 
However, with the advent of the World War II Stalin 
started to cultivate the Jews and the Zionists alike. Arab, 
especially the Palestinian leadership fell from grace. 
Moreover, Kremlin, before it could commit itself openly to 
the Zionists, had to outmaneuver Anglo-American moves to 
exclude Moscow from attempts to resolve the Palestinian 
problem Kremlin in 1946-47 retaliated by insisting that any 
change in "the status of dependent territories" should be 
decided by the United Nations. Stalin's persistence paid off 
in February 1947 when the British Government expressed it 
inability to mediate the Arab-Jewish dispute referred the 
Palestine problem to the U.N. In the meantime Soviet ability 
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to influence events in Palestine had considerably increased. 
The Jewish population had swollen on account of large scale 
immigration of East European Jews. The situatioxi in 
Palestine was deteriorating fast since the Jews and Arab 
Palestinians were locked in incessant conflagration with the 
British. This offered a unique opportunity to U.S.S.R. to 
influence events by supporting Zionist aspirations for on 
independent Jewish state. 
The Kremlin welcomed the submission of the Palestine 
Question to the U.N. Andrei Gromyko Deputy Foreign Minister 
declared o'n May 8, 1947, that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to 
take upon itself, together with the United Nations as a 
whole, the responsibility not only for the final decisions 
that may be taken by our organisation on the Palestine 
problem, but also for the preparation of the decision. 
Nonetheless, given the traditional Soviet hostility 
towards Zionism, it came as a surprise when in the fail of 
1947 Soviet spokesmen in the U.N. declared their support for 
the idea of partition and the creation of independent Jewish 
and Arab states in Palestine. Ideology was relegated to a 
second position while political expediency ruled the roost. 
Moscow had the realization that Britain was firmly 
rooted in the Arab World that the Soviet Union would not be 
IS 
able to gain any pro-Arab position. The Soviets had many 
other pragmatic considerations too. The Soviets were angry 
with the fact that Arab nationalist movecaents had taken a 
pro-axis orientation e.g. in Palestine it was led by the 
Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin Al-Husseini and in Egypt by Azis 
Al-Masri. There is another argument advanced by some writers 
that Stalin approved of the partition of Palestine in a fit 
of absent-mindedness. Soviets also visualised that only the 
majority proposal, which was the partition of Palestine, had 
the chance of comiftanding the the necessary two third 
majority. This was therefore the only proposal that 
promised to bring the end of the British rule in Palestine. 
The signal achievement of the Zionist diplomacy was 
the U.N. partition resolution of November 29, 1947. The 
Zionists for the first time in the history of their movement 
got an international sanction for the establishment of their 
own state. The origins of the November resolution lay in the 
UNSCOP, which at the end of August 1947 recommended British 
evacuation and termination of the Mandate. 
The resolution for the partition was adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on 29 November 1947. 
At that date Jews made up 32 per cent of Palestine's 
population and owned 5.6 per cent of the land. The Zionist 
state were allotted 56 per cent of the territory, with the 
most fertile land. 
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The voting of this partition plan was the occasion of 
some sordid maneuvers on behalf of Zionism. On 18 December 
1947 a member of the United States House of Representatives, 
Lawrence H. Smith, reminded Congress of what had gone on: 
Let's take a look at the record, Mr Speaker, 
and see what happened in the United Nations' 
Assembly meeting prior to the vote on 
partition. A two third vote was required to 
pass the resolution. On two occasions the 
Assembly was to vote and twice it was 
postponed.... In the meantime it is reliably 
reported that intense pressure was applied to 
the delegates of three small nations by the 
United States member and also by officials at 
the highest level in Washington... The 
decisive votes for partition were cast by 
Haiti, Liberia and the Philippines. These 
votes were sufficient to make the two-thirds 
majority. Previously, these countries opposed 
the move.... The pressure by our delegates, 
by our officials and by the private citizens 
of the FJnited States constitutes reprehensible 
conduct against them and against us. 
President Truman put unprecedented pressure on the 
State Department. Summer Welles, the Under-Secretary of 
state wrote, "By direct order of the White House, every form 
of pressure, direct and indirect,was brought to bear by 
American officials. ... to make sure that t?ie necessary 
majority would at length be secured". The Secretary for 
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Defence at that time James Forrestal, confirms this". "The 
met-hods t,hat had been used by people outside of the 
Executive branch of the government to bring coercion and 
duress on other nations in the General Assembly bordered 
closely onto scandal". 
In 1948, before the wave of "decolonisation", the 
United nations Organisation was largely dominated by the 
Western powers. It violated its own Charter by refusing to 
the Arabs, who at that time made up two-thirds of 
Palestine's population, the right to decide their own fate. 
The partition Resolution also raised many juridical 
questions. The decision in favour of partition was taken by 
the General Assembly and not by the Security Council. It 
thus had the weight only of a recommendation and not that of 
a decision to be put into effect. The Palestinians, 
moreover, were not alone in rejecting this partition. 
Begin's Irgun declared at the time that such a partitioii was 
illegal and would never be accepted. 
The U.N. partition plan did not survive the Arab-
Israeli war it provoked. The borders of Israel, as 
determined by the cease-fire agreements of 1949, in their 
turn lasted little more than eighteen years and the search 
for a viable political .settlement that still continues. 
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FREFACS 
In this thesis entitled "Zionism and the UN debates 
before the formation of Israel" an effort has been made to 
discuss and analyse the Zionist activities directed towards 
the formation of Israel. The focus is on the first half of 
the twentieth century. The Zionists had the network of their 
organisations and strategic contacts with the key figures in 
Great Britain, United States of America and the Soviet 
Union, the three powers which were directly concerned with 
the issue. They made concerted and well orchestrated effort 
in these countries to achieve their long-cherished goal i.e. 
the formation of Israel. These efforts of the Zionist paid 
rich dividends in promoting the cause of Israel in these 
countries and finally the United Nations General Ass^ ,mbly 
also. The culmination of all this was the Partition 
Resolution of 1947. 
The thesis has been divided into six chapters. An 
outline summary of these chapters has been given below. 
Chapter I which serves as an introduction to the thesis 
deals with the evolution of the Zionist ideology. It draws 
heavily from my M. Phil dissertation in Summary form and 
serves to place the present thesis in perspective. The 
chapter briefly discusses pre Heralian Zionism, the 
rise of HerEsl and his book Per Judengtaat- The role of Basle 
Congress which was held in 1897 has also been briefly-
discussed. 
Chapter II deals with the Zionism in practice. After 
all the Zionists were the people who inspired and activated 
other actors -- Great Britain, United States of America and 
the Soviet Union and ultimately through them the U.N. 
General Assembly. The evolution of post-Herzlian Zionist 
activities and their sophisticated diplomacy form the main 
pairt of this chapter. 
Chapter III discusses the role of Great Britain which 
was the Mandatory power of Palestine from 1920 to 1948. 
Earlier it had issued the Balfour Declaration — the seeds 
of the Israeli state. The British policy towards the 
Zionist goal has been discussed from World War I through the 
Mandatory period to the end of World War II. The British 
role culminated into her bringing the Palestinian Question 
on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1947. 
Chapter IV deals with the U.S. policy towards Zionism, 
its support to the Zionist Organisations and finally the 
cause of Israel. The U.S. was a reluctant supporter of the 
Zionist cause in the beginning. With the passage of time 
however, the Zionist efforts turned it into the main 
bulwark. It was the U.S. which through its might and 
diplomatic leverage gathered a preponderant majority (Two 
thirds) to vote for the partition of Palestine. 
Chapter V discusses the role of the Soviet Union. It 
was strongly anti-Zionist but over the years specially 
after World War II, turned into a supporter of the idea of 
Israel. The Soviet role in the U.N, was crucial in the 
sense that without its support, the support of its Republics 
and the East European countries, the two third majority was 
impossible. 
Chapter VI concentrates on the dynamics within the 
United Nations, and the specific role played by the "Jewish 
Agency", the Arab Higher Committee and the three major 
powers. The deliberations and debates resulting into the 
resolution on the partition of Palestine of 29 November 1947 
have also been discussed in detail in this chapter. 
It is hoped that this study will contribute, in its own 
modest way, to the understanding of Zionism and the role of 
the United Nations in creating the state of Israel. 
CHAPTER-I 
1 
INTRODOCTION: EVOLOTION OF THE ZIONIST IDEOLOGY 
"The word 'Zionism' appeared at the end of the 
nineteenth century to designate a cluster of different 
movements, the common element of which was the project of 
giving world Jewry a spiritual, territorial or state centre, 
usually located in Palestine", Naturally the Zionist idea 
took many forms particularly in its formative period, and it 
is not surprising that sometimes its strands negated each 
other. 
Zionism has manifested itself in multiplicity of 
concepts, values, emotions, ideological assumptions, 
political strategies and tactics, closely interlinked ith 
powerful networks of organisation. Like all fully gr«^ wn 
national or nationalist movements, it contains complexities, 
contradictions and ambiguities, often making the very 
definition of Zionism puzzling. 
Anti - Zionist ideologists have themselves often used 
the term 'Zionism' in a loose way. 
1. Maxim Rodinson, "Zionism: Theoretical Sketch of An 
Ideology" in Uri Davis, Andrew Mack, Nira Yuval Davis, 
(ed.), Israel and the Palestinians (London, 1975), 
p.57. 
2. Theodor Shanin, "The Price of Suspension", in Uri 
Davis, Andrew Mack, Nira Yuval Davis (ed.) Israel and 
the Palestinians (London, 1975), pp.24-5. 
3. Rodinson, n.l, p.57. 
I 
'Zionism' as a concept or ideology has been interpreted 
or understood from many angles. For some it is a 'permanent 
national calling of all Jewry'. Therefore it is justified 
and beneficial. For others it is subservient to universal 
values, and whether these values are taken from Judaism, 
liberal Humanism or from international proletarianism. For 
those who believe in universal human values and 
international proletarianism, Zionism is harmful and they 
consider it capitalism in its imperialist stage.'^  
The Western thinking and efforts lent a helping hand 
for the growth of Zionism. Two European developments in the 
second half of the nineteenth century created a conge .ial 
atmosphere for the imperialist-conceived Zionist idea'. The 
European Jewish mind was imbued with this Zionist idea and 
from a distance it seemed to be an 'inner motivated Jewish 
development'. The first was direct and indirect impact of 
the intellectual and political growth of European chauvinist 
nationalism. Nationalism had such an influence thet even a 
socialist like Moses Hess titled his book 'Rome and 
Jerusalem' (1862). This book glorified Italian nationalist 
4. Ibid. 
5. Abdul Wahab Al Kayyali, "The historical Roots of the 
Imperialist Zionist alliance" in A.W, Kayalli (ed.), 
Zionism. Imperialism and Racism (London, 1979), p.13. 
3 
movement and played upon the theme of 'pseudoscientific 
racist' theories of the nineteenth century. Hess had warned 
the Jews to avoid assimilation and reassert their 
exclusivity by 'reconstructing' their national centre in 
Palestine'. Rome and Jerusalem is an important book but what 
is more of historical importance is the political and 
•7 
intellectual climate of Europe that produced it. "The real 
politick of European statesmen exercised tremendous 
influence and Bismark was virtually an inspiration to the 
o 
intellectual and political founders of Zionism". 
The pogroms in Russia in 1881 were the second Eurc ->ean 
development which provided impetus to the Zionist idea. On 
account of these pogroms there was a mass exodus of Jews to 
other countries of Eastern and Western Europe. This was a 
vital reason for the failure of Haskalah assimilationist 
movement. It was substituted by the movement of 'Lovers of 
Zion' which was inspired by Leo Pinsker's pamphlet, 'Auto 
Emancipation'. Societies were formed in Jewish centres to 
chalk out a programme for the settlement of Jews in 
Palestine and to revive the Hebrew language. 
6. Ibid., p.13. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid.. pp.13-14. 
9. Ibid., p.14 
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The Jewish communities of capitalist Western Europe had 
already absorbed and accommodated themselves on account of 
the wave of emancipation in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Jews had been since then enjoying, equality as 
citizens of Judaic religion, but the new migrants from the 
East posed new problems. "Differing in culture, language and 
habits, and in general perceived as alien, the migrants 
posed a threat of social disruption and revival of anti-
Semitism" . The West European governments becaune 
apprehensive of the influences of the radical East European 
Jews. Similarly the assimilated Jews of Western Europe got 
threatened of the migrants who might jeopardizse thsir 
comfortable positions. However, the arrival of Eastern - aws 
did revive anti Semitism. A famous ultra-rich Jewish 
family of Rothchilds financed the Jewish settlements in 
Palestine to minimize Jewish immigration to Western Europe. 
Thus the feared rise of anti Semitism was averted and the 
Jewry was aligned to the imperialist interests in the Middle 
East.^2 
10. Davis, Mack & Davis, "Introduction" in Israel and the 
Palestinians (London, 1975), p. 4. 
11. Ibid.. p.14. 
12. Kayyali, n.5, p.14. 
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The Zionist effort in Palestine until now was the 
settlement of Jews for agricultural and religious purposes 
which was teirmed as 'Utopian Zionism' . It emphasized the 
need of agricultural settlements and at this stage its long 
1 3 term political aims were unclear. The Jewish Chronicle was 
established which later on became "an important vehicle for 
the popularization of Palestine colonization in Jewish 
circle".^^ 
The Zionist mechlirivvation can be summed in the 
following words: 
The Hebrew conquest of land, labour and means 
of production were the three pillars of the 
Zionist effort. On this premise, and under the 
leadership of Labour Zionism an exclusively 
Jewish economy and polity were established. 
Physical labour in the fields and factories 
was the bedrock of Labour Zionism. The native 
Palestinian Arabs, who would, otherwise have 
been the undisputed inheritors of the British 
as rulers of the country, were thus confronted 
with the increasing political challenge of the 
nascent Jewish Yishu in Palestine . *• 
13. Davis, n.l0, p.7. 
14. A. Taylor, The Zionist mind fBeirut. 1974), p.32 
15. Davis, n.l0, p.13. 
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Herzl 
If it was in Eastern Europe that conditions i;7ere ripe 
for Zionist movement and it was the 'Pale of Settlement' 
that continuously provided the membership of the movement, 
it was only in the Western Europe that conditions were 
congenial for a strategic political concept of Jewish 
nationalism. The concept of political Zionism evolved in 
Vienna which was then considered to be the metropolis of the 
16 19th century nationalist ferment. A young Jewish 
journalist from Vienna, Theodore Herzl, provided the 
political and organizational leadership of the new 
1 7 
movement. "Into the frustrated and hopeless lives of the 
'dreamers of the Ghetto' of Russia and Poland came the moat 
fantastic of them all Dr. Theodor Herzl, who became the 
founder of all absorbing dynamic political Zionism as a 
result of his own experience with anti-Semitism". 
16. Noah Lucas, The Modern History of Israel (London 1974), 
p.28. 
17. Kayyali, n.5, p.14. 
18. Moshe Menuhin, The Decadence of Judaism In Our limfi, 
(Beirut, 1969), p.31. 
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According to Carlyle Herzl was the "ablest, truest 
hearted, justest, noblest man". Herzl was most important 
and chief dispenser of the Jewish political and social 
ideas. It has been rightly said that Zionism as a true 
political movement and as an international force was to all 
intents and purposes his intention and his creation. 
Herzl had decided upon the idea of high politics (Hock 
politik) as an instrument to get his people a homeland. 
During his days in French parlisuaaent as a reporter he had 
learned much of the unethical art of European dipl'->macy 
practiced by the so-called statesman of that time. "As a 
journalist of high stature, he had every opportunity to 
learn about the prevalent international banditry, the gomes 
of colonialism, and the sanctimoniousness of the white man's 
burden"^^ 
The Jews always had awaited the advent of Messiah. That 
Herzl tried to portray himself as a Messiah cannot be 
19. Thomas Carlyle, Ihe Hero, as King. On Heroes> Hero 
Worship and the Heroic in History (London, 1962), VI, 
II, p.100. 
20. David Vital, The Origins of iianiam (Oxford. 1975), 
pp.234-35. 
21. Menuhin, n.l8, p.36. 
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exactly proved. But there are numerous evidences that he was 
well-versed in messianic legend and conscious of the fact 
that among his followers there were a few who were simple 
and naive who saw in him an anointed deliverer. Herzl had 
become curious when he heard in 1895 about Shabbetai Zevi of 
the seventeenth century who is famous in Jewish history as 
the False Messiah. He never confirmed or rejected when 
people drew parallel with him and Shabbetai. He wrote in his 
diary. "The difference between myself and Shabbetai Zevi 
(The way I imagine him), apart from the difference in the 
technical means inherent in the times, is that I, howe-'er, 
find the great small, as small as myself".^'^ A year b fore 
his death he visited Russia and there he said, "Our People 
believe that I am the Messiah, I myself do not know this, 
for I am no theologian' Herzl set out to translate the 
Messianic yearning of the Jews into territorial political 
claims. 
Doing something for the Jews and to rescue them from 
their pathetic condition had always obsessed Herzl and he 
22. Vital, n.20, p.244. 
23. Herzl Year Book, vii (New York, 1971), p.26. 
Q 
was very mi|ich aware of this fact that he was obsessed. 
However he a:^ way3 recognized this obsession as a source of 
strength 24 
'This obsession limited Herzl's vision and he 
suffered from narrowness and egocentricity. 
Herzl was too close to Eastern Europe (Jews 
and Gentiles) to be able to take a universal, 
objective and historical approach to the 
Dreyfus Affair and to the progressive 
advancing forces that fought against the 
26 forces of darkness he saw everywhere" Dr. 
Hezl was totally blind to the comprehensive, 
broad issues involved in the Dreyfus case.^ 
France in 1894 was on its way towards the goal of 
democracy when the Dreyfus Affair occurred. Dr«yfus was made 
24. Vital, n.20, p.244. 
25. It came to the knowledge of French General Staff in 
1894 that some highly secret documents hfid been stolen 
from their files and these documents have been sold to 
their potential enemy i.e. the Germens. Alfred Drefus 
who was a French Jewish Officer was arrested and 
charged of espionage without any proof except for some 
questionable papers later proved to be false. It was 
later proved that these papers were concocted and the 
mischief was done by the Anti Semites. 
26. Menuhin, n.l8, p.36. 
27. Ibid. 
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an scapegoat when the reactionaries temporarily gained an 
upper hand but, at last, they failed, when the democratic 
and l-'Heral values gained in str 3th and fought back to 
regain the lost ground. Emile Zola, who was a French 
inteile^' lal vindicated the name of Dreyfus while Jean 
Jaures exposed the forgeries, another French man Clemenceau 
in li .2 proved +hat Dreyfus was innocent and curtailed the 
right of the Catholic Congregations and the separation of 
the Church and the state was eifected. The issue involved in 
France was of democracy and it survived the storm against 
PR 
it. Emancipation had not failed rather it had workec '^^ 
Menuhin wrote: 
Herzl, the East European Jew, was unable 
to see that, any more than could the other 
'dreamers of the ghetto' who were born and 
reared in the darkn of Russia and Poland 
and who could not divest themselves of their 
frustrations and unqualified prejudices 
against the Gentile world. And Hess, the 
German Jew (Germany of those days was hardly a 
democracy) after losing one battle ov.xckly 
arrived at the conclusion that he haa lost the 
war.2^ 
2S, Ibid., p,37. 
29. Ibid. 
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Before the Dreyfus Affair Heral had thought of some 
other solution to the Jewish problem which was di:°ferent 
from "Jewish political nationalism". In 1695, he wrote in 
his diary in Paris, "Two years ago I wanted to solve the 
the Jewish question, ftt least in Austria, with the help of 
Catholic Church. I wished to arrange for an audience with 
the Pope and say to him 'Help us against anti-Semitism and I 
will lead a great movement for the free and honourable 
conversion of the Jews to Chiristianity". In broad day 
light, at twelve o'Clock a Sunday, the exchange of faith 
would take place in St. Stephen's Cathedral, with solemn 
parade and the peal of bell.^^ 
Socilism was another solution in Heral's mind. When L*.e 
Jews would become socialists there would emerge a movement 
which would fight the reactionary movements and anti 
Semitism. Later in 1895 Herzl discarded those views. He 
wrote, "The thought grew stronger within me that I would 
have to do something for the Jews. Throughout the two 
thousand years of our dispersion, we have lacked unified 
political leadership I consider this our great misfortune. 
It has done us more harm tiian all the persecutions." 
30. Mervin Lowenthal, The Diariea of Theodor H&rzl (Trans). 
(New York, 1966), p.$6. 
31. Ibid., p.36. 
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Heral's Political Personality: Herzl, as a matter of fact, 
was not familiar with the Jewish Question before he set out 
to find an answer to it. He had not heard of 'Lovers of 
Zion' until he had formulated his own ideas and chalked out 
a plan for its execution. He came into contact with those 
Jews who had first hand knowledge of "Jewish social scene' 
only when ?ie had come out to gather followers for his own 
op 
plans". Herzl did not regret, for not reading Pinsker's 
Auto Emancipation earlier. He wrote, that if he had read it 
perhaps he would have abandoned his own undertaking.^^ He 
had not cared to go through Rome and Jerusalem until 18£4. 
Only in May 1901 on a long train journey he finally read the 
book. He wrote, "Everything that we have tried is already in 
this book. The only bothersome thing is his Hegetian 
terminology. Wonderful the Spinozistic Jewish and national 
elements. Since Spinoza Jewry had brought forth no greater 
spirit than this forgotten, faded Moses Hess".^^ Herzl, 
according to Cleraenceau, was a man of action. "He 
32. Vital n.20, p.247 
33. Ibid 
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid. 
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distrusted subtlety, intricacy, verbal agility, compromise, 
demands for caution, concern for the views of others at the 
expense of one's own, and other such qualities that tend to 
obstruct rapid progress tov;'ards a stated goal." 
He did not agree that antecedence in publication 
bestows any kind of privilege or authority. He noted in his 
diary, "This Bimbaum who had deserted Zionism for socialism 
three years before I appeared on the scene, poses 
obstrusively as my 'predecessor. In his brazen begging 
letters which he wrote me and others, he sets himself as the 
discoverer and founder of Zionism because he has written a 
pamphlet like many another since Pinsker (whom, after all, I 
had not read either)".^^ 
Herzl gave a definite shape to his plan during the 
spring of 1895 and the winter of that year, a span of nine 
months. This plan required a large amount of finance and 
that was the reason why he turned towards the "two pillars 
of Jewish enterprise and wealth". Baron de Hersch and the 
Rothschild family. *^^ 
37. Ibid. 
38. Ibid. p.248. 
39. Ibid. p.248-49 
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Herzl did meet, Hersch. He tried to make him aware of 
the lack of Jewish political leadership and pointed out to 
him the problems of the Jewish people. The meeting with 
Hersch turned out to be a Fiasco. Herzl from now onwards did 
not consider him an ally. He also wrote a letter to the 
head of the Vienna branch of Rothschild family, Baron 
Albert, when he was still in Paris. He wrote, " I shall cotae 
to the point without preliminaries. I have composed a 
memorandum about the Jewish question for the German Kaiser. 
If you would like to know what is in the document, I shall 
read it to you. If not, it will be quite sufficient for you 
to return this letter to me".*^ Herzl waited for an answer 
and counted on July 4, "Albert R's reply, which was due 
today, has not come. Fortunately I did not degrade myself by 
42 
excessive courtesy in my letter" 
Herzl left Paris at the end of July. He by now had 
started suffering from inner tensions. He noted, "I am 
shunning all my acquaintances. They tread on my toes, having 
no idea of the world I come form; this makes daily living 
40. Ibid., p.249. 
41. Ibid., p.250. 
42. Ibid. 
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4 O 
terribly irritating* The number of men with whom he found 
himself in tune even on the general issue of the condition 
of Jewry was tiny. 
Herzl came across one notable person who some how or 
the other shared Herzl's views. He was Maz Nordau. Nordau 
was a physician and eleven years elder to Herzl. He had 
gained for himself immense literary reputation as an author 
of a number of volumes in which he had exposed the 
contemporary European society for its hypocrisies. When he 
read the address Nordan was enthralled. In a state of 
excitement he told Herzl, "If you are mad we are mad 
together: Count on me, I am with you!" Since then Nordan 
remained Herzl's most close associate. Herzl, while 
discussing the Jewish question with Nordan, wrote in his 
diary, "Each took the words right out of the other's mouth. 
I never had such a strong feeling that we belonged 
together" '^  But Herzl kept his own counsel as far as the 
solution to the Jewish question was concerned. He even did 
not take Nordan into confidence. 
43. Ibid-, p.251. 
44. Howard M. Sacher, A History of Israel (Oxford, 1977), 
p.37. 
45. Vital, n.20. pp.252-54. 
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Herzl, in November 1895 took a brief journey to Paris, 
to London and again to Paris. This was for him decisive and 
vital. He was exposed to intelligentia of these advanced 
cities. In Paris he met Zodoc Kohen the chief Rabbi, three 
times. He read to him his 'address to the Rothschild where 
he had carefully eliminated all the references to the 
family. The chief Rabbi brought others to meet him. He was 
listened to attentively and impressed a number of important 
people. Zodoc Kohan suggested that Herzl should read his 
text to Edraond de Rothschild. Herzl remarked, "would n't 
dream of it".'*^  
Herzl met an important person in London. He was 
Zangwill. The latter was a well known name among the English 
Jewish intelligentia. His work Children of the Ghetto (182) 
had already made its literary reputation. He welcomed Herzl 
in England and arranged for him a series of meetings. Herzl 
met and discussed the Jewish question with important 
personalities like Asher Myers who was the editor, of Jewish 
Chronicle, Herman Alder, the Chief Rabbi Goldsmid and Sir 
Samuel Montague. The last was the banker and member of 
Parliament and was the most importaint contact of all. Herzl 
46. Ibid.. p.256 
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was also introduced "bo the Maccabians by Zangwill. Maccabean 
was a Jewish society whose members were authors, artists and 
47 professional and those who did not indulge in commerce. 
London proved to be very hospitable to Herzl. People 
listened to him politely and with interest. Montague, though 
did not commit himself to Herzl's plan, was sympathetic and 
friendly. Herzl won a fried in Goldsmid. The editor of the 
Jewish Chronicle asked for prepublication a summary of his 
pamphlet. Herzl had enough good reason to be pleased. 
The Jewish Chronicle on January 17, 1896 published a 
resume, which titled "A Solution to the Jewish Problem'. 
This was followed by an editorial comment It wrote, "We 
hardly anticipate a great future for a scheme which is the 
outcome of despair " 
Herzl found the only encouragement from some German 
students who came to invite him to a meeting of this 
47. Ibid., pp.256-57 
48. Ibid., p.257. 
49. Ibid., p.258. 
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society. They fired him with many questions like, 'A regular 
state? A real state with its own laws, inhabited, governed, 
and administered by Jews? 
Der Judenstaat 
The fundamental concepts regarding Herzl's thought and 
Zionist outlook are in his Der Judenstaat. ^ Der Judenstaat 
consists of 30,000 words. Its language is simple and 
appealing and the author seems to be intent an getting it 
read. The very first sentence of Judenstaat reads, "The idea 
which I have developed in this pamphlet is a very old one: 
It is the restoration of the Jewish state.^^ Der Judenstaat 
does not appeal to pathos. He says, : I do not intend to 
arose sympathetic emotions on our behalf. That would be 
foolish, futile and undignified proceeding".^ He warned the 
Assimilationist Jews in these words, "Whoever would attempt 
to convert the Jew into a husbands man (i.e. Baron de 
Hersch) would be making an extra-ordinary mistake. "^ * 
50. Erwin Rosenberger, Herzl. As I Remember Him. (New York, 
1959), p.14. 
51. Kayyali, n.5, p.16. 
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Britain, 1970), p.22. 
53. 'The Jewish State' document, 3; as quoted in Vital, 
n.20, p.260. 
54. Ibid., p.260. 
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Herzl has made every effort 'to drive home the point 
that his pamphlet was down to earth, sensible and feasible 
plan. It was not an Utopia. The misery of the Jews was the 
propelling force. The problem was always to show how it 
could be set in motion. 
He said: 
The (organised and self initiated) 
departure of the Jews will involve no economic 
disturbance, no crisis, no persecutions; in 
fact, the countries they abandon will revive 
to a new period of prosperity. There will be 
an inner migration of Christian citizens into 
the portions evacuated by Jews ... The Jews 
will leave as honoured friends; and if some of 
them returned, they will receive hands of 
civilized nations as is accorded to all 
foreign visitors. 
Herzl traces the source of Jewish question to the 
bitter subjection and suppression of Jews in all countries 
where they lived. According to him the pressure on the Jews 
varied from place to place and from time to time but the 
55. Ibid. 
56. Salvie d' Avigdor, The Jewish State (trans), (1896), 
revised trans, Israel Cohen (1934) 'Introduction', as 
quoted by Vital n.20, p.261. 
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phenomenon was a general one. Among the Jews in economically 
upper classes it caused discomfort, in middle classes 
continual and grave anxieties, in our lower classes absolute 
despair. The nations in whose midst the Jews lived were all 
either covertly or openly optimistic Herzl was not 
interested in the causes of anti Semitism. He dealt briefly 
with the rise of anti-Semitism and did not appear to sound 
very scientific. It's remote cause according to him was the 
loss of the power of assimilation of the Jews during the 
middle ages; it's immediate cause was excessive production 
of mediocre intellectuals who could not find a social and 
economic outlet downwards and upwards."^ 
PLAN: Herzl says: "My plan is simple in design but 
complicated in execution". The plan consisted of two parts: 
Assumption of responsibility for Jewish national officers by 
a political body of to be called 'The Society of Jews'; and 
management of both the exodus of the Jews and their 
resettlement by a technical body to b.e called the Jewish 
Company. 
57. The Jewish State. Chapter 2 as cited by Vital, n.20, 
p.262. 
58. Kayyali, n.5, p.15. 
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The first was to contact the relevant governments end 
seek to obtain their consent for the attainment of Jewish 
sovereignty 'over a neutral piece of land, and then 
administer the territory as a provisional government. The 
second was to take form of a chartered company, established 
in London under English Law. The company would have to be 
provided with handsome working capital and would take care 
of the liquidation of the migrants property in their 
countries of origin. In exchange it would provide land, 
housing, and employment in the new country, . It was to 
promote industry and commerce. Herzl was to promote industry 
and commerce. Herzl has devoted longest chapter to this 
Jewish company in his Der Judenstaat.^^ 
He describes the plan of the migration of Jews in 
details, the method through which they will be provided with 
a new home "not by dragging them ruthlessly out of then 
substaining soil, but rather by transplanting them carefully 
to better ground. The bright young and ambitious 
professionals will be allocated by the opportunities 
provided by the society, and the company and they will draw 
the others after them. 
59. Vital, n.20, p.263. 
60. The Jewish State. Chapter 3, as quoted by Vital, p.264. 
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Herzl in his Der Judenstaat, elaborated the functions 
of the 'Society of Jews' which happened to be the organ of 
the national movement. He emphasized the importance of the 
society that had to be created before ail. The society would 
consist of active Jews who would be no secret members of it 
and would be endowed with the power of negotiation with 
other governments to foster its aim and objective. He 
wrote, "The Jewish people are at present prevented ... from 
conducting their political affairs themselves. Besides, they 
are in a condition of more or less severe distress in many 
parts of the world. They need, above all a gestor. This 
gestor cannot of course be a single individual. Such a one 
would either make himself ridiculous or seeing that he would 
appear to be working for his own interests contemptible. The 
gestor for the Jews must therefore be a corporate body, And 
op 
that is the society of Jews". 
It would not be sufficient for the Society to enter 
into negotiations with other governments but it would also 
work for the promotion of the study of the demography, 
economic resources, and public opinion of the Jews. The 
61. Vital, n.20, p.264. 
62. The Jewish State. Chapter 3, as quoted by Vital, p.265, 
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Society would form a nucleus around which the public 
institution of the Jewish state would later develop. Finally 
the Society would take up the issue where the Jews were to 
migrate. He discussed the question where the Jews were to 
migrate to "Shall we choose Palestine or Argentina? We shall 
take what is given us, and what is selecte4 by Jewish public 
CO 
opinion. The Society will determine both these points." 
Herzl had the clear cut idea what the Jews would have 
to give in return. He believed the Society of Jews, with the 
Jewish 'power of the purse' at its command would be able to 
grant financial advantages to the receiving - not in the 
form of a regular tribute but in the form of loans. He 
speculated, "Supposing his Majesty the Sultan were to give 
us Palestine we could in return undertake to regulate the 
whole finance of Turkey." He was of the opinion that the 
entry of the Jews into their new country would 'divert 
streams of wealth' to tVie entire region, and precipitate 'an 
unprecedented commercial prosperity al around It was 
63. Theodore Heral, "On the founding of a Jewish Nation", 
in Justus Buchler and Sterning p. Lamprecht (ed.) in 
Religions of the World. (U.S.A. 1967), p.388. 
64. Raphael Patai, (ed.), and Harry John( (Trans) Diarieg 
of Theodor Herzl. (New York and London, 1960), p.213. 
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his belief that all states would benefit, both those which 
the Jews would leave and those into whose neighborhood they 
would arrive. ^ 
Herzl had indeed pondered over Erez Israel as a most 
adequate land for Jews to settle. He mentioned, "It would 
have in its favour the facts that it is the unforgotten 
ancestral seat of our people, that its name would constitute 
a programme, and that it would powerfully attract the lower 
masses". However, on the practical level Herzl never had a 
special choice though he had the realization that in 
Palestine modern Jews would find it difficult to settle as 
it was a country where modern economic technique could not 
be easily applied and that it was too close to Europe for 
his taste. ^"^  
The subject of Erez Israel was delicate and he 
reconsidered his views. Putting aside his earlier 
reservations he wrote, "It is more and more to the interest 
of the civilized nations and of civilization in general that 
65. Vital, n.20, p.265. See also Justus Buchler and 
Sterning Lamprecht, Religions of the World (U.S.A., 
1967), p.367. 
66. Kayyali, n.5, p.16. 
67. Vital, n.20, p.266. 
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a cultural station be established on the shortest road to 
Asia. Palestine is this station and we Jews are the bearers 
of culture who are ready to give our property and our lives 
to bring about this creation." 
It is not strange for the Zionists to call themselves 
the most cultured people. They were through their scheme 
arrogating to themselves the task of civilizing the world a 
further stage in the 'White mans burden'. It is surprising 
that Zionists were destroying Palestine and its people by 
establishing a Jewish state there, and yet they called it a 
civilizing mission. They stood the human values on their 
head and they showed the least sensitivity to the 
Palestinians. Herzl justified the choice of Palestine on the 
vague and spurious historical claim. He wrote, "Palestine is 
our over - memorable historic home. The very name of 
Palestine would attract our people with a force of marvelous 
potency." 
68. Quoted in Jansen, Zionism, p.83, as quoted by Kayyali, 
n.5, p.16. 
69. The Jewish State, Chapter-2, as quoted by Vital n.20, 
p.267. See also James W. Dye and W.H. Forthman (ed.) in 
Religious of the World, p.368. 
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The primary purpose of 'Der Judenstaat' was tactical to 
make the issue public and to draw new allies After the 
publication of the pamphlet he wrote to colonel Goldsmid: 
The essay I have published has gained me the 
greatest of hatreds and the warmest of 
friendships. The Zionists of Veinna and 
Berlin have proclaimed their enthusiasm for 
my plan. The money men praise and denounce me 
in the sharpest possible may. The anti Semites 
treat me fairly. At all events, the discussion 
is now open and, it seems, will soon reach the 
71 parliaments. 
The response of the important personalities and general 
non-Jewish public was cool towards Der Judenstaat. The 
subject received a very moderate response in the press. 
Heral's own and most prominent newspaper in Veinna did not 
mention his pamphlet and his activities. The German and 
Austrian newspapers came out with unfriendly comments. The 
Jewish Chronicle ignored Herzl and supported Hersch, for 
Hersch confined his activities among Russian Jewry. It also 
felt that the absence of religious element in the scheme 
70. Vital, n.20. p.267. 
71. 27 February 1896, Igrot, II, n.44, p.66; as quoted by 
Vital, n.20, p.267. 
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"rendered it cold and uninviting". The chronicle rejected 
Herzl's theory that wherever Jews lived there was anti 
Semitism. Baron de Hitsch did not react nor did the 
Rothschilds. "^ 2^ 
All in all, Des Judenstaat made few converts to his 
cause. Max Nordan on 26 February wrote to Herzl, "I have 
read your Judenstaat twice. This is only my impression very 
briefly: From an objective point of view the pamphlet can be 
discussed from several aspects. From a subjective point of 
view it is, simply great It was particular courage to 
have admitted to feelings that other Jews had pushed back 
into the depths of their unconscious. What will come of the 
pamphlet I do not know; but that you have revealed yourself 
in it, that I do know" "^  
Basle Congress 
"The idea of calling a general assembly of Zionists 
crops up in Herzl's correspondence and his diary almost 
72. Jewish Chronicle, 24 April, 1896; as quoted by Vital 
n.20, p.269. 
73. S. Schwartz (ed.), Max Nordau Peigrotar, (Jerusalem, 
1944), app. V, n.2, p.295. As quoted by Vital, n.20, 
p.269. 
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immediately after his return to Vienna from his journey to 
7 A 
the (evant and to London and Paris". However he had no 
idea as to how he would translate this plan into action, 
nor had he the organisational detail. He was inclined to 
Zodoc Kahn's idea of a secret conference of eminent leaders. 
By the time the conference could be convened Herzl wanted to 
gain some diplomatic success to attract attention towards 
this meeting. He wanted to involve masses and arouse 
public opinion and wanted to keep a public congress a weapon 
in reserve. This idea had taken a firm root in his mind and 
he started pondering over it concretely. However, Herzl 
moved patiently. 
With the dashing of virtually all other expectations, 
and in a state of utter depression, the idea of a Congress 
76 
set upon his mind in January 1897. ° He had started 
referring to the Congress in his correspondence and in his 
diary in a definite way at the same time. He wrote to De 
Hass his chief contact in England, "I intended to call a 
74. Letter from Wolffshn to Herzl. 10 August, 1896, C.Z.A, 
II, VIII, 940/5; as quoted by Vital, n.20, p.328. 
75. Diaries 11, p.447; as quoted by Vital, n.20, p.328. 
76. Letters from Herzl to Stand: 18 November 1896, Igrot, 
II, n.l60, pp.171-2; as cited by Vital, n.20, p.328. 
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general assembly of Zionists in Switzerland this summer and 
started giving the matter a moderate preliminary 
77 publicity". 
On March 7,1897, a decision to convene a Zionist 
Congress was taken during a two-day conference of a group of 
Lovers of Zion from Berlin. Herzl was there with his 
associates from Austria to chalk out a plan for a 
cooperative working relationship with the Berlin circle. 
Willy Bambus was the leader of this Berlin circle, he was a 
leading personality of 'Esra' a society founded to 
facilitate and encourage the settlement of the Russian Jews 
in Eres-Israel."^^ 
The decision to call the Congress was a historic 
decision. It was not a difficult task set by Herzl to his 
friends which could not be attained. It was a task for which 
Herzl himself was best suited. He was gifted by the art of 
persuasiveness, sense of theatre and experience of the 
workings of the French parliament. He was from the very 
77. Letters from Herzl to Stand: 18 February 1897, Igrot, 
II, n.l93, p.205; Diaries, II, p.517; as cited by 
Vital, n.20, p.329. 
78. Ibid., n.20, p.329. 
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beginning quite clear about his aims. The Congress had to 
"be a glorious demonstration to the world of what Zionism is 
and of what it wants". Apart from that, its immediate 
business was to make a unified Zionist movement possible. ^  
Herzl never again looked upon those like Edmond de 
Rothschild who earlier had paid no heed to his ideas. The 
Congress had to be a manifestation of public rebellion 
against the well-established secular leadership of Jewry. 
Herzl did try to win over those like Goldsmid who were on 
the margin of opposition to him The western Jews in majority 
responded to the proposal of the Congress outrageously 
though the Austro-Hungarian Zionists convention endorsed the 
proposal for convening an international congress. 
There followed a mixed reaction. German newspapers came 
out with editorials condemning the proposed Zionist 
Congress as antinational and against the basic tenets of 
Judaism. The B'nai Brith Lodge of Munich called upon the 
Jews not to extend any cooperation to Herzl. A letter issued 
79. Letters from Herzl to Bentwich. 9 March 1897, Igrot, 
II, n.l99, p.212; as cited by Vital n.20, pp.332-33. 
80. Sacher, n.44, p.44. 
81. Ibid. 
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by "the executive committee of the association of German 
Rabbis expressed its sentiment against Zionism as follows: 
The Association of Rabbis in Germany regards it as 
proper to make the following explanations: 
1. The efforts of so-called Zionists to found a Jewish 
national state in Palestine contradict the messianic 
promises of Judaism as contained in the Holy Writ and in 
later religious sources. 
2. Judaism obligates its adherents to serve with all 
devotion the fatherland to which they belong, and to further 
its national interests with all their strength Religion 
and patriotism both lay upon us the duty of asking all who 
are concerned with the welfare of Judaism to stay away from 
the above mentioned Zionists endeavors and most particularly 
from the Congress which is still being planned, despite all 
on 
the warning against it. 
But the correspondent of Ha-Magid wrote, "If the 
assembly were to bring some unity to the movement then 
surely it was to be welcomed".""^ The newspaper Ha-Zefira 
wrote, Nothing comparable had been attempted since the 
82. Ibid. 
83. Ha-Magid, 21 April 1897; as quoted by Vital, n.20, p.341 
32 
movement had begun and we were entitled to see it as a good 
augury, the beginning of redemption for at last the many 
needs of our people have assumed a concrete form.... and the 
Jewish question on which all had trodden .... will now be 
discussed in public by the wise and the eminent". '^  
There were also private reactions which were mixed in 
nature. A few of the veterans became quick convert to the 
idea. Lillienblum felt about-Hersl to be a man who wanted to 
involve Western Jewry in the re-establishment of Yishuv in 
Erez Israel. He wondered, "could such a one be turned 
or 
down"^^ Ahad-Ha' am did not oppose the Congress but was not 
Rfi 
optimistic about it and could see little coming out of it. 
But nothing deterred Herzl to forge ahead. Herzl 
refused to compromise over the nature of the Congress. The 
site of the Congress was fixed at Basle in Switzerland. It 
Of 
was the only compromise Herzl was ready to make. The 
Jewish Chronicle had called the whole affair Dr. Herzl's 
88 Congress' 
84. Ha-Zefira, 5 May 1897, as quoted by Vital n.20, p.341 
85. Vital, n.20, pp.341-42. 
86. Ibid., p.347. 
87. Sacher, n.44, p.44. 
88. Vital, n.20, p.344. 
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The first Zionist Congress held at Basle was an 
unprecedented event. An air of uncerteinty was lurking among 
the delegates. The arrangement was perfect and well thought 
out and Herzl was determined to leave a strong and lasting 
impression. The agenda was provided before hand and the 
participants were provided with a budge bearing the 
inscription. 'The establishment of a Jewish state is the 
only possible solution to the Jewish Question. 
The Congress opened on Sunday morning, 29 August 1897, 
in the Concert Hall of the Basle Cassino. Herzl had insisted 
on the delegates attending the opening session to wear 
formal dress, tails and white ties. A modern Zionist flag 
was hanging at the building entrance. 
The Congress at Basle was attended by 200 to 250 people 
representing twenty four states and territories. The 
participants were an assembly of educated, middle class 
Jews: businessmen, industrialists, financiers, men of 
letters, members of professions and students. There were 
also eleven Rabbis. Overwhelmingly they were liberal and 
modernist in their social and religious tendencies. Very few 
89. Ibid., p.354. 
90. Ibid., p.354. 
34 
of "the participants were men of repute outside the Jewry. 
Only Nordan had an international reputation. The veterans 
from Russia and Poland - Mandelstamn, Ahad Ha'am, Sokolov, 
Ussekhin - were decidedly among the most powerful and 
interesting personalities present. 
It was Heral and Nordan who delivered the two key 
speeches the one made a brief restatement of the rationale, 
purposes and method of political Zionism, and the other gave 
an analysis of its sources in the contemporary social 
op 
conditions of the Jews. 
When Herzl rose to speak he was greeted by a 
thunderous ovation. Ben Ami, one of the Russian delegates 
remarked; Hail to the king' It was an appellation Herzl 
would not ?iave disdained. ^'^  
Heral said, "We are here to lay the foundation stone of 
the house which is to shelter the Jewish nation", He added, 
"Anti Semitism has given us our strength again. We have 
returned home .... Zionism is the return of the Jews to 
Judaism even before their return to the Jewish land. "He 
91. Ibid., p.358-59. 
92. Ibid., p.360. 
93. Sacher, n.44, p.45. 
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explained that the Congress would take up the task and take 
recourse to "the spiritual means of revising and nursing the 
Jewish national consciousness". He pointed out the 
inadequacy of the piecemeal colonization in Palestine which 
did not have the international legal sanction Herzl's 
address was impressive, temperate and restrained. Nordan 
spoke about the sad conditions of East European Jewry. He 
also analysed the failure of emancipation and the dilemma of 
Western European Jewry in social and political affairs. He 
described the West European Jews as the race of new 
Marranos. Nordau declared, "It is a great sin to let a race 
whose abilities even -its worst enemies do not deny, 
degenerate in intellectual and physical misery .... The 
misery of the Jews cries out for help. The finding of that 
or 
help will be the great task of this Congress." 
The Congress continued for three days and after that it 
constituted for itself a number of organisations to promote 
its aims and objectives. A permanent Zionist organisation of 
the Jewish Society on the lines of Herzl's essay was 
constituted. There had to be a General Council which would 
94. Ibid. 
95. Ibid. 
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perform "the function of the Executive of the Zionist 
organisation and would be known as 'Greater Action 
Committee'. It would comprise of representatives of the 
numerous national Zionists' federations; and a Central 
Executive (a "Smaller Actions Committee") whose members all 
lived in Veinna. Those who agreed with the Basle programme 
could become members by paying the annual fee of a 'Sheket', 
an ancient Hebrew coin which was equivalent to a single 
Austrian Schilling. Herzl was the unanimous for the 
President of the Zionist Organisation. The discussion 
finally ended with the singing of a Hebrew anthen "Ha 
Tikvah" (The Hope), written by Nephtali Imber, and a vote of 
thanks to Herzl. Herzl wrote afterwards, 'If I were to sum 
up the Basle Congress in a single phrase which I would not 
dare to make public, I would say in Basle 'I created the 
96 Jewish state' ".^" 
The key provision of the Congress stated, "The aim of 
Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in 
Palestine secured by public law"^' A reading of Herzl's 
96. Ibid. 
97. Sokolov, 268; as quoted by W.T. Mallison, Jr., "Claims 
to Constitute the Jewish People" in J.N. Moore (ed.) Xhfi 
Ay^b layaeli Cgn^list (New Jersey, 1974), Vol.1, pp.101-
2. 
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Diaries as well as an examination of subsequent Zionists' 
action would reveal that the term "public law" refers 
nothing but to the patronage of the imperialist powers 
He envisaged that the European powers would back Zionism for 
one of the three main motives: 
1. Imperialist self interest; 
2. Ridding themselves of Jews and antisemitism (in west 
European case avoiding the influx of Jewish immigrants from 
Eastern Europe) and 
3. Using organised Jewish influence to combat revolutionary 
movements and other internal factors. 
Four means were adopted to obtain this objective: 
(i) The programmatic encouragement of the settlement of 
Palestine with Jewish agricultural workers, laborers and 
artisans. 
(ii) The unification and organisation of all Jewry into 
local and general groups in accordance with the laws of 
respective country. 
(iii) The strengthening of Jewish self awareness and 
national consciousness. 
98. Kayyali, n.5, p.17 
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(iv) The preparation of activity for obtaining the 
consent of the various governments, necessary for the 
fulfillment of the aims of Zionism. 
These means were the same as Herzl had formulated in 
his pamphlet Der Judenstaat. The only change occurred when 
the word "Home"was substituted for the word "state". The 
change in terminology was a conscious attempt to appeal to 
those Jews who had a sentimental cultural or religious 
attachment to Palestine. These were the Jews who had been 
opposing the concept of Jewish nationality or Jewish 
qq 
state. Herzl was convinced that his supporters will not 
find it difficult in meaning it "Jewish State " in any 
case.100 
"This calculated ambivalence concerning a 
central element of the Zionist political 
programme aided Herzl in obtaining support for 
Zionism. Succeeding Zionist leaders have 
consistently used this technique of calculated 
ambiguity in terminology in order to enhance 
Zionist appeal among those opposed to Zionist 
nationality concept", ^^ 
99. Alan R. Taylor, Prelude to Israel: An Analysis of 
Zionist Diplomacy 1897-1947 (Beirut, 1959), p.5. 
100. Ibid., p.6. 
101. W.T. Mallison, n.97, p.102. 
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The first president of the Zionist Congress Theodor 
Herzl started translating the programmes of Basle Congress 
into action First of all he met with Kaiser Wilhelm 11, uho 
was on a tour of Ottoman Empire. Herzl discussed with him 
the opening of a land development comvany under the 
protection of Germany operated by Zionists in Palestine. At 
first the Kaiser showed some inclination in favour of the 
proposal but rejected it in the second meeting.^^ 
Herzl managed to approach directly to the Sultan of 
Turkey. He put forward in May 1901 his proposal of Zionist 
immigration to Palestine and in return he promised that the 
Zionists would take care of the financial problems of 
Turkey. The Sultan, howaver, did not agree to this idea 
of mass immigration to Palestine.^^^ 
The Zionist executive body then turned towards Great 
Britain in October 1902 to seek from them a chunk of Sinai 
Peninsula for immigration and settlement. During the 
interview with Chamberlain in October 1902, Herzl's voice 
102. Tayler, n.99, p.7. 
103. Ibid. 
104. Ibid. 
105. Ibid., pp.7-8. 
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trembled as he explained his proposal for an Anglo-Zionist 
partnership which involved colonial concessions for the Jews 
in Cyprus, el-Arish and the Sinai Peninsula to serve as a 
"rallying point for the Jewish people in the vicinity of 
Palestine" Herzl tried to convince Chamberlain and Lord 
Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, that by supporting the 
Zionist attempts the British Empire would gain not only a 
rich colony but also ten million Jews. He wrote: 
Will all wear England in their hearts if 
through such a deed it becomes the protective 
power of the Jewish people. At one stroke 
England will get ten million secret but loyal 
subjects active in all walks of life all over 
the world. At a signal, all of them will place 
themselves at the service of the magnanimous 
nation that brings long desired help .... 
England will get ten million agents for her 
greatness and her influence. And effect of 
this sort of thing usually spreads from the 
political to the economic. •^'^  
106. Patai (ed.). Diaries. p.1362; as quoted by Kayyali, 
n.b, p.18. 
107. Ibid-
108. Ibid. 
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The above collusion between Zionism ad imperialism was 
too clear to be commented on. An Arab wrioer said, "Herein 
lies the Zionist quid pro quo: for the power that undertakes 
to be universal protector they offer the Jews as universal 
agents and the Jewish settler state as a cl'.ent". 
Negotiations broke down» but in 1903 the British 
government offered the Zionist organisation the opportunity 
to colonize a portion of Uganda. 
Herzl somehow reconciled to Uganda offer but no 
concrete action was taken upon it. The plan was abandoned 
after Herzl's death in 1904.^^*^ 
In view of the subsequent Zionist emphasis upon 
Palestine the Uganda proposal may appear to be surprising. 
It is significant as an indication of the secular and 
political character of the Zionist movement. The search for 
the territory elsewhere when the Palestine objective was 
frustrated reveals the lack of strong cultural and religious 
ties to Palestine. Only J^t a later stage, did the emotional 
109. Ibid. 
110. Taylor, n.99, p.8. 
iZ 
attachment of the Zionist movement to Palestine became so 
great that no other territory would be considered. 
As far as public international law was concerned 
Zionism did not gain any recognition at the beginning of the 
world Wart I. The Zionist Organisation wej working and had 
entered ir^ to negotiations with many governments. However, 
the mere conduct of such negotiations gave some recognition 
to the Zionist Organisation as an international public body. 
"Nevertheless, the negotiations brought no practical 
political results for either the Organisation or its claimed 
national entity, "The Jewish people""^  ^  
The great conception of Herzsl, the gigantic enthusiasm 
of the Basle Congress antl the untiring efforts of the 
founder of political Zionism appeared to have fizzled out by 
the beginning of the World War I. It appears that if the War 
had not taken place with all its schemes on the part of the 
Allied Powers, and the situations created during and after 
the War, political Zionism would have died. The War, the 
intensified imperialist drive in West Asia and the winning 
ill. Ibid., n.97, p.103. 
112. Ibid. 
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over of the West European Jews and many others, who were 
reluctant at the beginning, brought a new batch of East 
European Jewish leaders, less imaginative but more 
pragmatist than Herzl, to the forefront. T ley furthered the 
idea of Herzl and through a long, concerted and 
internationally orchestrated propaganda and effort, 
ultimately got Israel, which appeared to be an impossible 
and fantastic proposition at the beginning. 
CHAPTER-II 
44 
THE ZIONIST GOALS 5MD ACTIVITIES AFTER HBRZL 
Zionism split into two factions after the death of 
Herzl in 1904, One supported Herzl's view that the main 
problem was that of international sanction and the 
achievement, . of an immediate solution to the Jewish 
Question. The solution of the problem either lay in 
Palestine or somewhere else. This group caFj to be known as 
that of the 'Politicals'. The other faction, strongly 
influenced by the cultural revivalism of the 'Lovers of Zion 
Societies, rejected the idea of the building of a Jewish 
home or a nation in any place other than Palestine. These 
people were referred to as the 'practicals'. The practicals 
demonstrated greater show of strength at the seventh Zionist 
Congress in 1905. A resolution was adopted in which it was 
declared that Zionism was concerned solely with Palestine.^ 
The titles attached to these w^o groups were of the time of 
Uganda proposal but they are misleading. Both the factions 
drew their strength from political Zionism. The only 
difference was , while one emphasized legalization the other 
stressed colonization of Palestine, and this was historical 
cultural romanticism. Eventually, the two trends political 
realism and romantic nationalism were to merge and form one 
1- Fanny Fern Andrews, Ihe Usilz Land Under Mandate 
(Cambridge, 1931), 1, p.316. 
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platform. Later, the third element of the programme, i.e. 
the rallying of world Jewry to the cause, was to become a 
major Zionist concern in view of the fact that in 1914 only 
13,000 of the 13,000,000 million Jews in the world were 
Zionists.^ 
Consequently Herzl's three point programme, namely, (1) 
the promotion of an organized, large-scale Jewish 
colonization of Palestine, (2) the acquisition of an 
internationally recognized legal right to colonize 
Palestine, and (3) the formation of a perroanent organisation 
to unite all Jews in the cause of Zionism, held together. 
From 1905 to 1914, colonization of Palestine continued 
gradually and, at the outbreak of World War I, fifty nine 
Jewish colonies with some 12,000 inhabitants existed in 
Palestine. There was also a group of Jews who attached 
greater importance to political recognition. These Jews 
moved to England in search of sympathetic support.'^  
2. Joseph M.N. Jeffries, Palestine: the Reality (London, 
1939), p.38. 
3. The ESCO Foundation for Palestine, Palestine, a Study of 
Jewish. Arab and British Policies (New Haven, 1947), 1, 
p. 40. 
4. Andrews, n.l, p.321. 
5. Chain Weizmann, Trial and Error (New York, 1949), p.93. 
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Zionist Diplomacy and World War I: 
Heral had regarded England as a potential ally of 
Zionism. After Herzl's death, the interest of Zionists in 
England increased over the decade. This interest 
intensified. The Zionists were quick to perceive that 
England could be helpful in what had been till now a futile 
search for unlimited immigration into Palestine and that the 
establisl-unent of a recognized and legalized Zionist 
political status could now be successful. Immediately, 
England became the uppermost concern of the Zionist 
organization. 
Chaim Weizmann was a Russian Jew and Chemist by 
profession. He moved to England in 1904. He was destined to 
become the new leader of the Zionist movement. Weizmann had 
the conviction that British were the most promising 
potential sympathizers of Zionism. He, in 1905, initiated a 
diplomatic offensive for establishing a rapport with British 
politicians. He met Arthur Balfour and later Balfour 
recalled WeizmcUin, as "the man who made me a Zionist" . 
6. Nahum Sokoiow, History of Zionism. 1600-1916 (London, 
1919), 1, p.44. 
7. Christopher Sykes, Two Studies in VirtuQ (New York, 
1953), pp.165. 
8. Meyer w. Wesgai ( e d . ) , Ciiaiffl Wejamann. Stat«?sman, 
S c i e n t i s t . and Bu i lde r of t h e Jewish Commonwealth (New 
York, 1944), p . 1 3 1 . 
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Weizmann, initially a member of the 'practical' faction 
of the Zionist Organization was the chief dispenser of 
q 
fusion of the factions within political Zionism. The 
deadlock between the 'politicals' and the 'practicals' had 
been broken at the Eighth Congress in 1907, ^  and, with the 
advent of the World War I, Weizmann's 'organic' Zionism 
became predominant. The three point programme of Herzl i.e. 
organization, recognition and colonization, gained in 
prominence, and the 'synthesis', as it is sometimes called, 
was symbolized in the person of Dr. Weizmann Weizmann had a 
developed sense of the importance of Gentile support of this 
time when it was so vital to Zionism to win such support. 
Weizmann already in 1907 had shown his awareness of thun 
importance of Gentile recognition of Zionism, "political 
Zionism means; to make the Jewish question an international 
one. It means going to the nations and saying to them. 'We 
need your help to achieve our aim...' 
Once the decision was taken to concentrate Zionist 
activity an winning England as Zionism's ally, Weizmann was 
9. Weizmann, n.5, pp.121-122. 
10. Ibid-, p.122. 
11. Weisgal, n.8, p.92. 
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joined by two of the leading Zionists on the continent 
Sokoiow and Tselenow. Two impoirtant directions were 
envisaged in Zionist plan:(l) the winning of British Jews to 
Zionism, a task which Weizmann had begun just before the war 
by interesting the Rothschilds in a project to found a 
university in Palestine, (2) winning aver of friends for 
Zionism among the top leaders in the British Government. 
Weizmann started cultivating new contacts though he had 
already met Balfour in 1914 which was of little consequence, 
since Balfour was not a cabinet member. There was a chance 
meeting in 1914 between Weizmann and C.P. Scott, then editor 
of the Manchester Guardian. Weizmann immediately won Scott 
to the cause of Zionism and Scott introduced Weizmann, 
Sokoiow and Tschlenow to Llyod George and Herbert Samuel, 
both members of the cabinet. Llyod George and Samuel, the 
latter a Jew himself, showed sympathy and thus began a 
period of Zionist diplomatic preparation designed to muster 
British support. 
12. Alan R. Taylor, Prelude to Israel. An Analysis of 
Zionist Diplomacy 1897-1947. (London, 1961), p.10. 
13. Sokoiow, n.6, 11, p.48. 
14. Jeffries, n.2, p.92. 
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The conversion of Balfour and Scott to the Zionist 
cause exemplifies the phenomenon of Gentile Zionism. Arnold 
Toynbee offers two explanations. First, he suggests that the 
pro Zionist inclinations of some Gentiles miy be derived 
from a sense of guilt arising out of a subconscious anti-
Semitism. He also attributes Gentile Zionism in Anglo-
Saxon countries to a characteristically "Anglo Saxon" 
attitude of combining an unavowed yet patent 
1 6 Machiavellianism with a suspect yet sincere Quixortry. . . " 
Christopher Sykes offers Christian millen arianism as an 
explanation of Gentile Zionism in England. 
Certainly many christians supported Zionism because 
they felt that Biblical prophesy foretells the 
restoration of the Jew to Palestine. 
Thus, if christians have supported Zionism on 
religious grounds, what is most surprising is 
that they have enquired into the biblical 
justification for Zionism with so uncritical 
and so unsearching an eye. 
15. Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London, 1954), 
VIII, p.308. 
16. Ibid., VIII, 308, footnote. As cited by Taylor, n.l2, 
p.11. 
17. Sykes, n.7, pp.149-152. 
18. Taylor, n.l2, p.11. 
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It may be further explained that the willingness of the 
Gentile to go out of their way to assist Zionism arises out 
of a confusion in their minds as to the relationship between 
Zionism and liberalism. Many Gentiles have supported Zionism 
with the conviction that they are serving the cause of 
racial tolerance by so doing. As a matter of fact, it has 
the assimilationist Jews who sought a liberal solutic. to 
racism, while the Zionists sought a national solution. Yet 
the confusion in the minds of Gentiles has existed, and this 
served partially to explain their pro-Zionist leanings.^^ 
In November 1914, just one month before his meeting 
with Samuel and Llyod George, Dr.Weizmann outlined the 
Zionist position to be laid before the British Government. 
This contained in a letter to Scott, which read: 
,..we can reasonably say that should 
Palestine fall within the British sphere of 
influence, and should Britain encourage 
Jewish settlement there, as a British 
dependency, we could have in twenty to thirty 
years a million Jews out there, perhaps more; 
they would developed the country, bring back 
civilisation to it and form a very 
effective guard to the Suez Canal. 
19. Ibid., p.11-12. 
20. Weizmann, n.5, p.149. 
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This idea of Weizmann developed into Zionism's war 
policy. Its aims were' (1) an Allied victory (2) the 
establishment of a British mandate in Palestine (3) an 
understanding that such a British mandate would then 
facilitate the entry of a million or more Jews into 
Palestine within a period of twenty to thirty years after 
the mandate was established, and (4) an understanding that 
the mandate would terminate in a Jewish controlled Palestine 
which could continue to serve Britain's interest in the Suez 
Canal by acting as a bulwark for the defence of that 
waterway. It is interesting to note that all four points 
have been fulfilled.^^ 
Lloyd George and Herbert Samuel started lending a 
helping hand to Weizmann in order to enlist the support of 
the British government. Herbert Samuel who was pro Zionist 
before his meeting with Weizmann presented the subject of 
the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine to Sir Edward 
22 Grey, the Foreign Secretary. Grey agreed to work to 
fulfill such a task and joined the ranks of pro-zionists in 
the British Government. 
21. Taylor, no.12, p,i2. 
22. The ESCO Foundation, no.3, 1, p.81 
Now lihe stage was set when the pro-Zionist case was put 
forward for the British Cabinet support. The then Prime 
Minister, Herbert Asquith was committed to a policy of 
replacing the Turks with the Arabs as friends of Great 
Britain in the Near East. ^  The leaders of assimilated 
British Jewry became active in opposing the idea of the 
establishment of a Jewish home as an answer to the Jewish 
Question. They were of the opinion that the national 
postulate of Zionism would only promote anti-Semitism and 
that they could not open discussions with a Zionist 
Organization which contained members in enemy countries. ' 
Consequently the Zionists embarked upon an extensive 
propaganda campaign. This was aimed at to muster supporters 
among British Jews and non-Jews, and to create the 
impression that the majority of world Jewry backed the 
Zionist cause. Herbert Sidebotham, a prominent English 
journalist associated with the Manchester Guardian and a 
pro-Zionist organised the British Palestine Committee to 
spread Zionist ideas throughout the United Kingdom. 
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Sidebot-ham was in-berested in Zionism from the British 
strategic point of view. ° 
Dr, Weizmann stationed himself in London. It was here 
that he could be in close contact with government officials. 
In his first meeting with Lloyd George, Chairman of the War 
Munitions Committee, Weizmann had learned that the British 
Government was in need of a method to produce acetone for 
explosives in large quantities.'^ During 1915, Weizmann 
developed such a method and informed Scott of his success. 
Scott made several trips to London to persuade Llyod George, 
Balfour and others to make use of Weizmann. Finally 
Weizmann accompanied Scott to see Llyod George, and, in 
February 1916, Weizmann was appointed to the admiralty under 
the supervision of Balfour. Weizmann deliberately avoided 
the question of Zionism, but Balfour told Weizmann one day, 
you know after the war you may get your Jerusalem. 
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In the autumn of 1915, Mark Sykes had been appointed as 
Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet. There were only two 
such positions, and the fact that Sykes was given charge 
primarily of Near Eastern officers made him a very important 
person in the eyes of Zionist recruiters. Some time before 
1914, a British Zionist named Moses Gaster had exposed Sykes 
to the principles of Zionism and, according to Sykes 
himself, it was Gaster who converted him to the cause 
shortly after his appointment to the service of the War 
Cabinet.^^ 
Sykes, on October 19, was approached by a pro-Zionist 
Armenian, one James Malcolm, probably, though not certainly, 
at the instigation of the Zionist Organisation. Malcolm 
succeeded in reviving Sykes sympathy for Zionism, stressing 
the fact that Justice Brandeis, a prominent American 
Zionist, had a special influence with President Wilson and 
could serve to help bring the United States into the War.^^ 
Sykes heeded to this argument and petitioned the Cabinet on 
several occasion to enter direct negotiations with the 
Zionists. This the Cabinet finally agreed to do, but without 
31. Sykes, n.7, p.176. 
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any previous comitiitments. Malcolm was appointed as the go-
between, and the Zionists prepared themselves for action in 
the face of this climactic success. 
The Zionists fist request was granted i.e. they could 
use British communication facilities to contact Zionists 
throughout the world. This particular grant of Zionist 
request established a precedent of cooperation with the 
Zionists and making it impossible to reverse this policy, 
owing to the fact that the communications facilities were 
used to proclaim British support of Zionism throughout World 
Jewry. To reverse this support would have resulted in 
incurring the wrath of Zionist Jews the world over. 
At this juncture of Zionist efforts and maneuverings a 
Zionist proposal was drawn up as the basis of negotiations 
with the British government. The document called "Progreimroe 
for a New Administration of Palestine in Accordance with the 
Aspirations of the Zionist Movement""^ "* was put before the 
British Government. It contained the proposal of the 
estabiistmient of a semi-governmental Jewish company in 
33. Ibid., pp.187-188. 
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Palestine under the suzerainty of Britain or France. The 
company was to have a national status and be allowed to 
encourage Jewish coloniaation of Palestine. The Zionist case 
rested on this proposal until December 1916, when llyod 
George replaced Asquith as Prime Minister and became leader 
of the Second Coalition Government. Llyod George, as has 
been noted, had already been recruited to the Zionist cause, 
and thus the battle was really over. With the Prime Minister 
in the Zionist camp, and the appointment of Balfour, another 
pro-Zionist, to the headship of the Foreign Office, a 
British commitment to Zionism was assured."^  
The Balfour Declaration: 
Mark Sykes in February 1917, after the formation of the 
second coalition government of Britain, was designated to 
represent the government to enter into negotiations with the 
Zionists. The first meeting"^ took place at the home of 
Moses Gaster who was instrumental in influencing Sykes in 
favour of Zionism. Gaster stated that the fulfilment of 
Zionist aim depended on England and could be realized 
through British suzerainty alone. This reassured the British 
35. Taylor, n.l2, p.18. 
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Government that U.K's strategic interest in Palestine would 
receive consideration as an integral part of any compromise 
reached between itself and the Zionist organisation. 
Whatever the British government was doing or intended to do 
in preparation of a deal with the Zionists, the Zionists 
were providing a sense of justifications for them. 
Herbert Samuel expressed the hope that complete 
national status would be given to the Jews of Palestine and 
that the Jews living in Diaspora would share this national 
status. The sharing of national status of the Jews of 
Diaspora was a suggestion which expected them to strive for 
dual nationality. The concept of the obligations of a 
citizen to this national state seems to have escaped Samuel 
38 completely. 
Weizmann spoke next and laid emphasis on the premise 
that the Mandatory power of Palestine should direct the 
administration that nothing should be done which would 
39 restrict the Jewish immigration in any manner. 
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At the end of the meeting the Zionists summarised their 
basic requirements- ' (1) an international recognized right 
of the Jews to Palestine, (2) the establishment of juridical 
nationhood for the Jewish community in Palestine, (3) a 
chartered Jewish company to be created in Palestine under 
one administration and (4) the establishment of extra-
territoriality in the holy places of Palestine. The first 
three of these points embody the Zionist aims, while the 
latter two were designed to placate Great Britain and 
Russia, respectively. 
The proposal was articulated to muster favour of in 
England and Russia and new efforts had to be directed 
towards France and the Arabs who were interested but 
uncommitted partners. Palestine was predominantly Arab, but 
the Zionists had never given cognizance to this vital Arab 
factor. And in many Congresses held since 1897^^ did not 
even mention them. Zionists; prime concern was to bring 
France in their favour. They gave secondary consideration to 
friendly overtures turns to the United States and Italy. 
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Mark Sykes was the first, person to foresee the 
importance to the Zionists of obtaining French approval. 
Sykes, on 8 February 1917 directed Sokolav to meet M. 
Georges Picot at the French Embassy in London. * Sokolow 
put the Zionist point across and was successful in winning 
Georges Picot to the Zionist point of view that mandate 
for Palestine should be given to England now the official 
support of the French government was required. The French 
government at that time was under the influence of a group 
known as 'Syrian Party' which wanted French mandate over 
whole of Syria Sokolow had to play the same game what the 
Zionist played in England to win the support of this 
particular Syrian Party and influence the French government. 
Sokolow started for France in March 1917. He in his mission, 
was joined by Sykes, who put Sokolow in touch with the 
proper French authorities. He also used his connections to 
investigate the thinking of the 'Syrian Party' and to 
facilitate Sokolows mission. 
Sokolow got busy in influencing the French government 
whila Sykes left for Italy to prepare ground for a 
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favourable reception of Sokolow in t-he Italian Government 
and at the Vatican. Thus, stage was set for Sokolow and 
when he >^rrived in Italy he was greeted with open arms, 
though Sokolow found it difficult to dispel Pope's concern 
A 7 
for the fate of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine. 
The French go^'Qmment , through an official letter 
delivered by Jules Camion, Secretary General to the French 
Foreign Ministry^ to Sykes on his return to Paris expressed 
the sympathy for the Zionist cause. The mission of Sokolow 
was accomplished. The transfer of the support of the French 
government from the 'Syrian Party' to the Zionists was due 
not only to the work of Sykes, but also to the influence of 
49 Baron Edmond de Rothschild.^^ 'At the crucial moment this 
convert of Weizmann talked the anti-Zionist Alliance 
Israelite Universelle into backing in the Zionist cause 
before the French Government thus providing the needed extra 
weight to carry the day for Sokolow'.^ 
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As Sokolow was busy in France the Zionists in England 
were busy preparing the draft of a resolution to be 
presented to the British Government as the basis of an 
official British statement on Zionism, while last mantle 
efforts were made to ensure British acceptance of the 
draft. Justice Brandeis assured Balfour that President 
Wilson looked with favour upon Zionism, while Weizmann tried 
to remove Balfour's fears that Britain's allies would not 
accept a pro-Zionist policy on the part of Britain. On 20 
May 1917, Weizmann announced before the English Zionist 
Federation that the British Government was prepared to 
announce its support of the aims of Zionism. '^  
At this stage the anti-Zionist forces in Britain 
started mobilizing in opposition to Political Zionism. Two 
leading British Jews David Alexander and Claude Mantefire^^ 
published a letter in The Times expressing their 
condemnation for the aims and objectives of political 
Zionism. Weizmann got apprehensive and wrote a reassuring 
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letter to Balfour's secretary. He wrote, 'The second 
category of British Jews [ the Assimilationists] will fall 
into line quickly when the declaration [the Balfour 
Declaration] is given to us'. * Weiamann being an astute 
person had already made a public declaration that the 
British Govermaent was committed to support Zionism. This 
move of Weizmann, had, in effect, closed the door behind the 
British Government and made it impossible to turn back on 
the course it was following. 
Balfour, in June, announced his readiness to receive a 
draft of Zionist proposals to be incorporated in an official 
statement of the British Government in support of Zionism. 
Zionists had prepared a complete formula in July and it was 
put before Balfour on the eighteenth of that month. The 
Zionist formula mooted that the British Government announce 
its acceptance that Palestine be recognized since quo non as 
the National Home of the Jewish people, in order to build up 
their national life in Palestine. They should enjoy 
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conditions of internal autonomy and they should also enjoy 
the privilege of unconditional colonization. The cabinet 
accepted the principle that Pc^ lestine be recognized as the 
National Home of the Jewish people, but insisted that means 
and methods be worked out by the British Government and the 
Zionist organisation. The leading Assimilationist British 
Jews protested against both the first and second formulas to 
the Cabinet. It was on account of pressure exerted by them 
that the final formula, known as the Balfour Declaration 
called for the following: (1) British support of the 
establishment of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine. 
(2) British co-operation in the achievement of this 
objective, and (3) an understanding that nothing shall be 
done to prejudice the rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine or the rights and status enjoyed by 
58 Jews in any other country. 
This was far less than what the Zionists had expected. 
The Zionists had envisioned the creation of a Palestine 
which would be 'as Jewish as England is English. ^ With such 
restrictions embodied in the Balfour Declaration a Palestine 
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envisioned by the Jews could not be established. However, 
they had to compromise, sinco a declaration of some sort 
expressing favour for Zionism was vitally needed before the 
war ended. Zionists also extracted a favourable statement 
from Lloyd George that "when the time arrived for 
according representative institution to Palestine, if the 
Jews... had become a definite majority of the inhabitants 
then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth". 
This took the task of the Zionists further ahead in a 
particular direction. They had only to ensure a Jewish 
majority in Palestine. 
The first phase of Zionist diplomacy successfully ended 
with the inclusion of Balfour Declaration into Herzl's 
programme. This programme had envisioned enlisting of 
support of Gentile nations in building a National Home for 
Jews in Palestine. 
The Balfour Declaration was not the result simply of 
British design to establish a buffer to the Suez Canal and 
to win the support of world Jewry to the Allied cause. More 
accuxately the coincidence of British and Zionist interests 
60. The ESCO Foundation, n.3, p.113, 
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was employed by the Zionists to engender British support. 
Thus, the Balfour Declaration was the outcome of planned 
Zionist diplomacy.^^ 
A British official who had come into contact with 
Weizmann summarized this diplomatic victory in the following 
words • 
'Once of the best examples of... successful 
diplomacy is that by which Dr. Weizmann 
brought into existence the Jewish National 
Home... when [the first World War] began, his 
cause was hardly known to the principal 
statesmen of the victors. He once told me that 
2,000 interviews had gone to the making of the 
Balfour Declaration. With unerring skill he 
adopted his arguments to the special 
circumstances of each statesman. To the 
British and Americans he could use Biblical 
language and awake a deep emotional undertone; 
to other nationalities he more often talked in 
terms of interest. Mr. Llyod George was told 
that Palestine was a little mountainous 
country not unlike Wales; with Lord Balfour 
the Philosophical background of Zionism could 
be surveyed, for Lord Cecil the problem was 
61. Taylor, n.l2, pp.22-3. Balfour Declaration has 
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placed in the setting of a new v?orld 
organisation; while to Lord Milner the 
extension of imperial power could be vividly 
portrayed. To me, who dealt with these matters 
as a junior officer of the General Staff, he 
brought from many source all the evidence that 
could be obtained of the importance of a 
Jewish National Home to the strategic position 
of the British Empire, but he always indicated 
by a hundred shades and inflections of the 
voice that he believed that I could also 
appreciate better than my superiors other more 
subtle and recondite arguments. This skillful 
presentation of facts would, however, have 
been useless unless he had convinced all with 
whom he came into contact of the probity of 
his conduct and the reality of his trust in 
CO 
the will and strength of Britain. 
After all these meetings, debates and manipulation the 
Zionists were in a position to get the Balfour declaration 
made on 17 November 1917 by the British government. ""^  
Now it remained for the Zionists to wrest the support 
of world Jewry and to colonize Palestine. The support of 
world Jewry would take time while the task of colonization 
was taken up immediately. 
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Zionists, Paris Peace Conference, and the Mandate: 
Balfour Declaration was officially accepted by France, 
Italy, the United States and Japan by the end of 1918. This 
C A 
was a considerable success of the Zionist movement. After 
the victory of Allied powers a peace conference V7as convened 
in Paris in January 1918. A Zionist delegation represented 
the Zionist organisation and presented its case before the 
Supreme Council. Weizmann and Sokolow as members of the 
delegation addressed the Supreme Council and presented in a 
sophisticated way the Zionist case touching various aspacts 
of draft resolutions which were contained in an official 
memorandum sent to the Supreme Council on February 3. 
The Zionist resolution demanded: 
1. The historic title of the Jews be recognized and 
admission of the right of Jews to reconstitute 
their National Home in Palestine. 
2. The establishment of certain boundaries for Palestine, 
designed to include -^juthern Lebanon, Mount Herman, 
Aqaba, and TransJordan. 
3. The establishment of a Mandate for Palestine under the 
administration of Great Britain. 
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4. Balfour Declaration be realized. 
5. The promotion of Jewish colonization of Palestine. 
6. The creation of a council of representative of the 
Jews of Palestine. 
This Zionist formula was a framework in which the 
earlier framework in which the promises were made to them 
could be carried out. 
The first action taken by the Peace Conference in 
regard to Palestine was the provision, contained in Artrcie 
22 of the Covenant of the League, calling for the 
establishment of temporary mandates in certain communities 
formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire."° 
The British delegation opened formal discussions with 
the Zionists on the matter of drafting what was to be the 
official mandate for Palestine. The Peace Conference, a 
month later, adopted the convenant of the League. David 
Hunter Miller, a member of the British delegation, received 
a letter dated 28 March 1919, written to him by Felix Frank-
furter. In this Frankfurter outlined the basic points which 
66. Taylor, n.l2, p.26. 
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"the Zionists wished to have embodied in the text of the 
Mandate.°' The se proposals were as follows: 
(1) the Balfour Declaration be re-stated in the text of 
the Mandate, 
(2) the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National 
Home to be developed into an autonomous commonwealth 
and should be the guiding principle of the Mandate 
(3) when the people of Palestine became ready for 
autonomy, a representative government be established. 
These proposals were subsequently revised. They were 
presented on 15 July 1919 to the British delegation as 
* 
a draft to be considered for inclusion in the proposed 
68 treaty with Turkey. This draft called for^ 
(1) the ultimate aim of the mandate should be the creation 
in Palestine of a self governing commonwealth 
(2) the formation of a permanent Jewish council in 
Palestine 
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68. Ibid., p.169. 
70 
(3) sponsorship of the principle of a Jewish National 
Home, 
(4) facilitation of Jewish immigration and colonization. 
(5) the establishment of Hebrew as the official language 
in Palestine. 
There was a third revision. It went a step-further by 
suggesting that the proposed Jewish National Home should 
69 comprise all of Palestine. 
Zionist proposals was that the Mandate for Palestine be 
dedicated to the creation of a Jewish state. The mandatory 
administration had to take up as its responsibility to 
strengthen the Jewish element in Palestine and was to 
continue in control of the country until such time as there 
were sufficient Jews in Palestine to make possible the 
establishment of a defacto Jewish state. 
The British Government was disposed to accept the 
Zionist proposals and on 25 April 1920 the Supreme Council 
which was sitting at San Remo, assigned the mandate for 
Palestine to Great Britain. The text of the Treaty of 
69. Ibid., pp.170-71. 
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Severes wi-th Turkey, which was signed the following August, 
underwrote the Balfour Declaration and thus all that 
remained to ensure the fulfillment of the aim of Zionism was 
the adoption of a mandate text which upheld the basic 
programme of the Zionist proposals. 
Lord Curzon, appointed as Foreign Secretary in the 
spring of 1920, created problems for the Zionists. Curzon 
was not a supporter of Zionism and was concerned over the 
growing tide of Arab opposition. Curzon was against Ziorjist 
sponsored clauses in the text of the mandate. Be 
particularly opposed the two clauses, one proclaiming the 
historical connection of the Jews with Palestine and another 
calling for the eventual establishment of a self-governing 
72 commonwealth in Palestine. The Zionists through Balfour 
and Milner (Milner was a pro-Zionist Cabinet Minister), 
exerted their influence on the Government, but were 
successful only in having the clause concerning the 
7 T historical connection of the Jews with Palestine. 
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Zionists were flexible and were ready to compromise to 
an extent, as long as British Government officials were 
sympathetic to the Zionist cause. Weizmann had proclaimed 
the support of British Government to Zionism in the spring 
of 1917. He had informed the English Zionist Federation that 
the aim of Zionism would be realised by stages, and that the 
first stage would have to be one of British control of 
Palestine. Later on Jewish connection with Palestine came 
to be recognized, the Balfour Declaration was under written, 
the Jews of Palestine were allowed the right of developing 
self governing institutions, the mandatory committed itself 
to the facilitation of Jewish immigration and provisions 
were made for the establishment of a Jewish Agency to assist 
the administration. This was all the Zionists really needed 
and the future was assured. 'In effect the Mandate granted 
to Zionism nearly all that the Zionists representative asked 
for at the Paris Conference in 1919. 
The Memdate and its Ratification: The Zionists in 1921 faced 
some hurdles with ragard to the ratification of the draft 
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Mandate agreed upon by the British cabinet and the Zionist 
Organisation. The Zionisi t^ ightjs and aspirations became 
international controversy since riots between Arabs and Jews 
broke out in Jaffa. An Arab delegation headed by Musa Kazim 
Pasha, arrived in London and presented its grievances to 
77 British Members of Parliament and to the Colonial Office. 
The Draft Mandate had been presented to the League 
Council by this time, and had undergone two changes. The 
clause of the Balfour Declaration concerning the civil and 
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine was inserted in the preamble of the new draft, 
whereas it had only. This change was of no great importance, 
but it did show a general concern over the potential threat 
7R 
of Zionism to the rights of the Arabs of Palestine. 
The second change was more significant. A new article 
was inserted specifying that the Balfour Declaration could 
not apply to the territories east of Jordan. This was the 
curtailment of the original Zionist aspiration which wanted 
to create a Zionist state in Palestine including 
TransJordan. This wad done in order to offer TransJordan to 
Abdullah as an emir .te. 
77. The Weismann, n.5, p.280. 
78. Taylor, n.l2, p.34. 
74 
It, was part.ly because of "these setbacks and partly to 
raise money that Weizmann decided to make a tour of European 
capitals. While Weiamann was in Europe trying to prevent 
any further alteration in the draft Mandate of iy20 and to 
counter tVie influence of the Arab delegation on political 
circles in London, the Zionist executive in London, was busy 
in extensive correspondence and discussion with the Colonial 
Office in an attempt to prevent any further changes in the 
draft of the Mandate.^"^ 
A number of British newspapers began a campaign against 
Zionism, and in the House of Lords a motion, introduced by 
Lord Islington and others calling for the repeal of the 
81 Balfour Declaration, was passed. By this time, Weizmann 
had returned to London, and his first task was to prevent 
the House of Commons from passing a similar motion. Weizuann 
later wrote, 'In the Commons, with such chsunpions as Mr. 
Churchill and Major Ormsby-Gore, we had better luck, and a 
similar motion was heavily defeated.^ 
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Ori 1 July 1922, the British Goverrunent issued a 
Statement which is known as Churchill White Paper. This 
statement was issued in order to placate the objections 
against the pro-Zionist stance of the British Government. 
The Wliite Paper denied that it was the intention of the 
British Government to create a Jewish state in the whole 
Palestine, that the Zionist representation in Palestine 
would be accorded a special position. The white paper 
separated Palestine from TransJordan and Jewish immigration 
was limited to its absorptive capacity. 
The Vn-iite Paper was regarded by Weizmann as 
curtailment of the provisions of Balfour Declaration. 
However he accepted it as far as it reaffirmed the right of 
the Jews to establish a national home in Palestine. 
Weizmann met opposition, on account of its acceptance 
of the Churchill Wliite Paper, at the annual conference of 
the World Zionist organisation in August 1922 held at 
Carlsbad. Realist as he was, he explained that the White 
Paper was a reality and there was simple risk in pressing 
for impossible demands. He emphasised on the need of 
fulfilment of the Zionist aims in stages.^ "* 
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The Churchill White Paper paved the way for the 
acceptance of the Mandate by Lhe • eague. It subsequently 
recognised the right of the Zionists to colonise Palestine. 
Herzl's programme got started for being translated into 
8fi 
action with British support. 
Zionist Movement After World War I: 
The leaders of the Zionist movement at the end of the 
World War I had the realization that an' elaborate 
organisation which could take up the operations of the 
movement was vitally needed. In February 1919, Weiamann and 
Sokolow called a Zionist Conference in London. In this 
conference, Weizmann was appointed to the executive, an 
honour which had not been extended to him before, even 
though he had served as de facto leader of the Zionist 
organisation for years. 
In the summer of 1920, a second past war conference was 
convened in at London. At this conference, Weizmann was 
elected President of the Zionist Organisation, Nahum 
Sokolow, his close associate, was mode Chairman of the 
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Executive. ° The conference also passed the following 
resolutions • 
(i) the Organization is determined to live at peace with 
the non-Jewish communities in Palestine. 
(ii) all land in Palestine colonised by Jews is 
eventually to become the cotairon property of the 
Jewish people, 
(iii) a Jewish National Fund will be established to emplo^ 
voluntary cor.tributions for the purpose of making 
the land of Palestine the common property of the 
Jewish people; 
(iv) a Central Immigration Office >7ill be created in 
Palestine 6...i Palestine offices will be opened in 
a31 countries expected to fur^ ish contingents of 
Q Q 
young immigrants. 
The London conference concentrated mainly on the second 
aspect of the programme. A consolidated immigration 
organisation was provided, n^''-l a special fund was 
establishc:d to implement a land policy, articulated to go 
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'hand in hand' with the immigration policy. The conference 
resolution to live at peace with the non-Jewish communities 
in Palestine must be viewed in the light of this programme 
Q0 
of planned acquisition. 
The London conference of 1920 appointed a commission to 
call a Zionist Congress, and accordingly the first Zionist 
Congress since before the war. The twelfth Zionist Congress 
was convinced was convinced at Carlsbad in September 1921. ^  
The 12th Zxonist Congress confirmed Weisma;^ a as the 
Presi'j.ent of the organisation and Sokolow as the President 
qo 
of the Executive.^^ Weizmann now was heading an elaborate 
organisation to carry the aims of political Zionism to its 
fulfillment. He headed a central office, the task of which 
was to maintain political contact with Colonial Office of 
the British Government, thus providing the machinery with 
which to maintain British support and to oversee the 
activities of Zionists throughout the world. Under the 
Central office was an executive group composed of the London 
and Palestine executives, the Actions Committee, and the 
Central Council. The London offices maintained close 
90. Taylor, n.l2, p.39. 
91. Israel Cohen, n.27, pp.127-32. 
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relations with the League of Nations, the French 
Government, and the Italian Government through special 
Bureaus. The Arabs had no such voice with the permanent 
Mandate Commission in Geneva. The London office also 
controlled the colonization funds and were advised on 
financial matters by a Financial and Economic Council. The 
Palestine Executive replaced the Zionist Commission in 
Palestine and was charged with supervision of the Jewish 
community in Palestine and Jewish immigration into the 
country. The Jewish community in Palestine was represented 
by a Constituent Assembly {Asefath Hanivharim) which elected 
a National Council (Vaad Leumi). A Robbinical Council was 
94 
also established. 
To ensure that the Palestine executive should have, and 
maintain good support alongwith the British Administration, 
Weizmann arranged for the appointment of a British officer 
of Jewish faith to the Palestine Executive. At the end of 
1922, Dr. Eder, a leading personality of the Palestine 
Executive, retired from office. In search of a replacement, 
Weizmann approached General Macdonough of British Military 
93. Antonius, n.37, pp.388-89. 
94. Taylor, n.l2, p.40. 
so 
Intelligence, asking him to suggest a candidate one 
"...belonging to both worlds, English as well as 
Jewish....' Macdonough suggested Colonel Fred Kisch, a 
member of Military Intelligence, a British officer in every 
sense, and the son of an East European Jew wVio had belonged 
to Choveve Zion. "From every point of view, Kisch was the 
perfect man. He was acquainted with High Commissioner 
Samuel, he could hold the respect of the British officers in 
the Palestine Administration, he could feel at home with 
Zionists, and he was trained in Intelligence, the key to 
Zionist diplomacy. It is indeed strange that the question of 
dual loyalty never was brought up in the case of Kisch. 
Somehow, Weizmann was always a genius at making what would 
ordinarily be considered unnatural seem innocuous and 
sensible."^° 
Establishment of Jewish Agency: Uptill now Weizmann was 
successful in retaining and strengthening of British support 
an in laying the ground work for the Jewish colonization of 
Palestine. The third requirement of the Jewish programme was 
95. Weizmann, n.5, p.295. 
96. Taylor, n.l2, p.42. 
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•winning the support of World Jewry to the cause of political 
Zionism. A machinery had to be installed to recruit a large 
group of non-Zionist Jews. The Jewish Agency was entrusted 
with this task. 
It is written in the text of the Mandate that ..."an 
appopriate Jewish Agency shall be recognised as a public 
body for the purpose of advising and c0-operating with the 
administration of Palestine in such economic, social and 
other matters as may affect the establisliment of the Jewish 
97 population in Palestine..." According to the text of the 
Mandate the Zionist Organisation was to serve as such an 
agency. At the Carlsbard Zionist conference of 1922, the 
Zionist Organisation formally accepted the rights and duties 
of the Jewish Agency expressing thiat ' the Jewish Agency 
98 shall represent the whole Jewish people'. 
As far as the fulfillment of the aims of political 
Zionism were concerned tVie Jewish Agency, till now, could 
hardly be considered a representative body of world Jewry. 
Winning the support of world Jewry was the third Herzelian 
plan and Jewish Agency presented itself as the ideal 
97- Hurewitz, n.56, pp.107-8 
98. Cohen, n.27, p.170. 
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solution. There was another obstacle - the opposition to the 
extension of the Jewish Agency among Zionists. The group led 
by Brandeis regarded the extension as unnecessary since he 
was apprehensive of the influence of non Zionists in the 
agency. Weizmann was lucky enough to see the passage of the 
99 leadership of American Zionism from the hands of Brandeis 
In February 1923, the Action Committee passed a resolution 
stating; that the controlling organ of the Jewish Agency 
shall be responsible to a body representative of the Jewish 
people'. The committee resolved to enter into 
negotiations with leading Jewish communities in order to 
gain their participation in the Jewish Agency.-^  At the 
Congress of 1925, a party known as the Revisionists led by 
Vladimir Jabotinsky opposed extension on the basis that 
Zionist policy could not be entrusted to Jews lacking strong 
nationalist convictions. ^^'^ However, the Congress passed a 
resolution favouring the establishment of a Council composed 
equally of Zionists and non-Zionist Jews. An action plan was 
envisaged for the Jewish Agency on the following principles; 
99. Cohen, n.84, pp.87-88 
100. Weizmann, n.5, p.307. 
101. Cohen, n.83, p.170. 
102. Ibid-, p.125. 
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(1) the development of a continuously increasing volume of 
Jewish immigration into Palestine, 
(2) the redemption of the land in Palestine as Jewish public 
property, 
(3) agricultural colonization based on Jewish labour. 
(4) the promotion of Hebrew language and culture in 
Palestine.^^^ 
The Congress agreed to the extension of the Agency, 
even though the matter remained controversial untill 1929, 
and specifications ensuring the fulfilment of Zionist policy 
were established. The Congress further guaranteed that the 
President of the Zionist Organisation would the President of 
the enlarged Jewish Agency. It also stated that of the non-
Zionist participants forty percent should be from America, 
which contained a large number of non-Zionist Jews and 
therefore was a major objective in the Zionist bid for 
universal Jewish support. 
Louis Marchall and Felix Warburg were two recognised 
leaders of American Jewry. Warburg was a convert Zionist 
about whom Weizmann remarked, ' I have seldom witnessed a 
more complete conversion'.^^ Through Marshall and Warburg. 
103. Fredrick H. Kisch, Palestine Diary (London, 1938), 
p.238. 
104. Weizmann, n.5, p.310, 
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American Jewry began to join the Zionist movement, to assist 
its work and to bear much of its financial burden. It was 
for this reason that the Congress of 1925 specified that 40% 
of the non-Zionist representation on the Jewish Agency was 
to be American. Marshall and Warburg assured Weizmann of 
financial and moral support from American Jewry. ^ 
Moreover, as a safeguard, that the new Agency would 
not fall under non-Zionist control, the Zionists obtained an 
assurance from the British Government to the effect that, 
should the partnership between Zionists and non-Zionists 
dissolve, the Zionist Organisation alone would be recognised 
as the Jewish Agency. ^ 
Zionist Diplomacy Till the end of World War II: 
In the 1920s Zionists had succeeded in building up the 
infrastructure and were ready, to implement their policies. 
They had started building the struggle for Palestine which 
came to ahead in the 1930s.^^^ 
The Conservatives were in power from October 1922 to 
June 1929, except for a brief period of the first Macdonald 
105. Ibid., p.314. 
106. Cohen, n.27, p.127. 
107. Taylor, n.l2, p.47. 
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Government from January to November of 1924. The 
Conservatives stood by the Balfour Declaration-'-'^ " and there 
was no hindrance created with the change of Government. In 
Geneva, the Permanent Mandate Commission started getting 
concerned over the problem of Palestine Arabs in 1924 but 
the Zionists opened a special Bureau there in the following 
year. However the succeeding sessions of the Mandates 
Commission were to show traces of its effect. Weizmann's 
personal contacts with leading members of the Commission 
served to develop a favourable attitude towards Zionism in 
that body.^^^ 
After the issue of the Churchill White Paper in 1922, a 
Labour Schedule was established to regulate the immigrate of 
Jewish workers in accordance with the economic absorptive 
capacity of Palestine.^ ^ The Zionist Organisation 
guaranteed the support of many of the immigrants for the 
first year of their stay in Palestine, -^^ and the Histadrut, 
or General Federation of Jewish Labour in Palestine, served 
108. The ESCO Foundation, n.3, p.288, 
109. Weizmann, n.5, p.326. 
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111. The ESCO Foundation, n.3, p.317, 
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as on employment agency for the new comers. In 1923, Jews 
possessing capital assets amounting to $ 2,500 or more were 
allowed to immigrate outside of the Labour Schedule. 
It is particularly of interest to note the attitude of 
Weizmann towards this Jewish immigration, since it shows the 
true character of political Zionism: '... We must see to it 
that we direct this stream, ' and do not allow it to deflect 
115 
us from our goal'. 
The leaders and responsible officers of the Zionist 
movement regarded themselves as a disciplined vanguard, an 
inner elite, of a Jewish movement which they considered to 
be the one answer to the Jewish Question. And their 
attitude, even towards Jews, was coloured by their zeal to 
complete the work of Zionism. Thus, they were impatient with 
anything connected with Palestine which did not clearly 
contribute to the establishment of Jewish statehood, and 
resentful of those things which in anyway acted against the 
1 1 fi interests of the movement. 
113. Andrews, n.l, Vol.2, p.26. 
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Arabs of Palestine resented the Zionist moves in 
Palestine. Land grabbing had displaced many Arabs. Soon 
after the 16th Zionist Congress rioting broke out in 
Palestine, which continued intermittently. Numerous 
commissions were sent by the British government. They 
suggested restriction of Jewish immigration. But as in the 
past, a set back to Zionism on account of the report of a 
Commission which was sent to see for itself, the cause of 
the troubles of Palestine, was reversed by the activity of 
Zionist diplomacy in London. Through propaganda, political 
pressure, and the use of the recruits of Zionism in high 
places, a government policy decision based on the findings 
of its own Commission was reversed. Those who saw things for 
themselves realized, that as Zionism was attaining its goal, 
there was an accompanying breach in the provision of the 
Balfour Declaration regarding the rights of the non Zionist 
communities in Palestine. Thus, they voiced their 
objections, remaining true to the provisions of the 
Declaration. The Cabinets, on the other hand, either did not 
grasp what was going on or were forced to look the other way 
because of the pressure that was being applied- The Zionist 
Organisations of the 1930s were not like the Zionist 
Organisation of the war years. In those earlier years they 
had to wait for their friends to come to power, but in the 
88 
1930s they did not hesitate to bend even a Prime Minister to 
117 their will, if that was necessary. -^  
With War clouds looming over the European horizon, the 
British called the London Conference in 1939 to try to 
settle the Arab-Jewish controversy. The Famous MacDonald 
White Paper, issued on 17 May 1939, imposed severe 
118 
restriction on Jewish immigration. The Zionist Congress 
rejected the White Paper as illegal. The 1939 White Paper, 
however, came as a major shock and setback to Zionist 
diplomacy. The leaders of the movement immediately sought a 
reorientation of Zionism in the face of the new turn of 
events. Through the war years, just such a reorientation 
took place in terms of policy, organisation, and of a shift 
in political concentration from Great Britain to the United 
States.^^^ 
Throughout the interwar period, the Mandate for 
Palestine had served the Jewish cause in gradual building up 
of Jewish immigration to result in the eventual Jewish 
majority in Palestine. The MacDonald White Paper thwarted 
117. Taylor, n.l2, p.51 
118. Lenezowski, George, The Middle East in World Affairs. 
(New York, 1953), pp.271-72. 
119. Taylor, n.l2, p.53. 
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"this effort. The policy of gradualism championed by Weizmann 
was in question. This called for a change. "Previously 
Mandate had been supported because its existence was 
consonant with the desires of Zionism, but, once the British 
showed unwillingness to continue their benign attitude 
towards the Zionists, the latter turned against their former 
benefactors and decided to work actively for the termination 
of the Mandate for Palestine".^^0 
The attacks on White Paper assumed the form of an 
onslaught against the Mandate itself. The first indication 
of this important policy shift was given by Dr. Weizmann 
himself who, ironically, was the strongest backer of co-
operation with the Mandate. Weizmann, in mid December 1939, 
met Winston Churchill and conveyed to him his intentions of 
building up a Zionist state with three to four million Jews 
in it. Churchill replied that such a plan met entirely with 
his approval. "With this preliminary agreement, Zionism 
began to depart from a phase of advantageous waiting to 
enter one characterized by active preparation for the 
fulfillment of the basic aim of Zionism - the creation of 
the Jewish State".-^^^ 
120. Ibid.,p.54. 
121. Ibid. 
122. Ibid., pp.54-5 
90 
The active opposition to Mandate went alongwith a 
campaign in the West specially in America. This was 
necessary in order to reorient Zionist members to the new 
policy. In early 1940 a conference in Washington was 
informed by the Jewish National Fund that the policy of the 
Fund was to preclude any possible partition of Palestine by 
•J 2 3 
purchasing frontier areas. Nahum Goldmann defined the 
territory of Jewish national interest as including 
Transjordan. ^ This gave the warning that time was at hand 
to pave the way for the establishment of a Jewish State in 
all of Palestine. At a convention of Canadian Zionists a 
similar proclamation was made by the legal adviser of the 
Jewish Agency, Dr. Bernard Joseph. On 29 March 1941, 
Dr Weizmann announced at Chicago that after the war a Jewish 
commonwealth could be set up side by side with Arab 
Federation in the Middle East.-^ ^^  
These oft repeated pronouncements led the Western 
Zionist Jewry to support in active way bo the idea of the 
imminent establishment of Israel as a state once the war was 
123. Kirk George, E. JJag Middle Easi in the War 
(London, 1953), p.233. 
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over. The Zionist Organisation of America resolved as early 
as 7 September 1971 to demand the creation of a Jewish 
commonwealth within the historic boundaries of Palestine. 
However, this was not enough. It was felt necessary for 
an important body of the Zionist diaspora to hold at a 
suitable place and unanimously declare the decision of World 
Zionism to bid for the establishment of Israel upon the 
completion of the war. An emergency committee was formed in 
America to serve as the wartime head quarters of the Zionist 
Organisation. This emergency committeo was willing to 
sponsor the convention. Thus an extraordinary conference 
of American, European and Palestinian Zionists was held at 
the Biltmore Hotel in New York city in Kay 1942. 
The Zionists Conference was addressed by three top 
129 leaders of Zionism. Weizmann, Ben Gurion, and Nahum 
Goldmann, Chairman of the Administrative Committee of the 
World Jewish Congress. Ben Gurian demanded that the Jewish 
Agency be given full control over immi^ixation into Palestine 
and that the concept of binationalism be discarded if it 
127. Ibid. 
128. Hurewitz, n.56, p.234. 
129. The ESCO Foundation, n.3, II, p.1080-1083 
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ent-ailed offering Palestinian Arabs equal representation 
with Jews in the departments of government ."^ "^  Here lay the 
basic formula of the new Zionists policy, for this could 
lead to only one outcome the creation of a Jewish State. The 
conference endorsed Ben Gurian's formula. Thus the 
underlying motive of political Zionists came to surface. 
Full implementation of Herzelian programme was taken up 
through already planned policy of activism. ^ "^ ^ 
The Conference on 11 May 1942 adopted a set of 
resolutions known collectively as the Biltmore Programme. ^'^'^  
The programme in short enumerated the following (1) 
recognition that the purpose of the provisions in the 
Balfour Declaration and the Mandate declaring the historic 
connection of the Jewish people with Palestine was to found 
133 there a Jewish commonwealth. This demand of the Biltmore 
programme was made inspite of the fact that the Churchill 
White Paper of 1922 denied that the purpose of the Balfour 
Declaration was to make Palestine 'as Jewish as England is 
130. Ibid. p.1062. 
131. Taylor, n.l2, p.57. 
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English' or "tha-t the development of the Jewish National Home 
meant the imposition of Jewish nationality upon the people 
of Palestine as a whole. (2) the invalidation of the 
MacDonald White Paper, (3) a solution of the problem of 
Jewish horoelessness as part of the post-war settlement, (4) 
the transfer of control of immigration into Palestine to the 
Jewish Agency, (5) the establislrunent of Palestine as a 
Jewish commonwealth. The points 'three' and 'four' implied 
that the Zionists solution was the only solution to 
Palestine problem and that the Agency should be accorded 
•I o r 
essential powers of a sovereign government respectively. 
The Biltmore Programme gave tremendous impetus to the 
new policy of the Zionists leadership. It also was 
successful in bringing in its fold a great majority of World 
Zionism, positively behind the platform of imminent 
statehood. The Zionist Organisation, Haddassah, Mizrachi and 
other Labour groups adopted the Biltmore programme in 
October 1942. On 6 November, the General Council of the 
World Zionist Organisation endorsed the programme. The 
Biltmore programme had been endorsed by the General Council 
134. Taylor, n.l2, p.58. 
135. Ibid. 
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in 1942 in spite of opposition among Jews in the United 
1 3fi States and Palestine. When the World War came to a 
close, a Zionist Conference was held in August 1945. The 
thinking of such a large majority of the Zionists had been 
geared to the Biltmore programme in such a war that it was 
137 
strongly endorsed. 
Shift from O.K. to O.S.A.: 
Since the beginning of World War I, political Zionism 
had recruited Gentile support which was one of the basic 
tenents of Herzlian programme. It had succeeded in receiving 
the assistance of the British Government through the 
recruitment of cabinet ministers and other British political 
leaders. The Zionist attitude towards Great Britain 
underwent a fundamental change since the publication of 
White Paper of 1939 and subsequent formulation of new 
Zionist policy. As the situation stood now from the Zionist 
perspective the British Colonial Office and the Mandate 
136. Kermit Roosvelt, 'The Partition of Palestine: a lesson 
in Pressure Politics' . Hiddl^ East Journal 
{Washington, D.C. Jan.1948), p.4. 
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authorities in particular, were regarded as enemies and 
hindrance to the realization of fundamental objectives of 
Zionism. ^•'^^ 
The reasons mentioned above were enough for the 
Zionists to turn towards America. Initially the tactic was 
to apply American pressure on the British Policy. 
The Zionist search for American support and making 
America a centre of Zionist activities had two main 
underlying reasons. 
(1) The Zionist opposition to 1939 White Paper and British 
intransigence over it. 
(2) To replace Great Britain for the Gentile support. 
There was an anticipation in the Zionist circle that if 
the Allied powers did win the war the U.S. would emerge as 
the leader of the West and it would be possible for them to 
translate the Biltmore programme into action with the 
gentile support in America. "The Ziox'^sts went about their 
task on three different levels to win for their cause the 
American people, the Congress and the Administration". ^ 
138. Taylor, n.l2, p.59. 
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Winning American people. Congress and Administration: The 
American Zionist Emergency Council, previously known as 
American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs started 
projecting elaborate propaganda for the Zionist cause in 
America. The committee consisted of 76 state and regional 
branches with 380 committees on the local level. ^^ Another 
organisation known as American Palestine Committee was 
established. The objective of this committee was to muster 
the support of Christians in America. Another Organisation 
related to above organisations was launched. This was known 
as the Christian Council on Palestine. The aim and purpose 
of this Christian Council was to concentrate on the 
clergymen to inculcate a sense of oneness with Zionism. 
There was a prevalent Protestant opinion in America. This 
was congenial to the Zionists and they carefully exploited 
it.142 
Besides winning the support of clergymen and church 
groups, the Zionists also needed the cooperation of 
140. Hurewitz, Jacob C. Th^S? Struggle for Palestine. the 
Fallacies and Dangers of Political Zionism (New York, 
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journalists and persons in eminent positions. Thus 
Zionist campaign in 1943 got in full swing and its effort 
was to..-inject Zionism political nationalism into every 
crevice of the American scene'. On the surface level it 
seemed that Zionist propaganda campaign was launched to 
unite opposition to the 1939 White Paper but the underlying 
aim was to promote support for Zionism's new policy of the 
establishment of Jewish statehood.-^ '^  
The general ignorance of American gentile of Zionism 
and the Zionist ingenuity led to the building of 
considerable gentile support for Zionists. 
The Zionists in the course of amassing support among 
the gentile did not neglect American Jewry. American Jewry 
at that time was assimilationist by tradition. The time 
was ripe to implement the third point of the Herzelian 
programme - the development of Jewish support. 
To put the plan into action the Palestine Executive 
sent propaganda officers known as 'schbehim' to the U.S. to 
143. Hurewitz, n.l40, p.210. 
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convince American Jewry that political Zionism was the only 
solution to the crisis then facing world Jewry. * 
In this effort Zionists' attempt to win American Jewry 
was as successful as the campaign to win the American 
gentile public. 
Congress: A through going plan was envisaged by the Zionists 
for ultimate conversion of the United States Congress to the 
Zionist cause. The enrolment of 67 Senators and 143 
Representatives was made in the American Palestine 
Committee. In December 1942 one third of the Senate 
alongwith one and a half thousand other public figures 
signed a proclamation demanding the creation of a Jewish 
Army.148 
The Zionists encouraged by this initial success needed 
a Congressional declaration backing the Biltmore Programme. 
In October 1943, a group of 500 rabbis arrived at the 
Capital Hill and presented Zionist demands to Vice-President 
147. Kirk, n.l23, p.329 
148. Ibid., p.247. 
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Wallace. This move was supported by Zionist lobbies. ^ '^  
Resolutions endorsing the Biltmore programme were introduced 
in both houses of Congress in January 1944. The 
resolutions were temporarily shelved on the advice of the 
chief of Staff, General Marshall. Marshall felt that their 
passage would be detrimental to allied war effort. 
Nonetheless it is surprising that America came so close to 
committing itself officially to a movement whose aims and 
objectives were not clearly understood. However this was the 
outcome of barely three years of Zionist concentration in 
America.-^^^ 
Though the resolutions were shelved in the Congress the 
Zionists pursued their aims at the national conventions the 
following summer. This resulted in the adoption by both 
Party Convention of pro-Zionist planks.-^"^^ The Zionist 
influence was so intense that neither Party hoped to win 
without the support of Jewish electorate. 
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Administration•• To win the U.S. administration's support 
Weizmann made three trips to America. He devoted 
considerable time and energy to win Administrations 
commitment to Zionism and the Biltmore programme. He talked 
to Roosvelt in February 1940 seeking American stand opposing 
the 1939 White Paper. He carefully avoided the subject of 
statehood. Nevertheless Roosvelt hesitated to grant special 
favour to Zionism seeking a joint Arab-Zionist solution to 
the problem of Palestine. •'•^^ 
Weizmann traveled to America again in the spring of 
1941. There he talked to Summer Welles and other top 
government officials. However state Department officials and 
others charged with U.S. policy in the Middle East as a 
whole would not regard Zionist interests as isolated or 
special. As the policies suggested by British commissions 
had been reversed, so, too, could the opinions of American 
experts on the Middle East be reversed in Washington. 
Weizmann, therefore continued to concentrate on the top 
levels, where decisions from below could easily be 
reversed. 
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During the time when Congressional Resolutions 
endorsing Jewish statehood were kept suspended Rabbis Wise 
and Silver were successful in convincing Roosvelt to make a 
statement conveying American opposition to 1939 White Paper. 
A year later on 16 March 1945 Wise tried to wrest 
another statement from Roosvelt regarding his meeting with 
Ibn Saud after Yalta Conference. Roosvelt stated simply that 
he had not changed his position on Zionism. 
Even though the Zionists were by and large unsuccessful 
in their dealings with Roosvelt, they succeeded during his 
Administration in seeking to influence American policy on 
the Middle East through the White House. During the 
Presidency of Truman this tactic brought handsome reward. 
With the advent of Truman, the Administration joined the 
Congress and the public to become a new prize in the Zionist 
158 
struggle for Jewish statehood. 
Later on when the Zionist state was created, the new 
nation felicited Chaim Weizmann, for decades the recognized 
157. Ibid., p.83. 
158. Taylor, n.l2, pp.83-84. 
10' , 
leader of the Zionist, movement by electing him the first 
President. Weizmann minimized his role and insisted that the 
person, most responsible, for the creation of the state of 
Israel was Harry S. Trumann. Truman's support was the 
master stroke of Zionist diplomacy in the realms of 
realpolitik. 
159. John Snetsingers, Trmngn, the Jft>?ish Votg and the 
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GKEAT BRITAIN, ZIONISM AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION 
The Middle East and British War Policy: 
"It was the outbreak of the World War I that suddenly 
invested Palestine with a new importance in Allied military 
calculations. From then on, England based its Near Eastern 
policy on a central and immutable criterion, the security of 
Suez Canal". This vital passageway for British commerce, 
an artery of transport for the military manpower reserves of 
the overseas empires was threatened twice during January 
1915 and August 1916 on account of Turkish military 
expedition. Though the attacks were repelled, Britain became 
aware of the vulnerability of the Sues to such kinds of 
assault from neighbouring Palestine. To counter this threat 
military headquarters in Cairo devoted their attention to 
new political strategy. This was to mobilize the Ottoman 
Empire's restive Arab subjects to their side by luring them 
2 
to the promise of independence and sovereignty. 
From the British point of view, status of those lands 
comprising the Ottoman Empire had been of importance since 
the beginning of the nineteenth century. Anglo -Turkish 
friendship had been possible at that point because of the 
mutual interest in frustrating the efforts at direct 
1. Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel. From The Rise Q± 
Zionism To our Time (Oxford, 1977), p.92. 
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political penetration mad© by Napoleonic France. It was 
strengthened as the century progressed under the pressure of 
Russian expansionism . 
With the consolidation of control in India, successive 
British governments came to hold the strategic value of the 
Ottoman Empire's Arab regions in ever greater regard. 
Generals and statesmen alike acknowledged the necessity for 
retaining unimpeded access to the two routs linking England 
with her Indian Empire and the Orient: The land route 
across Syria and Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf; and the 
waterway (Suez Canal) connecting the Mediterranean Sea with 
the Indian Ocean. 
The legacy of the British foreign policy was to support 
the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Ezapire although 
annexation of Cyprus in 1878 and the occupation of Egypt in 
1882 were stark aberrations. The conversion of Turkish 
policy from professed neutrality to belligerency in late 
3. See Sir John A.R. Mariott, Uae Eastern Question: ^^ 
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H.W.V. Temperley, England and the Near East (London, 
1964). These studies have thoroughly dealt Britain's 
relationship with F^atern Question. 
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1914 forced a complete rethinking as far as British military 
and political strategies were concerned. 
After considerable delay, and only in response to 
intense diplomatic pressure from France and Russia, the 
British Government sought to fonnulate its ultimate war aims 
and territorial ambitions in the Middle East. An inter-
departmental committee was specifically constituted under 
the Chairmanship of Sir Maurice de Bunsen to consider 
British desiderata in Turkey. The committee reviewed in 
detail the existing interests of Great Britain in the region 
and then submitted a secret report to the War Council on 
3e^h June 1915.^ 
According to the report nine specific desiderata in the 
Arab region were distinguished. Three of tViese pertained to 
the Arab peoples. They called for the fulfillment of pledges 
under consideration or already given to the several Sheikhs 
of the Arabian Peninsula and, "Generally maintenance of the 
assurances given to the Sharif of Mecca and the Arabs"; 
insurance that Arabia and the Muslim holy places would 
remain "under independent Muslim rule"; and , lastly, a 
settlement of the question of Palestine and the holy places 
of Christendom. 
5. Ibid., p.4. 
6. Ibid., p.5. 
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However, the moderate proposals of the d& Bunsen 
committee were rejected though its basic postulates were 
shared by Foreign Office, India Office, and War Office in 
their future dealings with the Arabs, the French, and the 
Zionists. 
British War promises to the Arabs: 
The emergence cf the Arabs as a distinctive entity, and 
their recognition as such by the British Government, was one 
of the major results of Anglo-Turkish hostility. The state 
of war permitted Britain to exploit grievances between Arabs 
and Turks and to deal directly with the Arab spokesmen. As 
early as November 1914, a message had been sent to Sharif 
Hussain of Mecca, ruler of Hejaz, at the instruction of Lord 
Kitchener, the Secretary"of State for War. It advised that: 
If the Amir and Arabs in general assist Great 
Britain in this conflict that has been forced 
upon us by Turkey, Great Britain will promise 
not to intervene in any manner whatsoever, 
whether in things religious or otherwise.... 
Till now we have defended and befriended Islam 
in the person of the Turk: henceforward it 
shall be in that of the noble Arab.... It 
7. Ibid., p.6. 
8. See Zeine N. Zeine, Arab Turkish Relations and the 
Emerjgence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut, 1958), Bernard 
Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1961). 
10? 
would be well if your Highness could convey to 
your followers and devotees, who are found 
throughout the world in every country, the 
good tidings of the freedom of Arabs and the 
rising of the sun over Arabia. 
It should be noted that the British encouraged the 
Sharif in his personal ambitions, even intimating to hitn 
that "it may be that an Arab of true race will assume the 
Caliphate of Mecca or Medina'. They also tended to 
overestimate the scope of his prestige and authority and the 
extent of Arab homogeneity. 
This message, and an earlier visit by the Sharif's son 
Abdullah, to the British Residency in Cairo soon led to a 
direct correspondence between the British High Commissioner 
for Egypt and the ruler of Hijaz concerning prospects for an 
alliance. 
Hussein - McMahon Correspondence: 
A correspondence -- later known as Hussein -- McMahon 
Correspondence consisting of ten letters, was exchanged 
during the period from July 1915 to March 1916 which 
culminated in a British promise of Arab independence.^^ 
9. Cabinet meetings, 271, p.144 (Committees General Series, 
1915), Hereinafter CAB. 
10. Aaron, n.4, p.8. 
11. Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest. (New York, 1967), p.14. 
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In his opening letter of 14 July 1915 Sharif Hussein 
sought to gain the endorsement of Great Britain for his 
definition of Arab aspirations. He began by stating that 
"the whole of the Arab nation without exception have decided 
in these last years to live, and to accomplish their 
freedom, and grasp the reigns of their administration both 
12 in theory and practice". He then asked approval of 
several "fundamental propositions", the most important 
being that England should acknowledge "the independence of 
the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and 
Adana up to 37*^  of latitude...; on the east by the borders 
of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the 
Indian Ocean; on the west by the Red Sea \and the 
Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina. It is presumed that 
Sharif Hussein was influenced in his claim by a protocol 
drawn up early in 1915 by secret societies of Arab 
nationalists at Damascus. In return the Sharif promised 
to acknowledge the preferential position of England in all 
12. Parliaunentary command paper: "Correspondence between 
Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesties High Commission in 
Cairo and the Sherif Hussain of Mecca, July, 1915-
March 1916" (Cmd. 5957), p. 3, hereinafter cited as Cmd. 
13. Ibid. 
14- Antonius George, Th^ Ar^b Awakening. (Philadelphia, 
1939), pp.157-58. 
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economic enterprises in the Arab countries. Replying on 30 
August, Sir Henry McMahon expressed satisfaction that "Arab 
interest are English interests and English Arab", and that 
"our desire [is] for an independent Arabia". Regarding, the 
question of limits and boundaries, he advised that "it would 
appear to be premature to consume our time in discussing 
such details in the heat of war". 
This first exchange of letters set the tone for future 
correspondence by revealing divergent emphasis. In 
communicating with the Sharif, McMahon had but one immediate 
objective", to have the Arabs commit themselves against their 
political suzerain and co-religionists. He thus sought to 
avoid lengthy, detailed negotiations over exact boundaries 
and spoke initially only of an independent Arabia. The 
Sharif, on his part, was specific both with regard to the 
nature of military and financial support expected of Britain 
and to the territorial dimensions of future Arab rule. 
However, Sharif Hussein was vague in the matters of less 
immediate concern; he did not specify what form this future 
independence might take; whether one vast kingdom or several 
units, each with a separate form of government yet coming 
15. Cmd. 5957, p.3, 
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together to form a conferation. Thus, for example, on 
September 9, Hussein wrote, "I am myself, with all my might 
carrying out in my country...all things which tend to 
benefit the rest of the Kingdom", to which McMahon replied 
on 24 October: Great Britain would advise and assist to 
establish "what may appear to be the most suitable forms of 
17 government in these various territories".-^ 
Sharif Hussein kept on insisting for a discussion of 
frontiers, and McMahon, having realized that the Sharif 
regarded this question as one of vital and urgent importance 
and would delay entering the war, sought instructions from 
London. He was then authorized to make the following 
statement in his letter of 24 October: 
The two districts of Mersina and Aloxandretta 
and portions of Syria lying to the west of the 
districts of Damascus Homs, Hauna and Aleppo 
cannot he said to he purely Arab and should be 
excluded from the limits demanded. 
16. Aaron, n.4., p.9. 
17. Cmd. 5957, p.6. 
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With the above modification, and without 
prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab 
chiefs, we accept those limits. As for those 
regions lying within those frontiers wherein 
Great Britain is free to act without detriment 
to the interest of her ally, France, I am 
empowered in the name of the Government of 
Great Britain to give the following assurances 
and make the following reply to your letter: 
(i) Subject to the above modifications, Great 
Britain is prepared to recognize and support 
the independence of the Arabs in all the 
regions within the limits demanded by the 
Sharif of Mecca...^^ 
Encouraged by this acceptance of his principal demand 
for independence, Hussein wrote back on 5 November, 
retracting his insistence upon the inclusion of vilayets of 
Mersina and Adana in the Arab Kingdom. At the same time, 
however, he did stress that the vilayets of Aleppo and 
Beirut and their sea coasts were purely Arab and that the 
vilayets in Mesopotamia were historically bound to the 
Arabs. But he was willing to leave the latter under British 
administration for a short time in return for a suitable sum 
paid as compensation to the Arab Kingdom for the period of 
18. Ibid. 
m 
occupation". Sheif Hussein emphasized on this point that he 
had made the utmost in concessions for the sake of 
19 
agreement. 
The British Government, having consented reluctantly to 
the Sharif's territorial claims, subsequently introduced 
modifications. By the time McMahon sent his letter of 14 
December to Mecca, three reservations were apparent: (i) 
further consideration would have to be given to Aleppo and 
Beirut, "as the interest of our ally, France, are involved 
in them both". 
(ii) since Britain could not repudiate agreements 
already in existences those which were then in effect with 
Arab Chiefs would still apply "to all territories included 
in the Arab Kingdom" 
(iii) Britain insisted that her established position 
and interest in Mesopotamia would necessitate special 
administrative arrangements. Twenty thousand British pounds 
sterling, an "earnest of intentions", accompanied the letter 
in the hope of softening the Sharif's reaction. 
19. Aaron, n.4, p.10. 
20- Cmd 5957, Letter No.6 dated in December 1915, pp.11-12. 
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In his final letter of 1 January 1916, the Sharif said 
that he would not press an issue which might impair the 
alliance between Great Britain and France. "Yet we find it 
our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that, at 
the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall 
ask you (what we avert our eyes from today) for what we now 
leave to France in Beirut and its coasts.... It is 
impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any 
other Power, a span of land in those regions." 
Sir Henry McMahon answered this in his fourth letter of 
25 January 1916, by taking note of the Sharif's "desire to 
avoid anything which might possibly injure the alliance 
between Great Britain and France", and assured him that the 
friendship between the two countries would endure after the 
22 war.^^ 
The Sharif, on his part, never referred to the boundary 
question again during the negotiations but the claims, not 
accepted by the British Government, were not withdrawn. 
21- Ibid., Letter no.7 and 1 January 1916, pp.12-14. 
22. Ibid., Letter no.8 dated 25 January 1916, pp.14-15. 
23. Robert John an Sami Hadawi, The Palestine Diarv. Vol.1, 
(Beirut, 1970), p.40. 
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The Sykes - Picot Agreement (1916): While the British 
Government through its official representative in Cairo was 
negotiating on the possibility of an agreement with the 
Arabs by promising them independence in a region to include 
Palestine, other representatives were negotiating secretly 
with France and Russia for dividing control of the Asiatic 
portions of the Ottoman Empire after victory. 
As the major ally France's claim to preference in parts 
of Syria could not be ignored. The British Foreign Minister, 
Sir Edward Grey, told the French Ambassador in London, Paul 
Cambon, on 21 October, 1915, of the exchanges of letters 
with Sharif Hussein and suggested that the two governments 
arrive at an understanding with their Russian ally on their 
future interests in the Ottoman Empire. 
M. Picot was appointed French representative with Sir 
Mark Sykes, now Secretary of the British War Cabinet, to 
define the interests of their countries and to go to Russia 
to include that country's views in their agreement. The 
negotiations for this Tripartite Agreement for the partition 
24. Ibid., p.53. 
25. Ibi.d, p.54. 
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26 of the Ottotaan Empire started as soon as general agreement 
had been reached with Hussein but neither Sir Henry McMahon 
nor Sherif Hussein were told of them. 
Russia was accorded the occupation of Constantinople 
in the secret discussions with Foreign Secretary Saaanov, 
both the shores of the Bosphorus and some parts of the 
Turkish Armenia. France claimed Lebanon and Syria eastward 
to Mosul. Palestine did in fact have inhabitants and shrines 
of the Greek and Russian Orthodox and Armenian Churches, and 
Russia at first claimed a right to the area as their 
protector. This was countered by Sykes - Picot and the claim 
was withdrawn to the extent that Russia, in consultation 
with other allies, would only participate in deciding a form 
of international administration for Palestine. 
The Sykes Picot Agreement provided for the Arab areas: 
(a) an independent Arab state or a federation of Arab 
states in a part of what in now geographically known as 
Saudi Arabia and Yamen; 
26. E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, Documents on British 
Foreign Policy. 1919-1939. 1st Ser., Vol.4 (London, 
1952). Hereinafter ,ited as Document 4 (four). 
27. John & Hadawi, n.23, p.54. 
28. Ibid., p.35. 
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(b) France in Lebanon and Syria and Britain in Iraq 
and Trans Jordan: 'to establish such direct or indirect 
administration or control aa they may desire or as they may 
deem fit to establish after agreement with the Arab State or 
confederation of Arab States'. 
(c) Parts of Palestine to be placed under 'an 
international administration of which the form will be 
decided upon after consultation with Russia, and after 
subsequent agreement with the other Allies and the 
on 
representatives of the Sharif of Mecca. 
George Antonius an Arab authority on the subject has 
analysed the provisions of the document. He remarked; 
What the Sykes - Picot Agreement did was, 
first, to cut up the Arab rectangle in such a 
manner as to place artificial obstacles in the 
way of unity.... Whatever gains the Allied 
Powers may have hoped to derive from the 
partition of that territory, it showed a lack 
of perspicacity on their part to have imagined 
that it could make for peaceful or a lasting 
settlement. 
29. Documents 4, pp.241-251. 
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Antonius added: 
Another peculiarity was that it provided for a 
topsy theory political structure in which the 
first were to come last and the last first. 
The inhabitants of Syria and Iraq were 
politically more developed and mature than the 
inhabitants of the inland regions. yet the 
agreement provided that the greater part of 
Syria and Iraq might he placed under a regime 
of direct foreign administration, while the 
in land regions were in any case to form 
independent Arab States. The absurdity of 
these provisions is particularly evident in 
the case of the regions destined to form the 
British sphere of influence. 
He elaborated". 
But more serious even than those errors of 
judgement was the breach of faith. The 
Agreement had been negotiated and concluded 
without the knowledge of the Sherif Hussein 
and it contained provisions which were in 
direct conflict with the terms of Sir Henry 
McMahon's compact with him. Worse still the 
fact of its conclusion was dishonestly 
concealed from him because it was realized 
that, were he to have been apprised, he would 
have unhesitatingly denounced his alliance 
with Great Britain. 
Antonius has denounced the Agreement as a shocking 
document. He described, "it is only the product of greed at 
its worst, that is to say, of greed allied to suspicion and 
so leading to stupidity; it also stands out as a startling 
.30 piece of double dealing. 
30. Antonius, n.l4, p.248, 
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The Agreement was in contradiction to the promises made 
to the Arabs. The Turks gave Hussein the details of the 
Agreement. Hussein could do nothing but formerly repudiate 
it and went on fighting. His faith in Great Britain remained 
unshaken. ••^•^  
The tripartite agreement did not mention of concessions 
to Zionism in the future disposition of Palestine. However, 
before the departure of Sykes to Petrograd on 27 February 
1916 for discussions with Sazanov, he was approached with a 
plan by Herbert Samuel, who was a member in the cabinet by 
virtue of being the President of the Local Government Board 
32 and was strongly sympathetic to Herzl's Zionism. 
The plan put forward by Samuel was in the form of a 
memorandum. Sykes was prudent enough to commit it to memory 
and destroy. Sykes wrote to Samuel suggesting that if 
Belgium should assume the administration of Palestine it 
might he more acceptable to France as an alternative to the 
international administration which she wanted and the 
33 Zionists did not. Of boundaries marked on a map attached 
31. John & Hadawi, n.23, p.37, 
32. Ibid. 
33. Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration. (London, 1961), 
p.109. 
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•bo the memorandum he wrote, "By excluding Hebron and the 
east of the Jordan there is less to discuss with the 
Moslems, as the Mosque of Omar then becomes the only matter 
of vital importance to discuss with them and further does 
away with any contact with the Beduins, who never cross the 
river except on business. I imagine that the principal 
object of Zionism is the realisation of the ideal of an 
existing centre of nationality rather than boundaries or 
extent of territory. The moment I return I will let you 
know how things stand at Petrograd". 
Nevertheless, Sozanov in deliberations both with Sykes 
and the French ambassador, was careful not to commit himself 
as to the extent of the Russian interest in Palestine, but 
made it clear that Ru~Eia would have to insist that not only 
the holy places, but all towns and localities in which there 
were religious establishments belonging to the Orthodox 
Church, should be placed under international administration, 
with a guarantee of free acces to the Mediterraneam. 
Caarist Russia would not consent to a Zionist formula for 
Palestine; but its days were numbered. *^° 
34. Ibid., pp.233-234. 
35. John & Hadawi, n.23, p.58. 
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The Sykes Picot agreement was a striking example of 
traditional diplomacy. If amounted to a calculated division 
in advance of territorial spoils of war. The analysis of its 
provisions and implications is significant. First it assumed 
that a spirit of close cooperation and consultation would 
continue to govern relations between the two powers in 
peacetime. The Agreement overlooked the conflicting 
interests of the two powers in area. Second, both parties 
appear to have held a limited definition of Arab 
sovereignty. They considered themselves "the protectors of 
the Arab State" and believed that any administrative systems 
which might be established could only be "as they desire and 
as they may think fit to arrange" with the Arab State. Yet 
they agreed to negotiate with the Arabs over the boundaries 
of the Arab State ana were prepared to accept the King of 
HejaE as an equal to be consulted together with the other 
allies in matters pertaining to that area reserved for 
international control. Third, the signatories were vague in 
their conceptio.-i of the form which Arab rule would take. The 
acceptance of the agreement by His Majesty's Government was 
conditional provided that "the cooperation of the Arabs is 
secured, and that the Arabs fulfill the conditions and 
obtain the towns of Horns, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo". It 
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was taken for granted that in any event the specific 
interests of all three parties could be adjusted reasonably 
and honorably once Turkey had been defeated. 
This was the spirit, and out of lingering anxiety on 
account of war the British Government proceeded to take upon 
itself a further obligation in November 1917, this time to 
the Jewish people, in the form of Balfour Declaration. 
Britain's Pledge to the Zionists; The Balfour Declaration: 
"From the British point of view, the secret war time 
agreements were dictated by the imperative necessity of 
gaining allies for the sake of winning the war. Russia, 
Italy, France and the Arabs were such allies. It was also 
believed in Great Britain that an understanding with the 
Zionists would produce a new ally in the form of world 
Jewry. "'^ ^ 
The spring of 1917 brought two dramatic developments 
which proved to be decisive for the success of the Zionist 
cause. The firjt was the revolution in Russia and the second 
was the US entry into the war. The Western allies were 
36. Aaron, n.24, p.13 
37. George Lencaowski, Ihfi Middle East in World Affairs. 
(London, 1982). p.82. 
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intensely interested in keeping Russia in the War and in 
preventing a separate peace treaty with Germany. Prime 
Minister Lloyd George as well as Lord Balfour believed that, 
in view of the prominence of the Jews in the Russian 
revolutionary movement, it was essential to acquire their 
goodwill by responding favourably to Zionist aspirations. 
It was also important to obtain full co-operation and 
maximum effort from Britain's new ally, the United States. 
Here, too, it was believed, the Jews could render 
inestimable service. Moreover, an Allied pronouncement in 
favour of Zionism might win over the German Jewry to the 
Allied cause and, indirectly, help in producing internal 
disaffection in the Central Powers. While these were the 
practical reasons for Britain's decision to satisfy the 
Zionists, emotional motives on the part of some statesmen 
and a section of the Allied public opinion cannot be ruled 
out. "Christian charity toward a persecuted race, the Old 
Testament heritage so important in shaping the historical 
consciousness of some Protestant groups, and democratic 
liberalism added the glow of virtue to purely practical 
38. Ibid. 
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calculation, or appealed to those for whom Realpolitik was 
.. 39 not a sufficient inducement . 
In their negotiations with Great Britain, the Zionists 
insisted on a British protectorate over Palestine as the 
best guarantee for the success of their programme. This 
amounted to the repudiation of that part of the Sykes Picot 
Agreement which provided lor the internationalization of the 
Holy Land. This also amounted to another contradictory 
pledge. The British Government was not averse to accepting 
this Zionist proposal. 
The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, in May 
1917 paid visit to America. There he talked to Justice 
Brandies, a leading Zionist and a close adviser to President 
Wilson. The British Cabinet before committing itself desired 
to arrange for a formal endorsement by President Wilson of a 
pro-Zionist pronouncement. President Wilson not only 
supported Zionism but referred to himself as a Zionist in 
the course of discussions with other noted statesmen. 
38. Ibid., pp.83-34. 
40. J.M.N. Jeffries, Palestine:The Reality (London, 1939), 
pp.141-44. 
41. Reuben Fink, hmf.riQ& and Fal<S3tin<i; (New York, 1945), 
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However, Wilson was unwilling to roake any endorsement 
at that time to pro Zionist policj', since the U.S.A. was not 
at war with Turkey. But following an official British 
enquiry addressed to Colonel House, Wilson on October 16, 
1917 instructed him to approve the Pro-Zionist draft 
declaration proposed by the British government. 
On November 2, 1917 following the acceptance by the 
British Cabinet of the major points of the draft submitted 
by the Zionists, Lord Balfour addressed the following letter 
to Rothschild: 
Dear Lord Rothschild, 
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on 
behalf of the Majesty's Government, the 
following declaration of sympathy with Jawieh 
Zionist aspirations which has been submitted 
to, and approved by, the Cabinet. 
His Majesty's Government view with favour the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home 
for the Jewish people, and will use their best 
endeavours to facilitate the achievement of 
this object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done, which may prejudice the 
civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights 
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and political status enjoyed by Jews in any 
other country. 
I should be grateful if you would bring this 
declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist 
Federation. 
Yours sincerely, 
A 0 
Arthur James Balfour 
By issuing the Balfour Declaration the British 
Government had committed itself even further to the emerging 
struggle for the Middle East, a struggle between Britain and 
A. T 
France for regional pre-eminence. 
Balfour and Zionism: 
Balfour in 1917, in conversation with Harold Nicolson, 
explained his approach to the Jewish question in words like 
these: "The Jews are the most gifted race that mankind has 
seen since the Greeks of the fifth century. They have been 
exiled scattered and oppressed. If we can find them an 
asylum, a safe home in their native land then the full 
flowering of their genius will burst forth and propagate.... 
42. The letter was first published in tVie Jewish Chronicle 
in London, 9 Nov.1917. 
43. Aaron, n.4, p.14, In contrast to its open circulation 
in Europe,the declaration was kept secret from the Arab 
Communities. A public reading of the declaration 
apparelntly did not take place in Palestine until 
April, 1920. 
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The submerged Jews of the ghettos of Eastern Europe will in 
Palestine find a new life and develop a new and powerful 
identity. Such, more or less, Nicolson recalls, were the 
exact words he used. 
Balfour felt that the Christian religion and 
civiliaation owed to Judaism an immeasurable debt, 
shamefully ill-repaid. Asked at a private gathering a few 
months after the declaration about the real motives behind 
it, he replied, "Both the.Prime Minister and myself have 
been influenced by a desire to give the Jewe their rightful 
place in the world; a great nation without a home is not 
right". In a conversation recorded by Mr Dugdale^ in 
1926, he said, "As you know, I have always been a a Zionist, 
long before the War. Therefore, when the problems of 
nationalism... began to occupy ray mind I was at the Foreign 
Office during the War. It is not likely that I would be less 
keen to satisfy Jewish nationalism than any of the 
others". 
44. Sir Harold Nicolson in The Jerusalem Post, Weizmann 
Memorial Issue, (2 Nov. 1952). As quoted in Leonard 
Stein, n.33, p.157. 
45. Leonard Stein, n.33, p.159. 
46. 16 July 1926 Dugdale Papers as quoted in Leonard 
Stein, n.33, p.159. 
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In a memorandum written during the Peace Conference in 
1919 he brushed aside the argument that this was not the 
normal case of a nation seeking the right to live its life 
on soil which it had already occupied. He said, further 
The four Great Powers are committed to 
Zionism. And Zionism, be it wrong or right, 
good or bad, is rooted in age long traditions, 
in present needs, in future hopes of far 
profounder import than the desires and 
prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who 
now inhabit that ancient land. 
He told Mrs Dugdale in 1926, 'I was very sympathetic to 
Arab nationalism, too, though I always felt that, as far as 
Palestine went, Arab claims were infinitely weaker than 
those of the Jews. 
Zionism appealed to Balfour not only because he saw in 
it a national movement at least as worthy of respect as any 
other, but also because the unhappy history of the Jews 
seemed to him to give them a special claim to some measure 
of reparation. When he thought of the wrongs they had 
suffered at the hands of their persecutors, he was oppressed 
48. Ibid. 
49. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. (London, 
H.M. S.O.). IV, No.242, p.345 (11 August 1979). 
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by a certain sense of guilt, and the passionate advocacy of 
Zionism is accounted for, at least in part, by the 
promptings of a troubled conscience. The idea of atonement 
is brought out strongly in the concluding passages of his 
speech in the Palestine debate in the House of Lords on 21 
June 1922:^^ 
Consider whether the whole culture of Europe, 
the whole religious organisation of Europe, 
has not from time to time proved itself guilty 
of great crimes against this race. Surely it 
is in order that we may send a message to 
every land where the Jewish race has been 
scattered, a message which will tell them that 
Christendom is not oblivious of their faith, 
is not unmindful of the service they have 
rendered to the great religions of the 
world... and we desire to the best of our 
ability, to give them the opportunity of 
developing in peace and quietness, under 
British rule, those great gifts which hitherto 
they have been compelled... only to bring to 
fruition in countries which know not their 
language and belong not to their race....That 
is the aim which lay at the root of the policy 
I am trying to defend; and though it is 
defensible on every ground, that is the ground 
that chiefly moves me. 
51. Stein, ri.33, p. 160. 
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The Balfour Declaration took shape in the interval 
between the Russian Revolution of March 1917 and the events 
immediately preceding the Bolshevik coup d'etat in the 
following November. Considering how Czarist Russia had 
treated its Jews, it is little surprising that it should 
have struck Balfour as an 'extraordinary phenomenon' that 
many Jews were active, and some were conspicuous, in the 
revolutionary movements. But Balfour's remark that those 
were the reasons "which make you and me such ardent 
Zionists" is significant, Zionism as perceived by Balfour 
would provide an antidote to the destructive mania of Jews 
in rebellion against their lot by offering them a healthy 
outlet for their frustrated energies. Balfour believed that 
the solution proposed by the Zionists organisation was the 
correct one. At the time of the Balfour Declaration these 
ideas were already coming to the fore, but, strongly as they 
appealed to Balfour in the light of the Russian Revolution 
they served only to fortify him in beliefs which on other 
grounds he had come to hold with firm and, indeed, 
52 passionate conviction. 
53. Stein, n.33, p.162. 
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Declaration analysed: 
For the purpose of analysis the text of the Balfour 
Declaration issued on 2 November 1917 may be divided into 
three parts. 
The first is applicable to the Jews. It provided: 
'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment 
in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and 
will use their best endeavour to facilitate the achievement 
of this object". 
The second affecting the rights and position of the 
Muslim and Christian inhabitants, stipulated: "It being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non 
Jewish communities in Palestine". 
The third pointing towards the position of the Jews 
outside Palestine, ruled: "The rights and political status 
enjoyed by Jews in any other country shall not be 
prejudiced by the establishment in Palestine of a national 
home for the Jewish people. This latter protective clause 
gave the Jews the homeland of another people while 
safeguarding their own rights in their countries of 
. . .. 53 origin . 
53. Hadawi, n.ll, p.18. 
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If one reads through the second safeguarding clause, 
one is able to discern that the Muslim and Christian 
inhabitants have been mentioned in such a way as to give an 
entirely false picture of their position in the country and 
their indubitable right to it. Although constituting, in 
1917, 92% of the population, they were referred to as "the 
existing non-Jewis?i communities of Palestine". This tended 
to give the erroneous impression that they were an 
insignificant minority occupying a position subordinate to 
the Jews. This clause, by purporting to protect the rights 
of the Arabs as "the existing non-Jewish communities", in 
reality aimed at robbing them in due course of their right 
to the country as owners and inhabitants. 
But leaving aside this deception and looking 
at the implication of the safeguarding clause, 
there is only one possible judgement that can 
he passed on it, namely, it was sufficient to 
nullify the rest of the Declaration. The 
British Government should have known that what 
the Zionists wanted would have constituted a 
disastrous encroachment on Arab rights in 
Palestine. In effect the British Government 
promised to help the Zionists achieve them, 
provided that nothing was done to enable them 
to achieve it'. 
55. Ibid. 
m 
Answering the criticism of the Declaration, Lord 
Balfour said, "Zionism may fail.... This is an adventure.... 
Are we never to have adventures ? Are we never to try new 
experiments ?"^ "^  Lord Sydenham replied that the Zionist 
experiment would fail, 
But the harm done by dumping down an alien population 
upon an Arab country - Arab all round in the hinterland may 
never be remedied.... What we have done is, by concessions, 
not to the Jewish people but to a Zionist extreme section, 
to start a running sore in the East, and no one can tell 
how far that sore will extend." 
British Reassurance to Arabs: 
The British had concluded two secret agreements which 
conflicted with Arab aspirations, the Sykes Picot Agreement 
dividing Arab territories between Britain and France, and 
the Balfour Declaration signing away to the Jews Arab rights 
in Palestine. The Arab were unaware of it till the text of 
these two instruments were announced by the Bolsheviks on 
CO 
coming to power in 1917.^" This was widely publicised by the 
56. Hansard's Reports, House of Lords, 21 June 1922, p.997. 
57. Ibid., p.1025. 
58. Hadawi, n.11, p.22. 
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Turkish military commander as a sign of Britishi betrayal of 
her pledges to the Arabs. 
Nonetheless, the disclosure created great commotion in 
Arab circles and an explanation was requested by Sharif 
Hussein of Hejaz from the British Government. Assurances 
from the British Government came from time to.time, however 
unconvincing, the Arabs continued to fight the Turks. 
(1) The Hogarth Message of January 1918: 
An explicit assurance was given that "The Jewish 
settlement in Palestine would only be allowed in so far as 
would be consistent with the political and economic freedom 
of the Arab population." 
The phrase 'political and economic freedom of Arab 
population' is important since it is a marked departure from 
Balfour Declaration which guaranteed only the 'civil and 
religious rights of the Arab population. This was an 
assurance for Arab independence and sovereignty, which was 
ignored in Balfour Declaration. 
(2) The Bassett Letter of 8 February 1918: 
This letter was another reassurance that "His Majesty's 
Government and their allies remain steadfast to the policy 
59. Antonious, n.i4, p.268. See Also Aaron, n.4, p.16 and 
Lens, n.37, p.82. 
13-1 
of helping any movement which aims at setting free those 
nations which -.re oppressed...." The letter went on to say, 
The Government of His Britannic Majesty repeats its 
previous promise in respect of the freedom and the 
emancipation of the Arab peoples.' 
(3) The British Declaration to the Seven of 16 June 1918: 
Earlier British pledges to the Arabs were confirmed. 
The Declaration referred to the proclamations read in 
Baghdad and Jerusalem on March 19 and December 9, 1917, 
respectively and stated that these proclamations "define the 
policy of His Majesty's Government towards the 
inhabitants.,. which is that the future government... should 
be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed. 
This policy will always be that of His Majesty's 
fi 1 Government." 
(4) the Anglo-French Declaration of 9 November 1918: 
Anglo French intentions were more explicit in the last 
document of consequence to emerge from the war period. A 
Declaration was issued jointly by the two countries in 
60. Jeffries, n.41, pp.216-217. 
61. Antonius, n.l4, pp.20-21. 
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November 1918 and was given wide publicity. After repeating 
the desire of France and Great Britain to foster the 
emancipation of the peoples in the Middle East and the 
estabiishtment of freely-chosen national governments and 
administrations, it stated: 
Far from wishing to impose on the populations 
of these regions any particular institutions, 
they are only concerned to ensure by their 
support and adequate assistance the regular 
working of governments and administrations 
freely chosen by the populations themselves. 
To secure impartial and equal justice for all, 
to facilitate the economic development of the 
country..., to favour the diffusion of 
education, to put an end to discussions.. . . 
Such is the policy which the two Allied 
Governments uphold in the liberated 
en 
territories. 
With these assurances and affirmations, the Arab War 
against the Turks went on with greater vigour and 
63 determination. 
62. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Series, 145:36. 
63. Hadawi, n.ll, p.21. 
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BRITAIN AND THE MANDATE 
With the signing of the Armistice of Mudros by the 
Entente Powers and Turkey on 30 October 1918, fighting 
ceased in the Middle East. On 30 January 1919, the Supreme 
Council of the Peace Conference decided that the conquered 
Arab provinces, including Palestine, were not to be restored 
to Turkish rule. ^ Palestine remained under British military 
administration until 1920, when a civil administration was 
set up which continued until the British Government obtained 
on 24 July 1922 a formal mandate from the Council of the 
League of Nations to administer the country. A writer has 
commented on the nature of the Mandatory system as follows: 
"To circumvent the fulfillment of their 
promises of Arab independence and to implement 
the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, the 
Allied Powers devised what became kriown as the 
Mandate system. This turned out to the 
fi7 disguised colonialism.' 
64. Aaron, n.4, p.17. 
65. Hadawi, n.ll, p.55. 
66. Henry Catlan, Palestine and International Law. (London, 
1973), p.15. 
67. Hadawi, n.ll, p.55. 
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The Palestine Mandalie: 
The concep-t of international mandates was inspired by 
the principles, propounded by President Wilson and leaders 
of the Russian Revolution, that war settlements at the end 
of the First World War should not involve any annexations 
but should be based upon the principle of self 
determination of peoples. The first concrete proposal of 
the concept was made by General Srcuts as part of a project 
for a League of Nations which he published in December 1918 
fi9 
on the eve of the Peace Conference. 
The concept of the mandate was accepted and its basic 
objectives laid down in Article 22 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations which was adopted on 25 April 1919. 
Article 22 indicated the territories which would be 
subjected to Mandates. There were: 
(a) territories detached from the Turkish Empire, 
(b) certain territories in Central Africa, 
(c) territories in South - West Africa and certain of 
the South Pacific Islands. 
68. Stott, Official Statements of War Aims and Peace 
Proposals, pp.188, 265 and 309 (Washington, 1921). As 
cited in Cattan, n,67, p.15. 
69. See General Smuts, The League of Nations (London, 
1918). 
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The character of the Mandate and the Mandate ry Powers 
would differ in each of these three classes of territories. 
The least onerous were he Mandates to be granted in respect 
of territories detached from the Turkish Empire. As regards 
these territories. Article 22 provided: 
"Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish 
Empire have reached a stage of development where their 
existence as independent nations can be provisionally 
recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice 
and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are 
able to stand alone. The wish of these communities must be 
principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory." 
However, Article 22, did not designate the Mandatory 
Powers. This was done later by the Supreme Council of the 
Allied Powers. 
Palestine, as one of the territories detached from the 
Turkish Empire, was one of the countries whose independence 
was thus provisionally recognized, "subject to the rendering 
of administration advice and assistance by a Mandatory." On 
25 April 1920 at San Remo the Supreme Council of the Allied 
Powers decided to allocate the Mandate over Palestine to 
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Great Britain. But the terms of the Mandate were yet to the 
settled. "^"^  
"One of the most extraordinary aspects of the Palestine 
Mandate is that its terms were proposed by a foreign body 
which harboured political ambitions in respect of the 
country concerned. In its memorandum dated 3 February 
1919, submitted by the World Zionist Organisation to the 
Peace Conference at Paris, this body outlined its wishes and 
desiderata with respect to the future of Palestine. It is 
important to note that "many of the suggestions of the 
memorandum found their way, after revision, into a draft 
Mandate for Palestine formulated by the Zionist Organisation 
and circulated at tVie end of March 1919.. . and, after 
further revision, into the Mandatory instrument approved by 
72 the Council of the League of Nations". The terms of the 
Mandate over Palestine were settled by the British 
73 Government "in consultation with Zionist representative's. 
70. See W.T. Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Palestine 
Problem in International Law and Order (London, 1986), 
pp.13-68. 
71. Cattan, n.67, p.16. 
72. J.C. Hurewitz, DiT>lomacy in the Near and Middle East. 
Vol. II (New York, 1956), p.45. 
73. H.W.V. Temperley, History of the Peace Conference of 
Paris, Vol. VI, p.174. 
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The Arabs of Palestine, who V7ere the party : timed lately 
concei-ried were not even consulted. The Palestine handate was 
approved by the Council of the League of Nations 
substantially in the terms proposed by the Zionist 
Organisation. 
The Mandate had two principle objectives: 
The first objective was to give effect to Article 22 of 
the Covenant. The first recital in its preamble stated: 
"Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for 
the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 
of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to n 
Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of 
the territory of Palestine " 
In fulfillment of this objective Article 2 of the 
Mandate prr^vided: 
"The Mandatory shall be responsible for... the 
development of self governing institutions...." 
The second objective was to put into effect the Balfour 
Declaration, and facilitate Jewish immigration. The second 
recital in the preamble stated: 
74. Cattan, n.67, p.16 
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"Wlriereas the Principal Allied Powers have also 
agreed that the marxdatory should be 
responsible for putting into effect the 
declaration originally made on 2 November 
1917, by the <3overTiment of His Britannic 
Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in 
favour of the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people, it being 
clearly understood that nothing should be done 
which might prejudice the civil and religious 
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine, or the rights and political status 
enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and 
Whereas recognition has thereby been given to 
the historical connexion of the Jewish people 
with Palestine and to the grounds for 
reconstituting their national home in that 
country...." 
To fulfill this obejctive Article 2 provided: 
"The mandatory shall be responsible for 
placing the country under such political, 
administrative &ud economic conditions as will 
secure the establishment of the Jewish 
national home, as laid down in he 
preamble...." 
Armed with the Mandate, using the might of British 
empire and seconded by the forces of Zionism, the British 
Government implemented the Balfour Declaration in Palestine 
14^, 
against the will and despite the opposition of its original 
inhabitants. 
The foul play was aggravated by the way Mandate was 
implemented: 
First, the British Government as Mandatory did not 
take into account the tenuous safeguards laid down in favour 
of the original inhabitants of Palestine both in the Balfour 
Declaration and in the Mandate itself. The Balfour 
Declaration had provided that "nothing should he done which 
might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing 
non Jewish communities in Palestine". The Mandate had 
provided that in facilitating Jewish immigration into 
Palestine, the Administration should ensure that "the rights 
and position of other section of the population are not 
prejudiced " (Article 6). The Mandate was implemented 
without taking into consideration those safeguards. 
Second, Article 2 of the Mandate provided that the 
Mandatory was responsible for developing self-governing 
institutions. There was no trace of any such institutions at 
75. Ibid., n.67, p.17. 
76. Ibid., p.18. See also Hadawi, n.ll, pp.59-60. 
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any -time during "the Manda-te. Palestine was governed and 
administered from beginning to end as if it were a colonial 
possession. A half hearted attempt was made by the British 
Government in 1922 to grant some semblance of autonomy to 
the people of Palestine in the form of a Legislative 
Council. This attempt, however, failed because of Arab 
opposition to the proposed measure on the grounds that it 
did not recognize majority rule, and because of a Jewish 
opposition to the grant of self government to Palestine in 
77 any form so long as they were a minority. 
British Civil Administration in Palestine: 
A civil administration in Palestine was established on 
1 July 1920. The consortium of British Officers which 
arrived in the country included British Zionist Jews who 
were placed in key position. Some of these were Herbert 
Samuel, one of the framers of the Balfour Declaration as 
High Commissioner; Norman Bentiwich, Attorney General and 
chief legislator of Palestine laws, Albert Hyamson, Director 
of Immigration, and Max Nurock, Principal Assistant 
Secretary to the Government with access to all matters 
pertaining to policy in Palestine. 
77. Ibid., p.18 
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One of the early actions of this consortium was to 
enact the first immigration ordinance on 26 August 1920, 
fixing a quota of 16,500 immigrant Jews for the first 
year 7^ 
Other legislation followed, all were aimed to 
facilitate the "Jewish national home" policy. It seemed as 
if the British Government had no obligations to the Arab 
section of the community. Significant among these, next to 
the Immigration Law, were laws affecting land disposition, 
registration and settlements; this was being done to hasten 
Jewish acquisition of Arab land. One of these laws 
disguised as a law to protect cultivators against eviction 
by their land lords had the opposite effect. This was 
because almost all the large tracts of land were owned by-
absentee land - owners living in Lebanon and Syria. Whereas 
relations between landlord and tenant had untill then been 
on the best of terms the new law gave the tenant the 
impression which was also encouraged by Jewish land brokers 
that he no longer needed to pay his rentals since the law 
gave him certain 'tenancy rights' and protected him against 
78. Hadawi, n.ll, p.58 
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eviction. Even 'squalors' were soon able to establish 
'tenancy rights' under certain ambiguously worded provisions 
of the law. The landlord, placed in the unenviable position 
of owning land but getting hardly anything out of it, and 
hardened with taxation beyond his means, found him self in a 
critical situation. Here is where the Jewish land broker 
stepped in and offered to buy the land and rid the landlord 
of his problems. This resulted in massive purchase of lands 
by the Jews and appalling displacement of the agricultural 
Arab families. Other measures favouring Jews were the 
granting to Jewish companies of concessions over state lands 
and the natural resources of the country, such as 
irrigation, electricity and the extraction of potash and 
other minerals from the Dead Sea. 
The Arab majority was denied the right of controlling 
its destiny while it had to change its policy in deference 
to the will of the minority, or untill the minority had 
79 itself become a majority. 
79. Hadawi, n.ll, pp.59-60. 
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The Arab Opposition: 
Arab opposition to the Mandate and the policy of the 
Balfour Declaration remained steadfast and unrelenting 
throughout the period of the Mandate. 
When appeals, protests, arguments, demons-
trations and strikes failed to move the 
British Government to fulfill its pledges to 
the Arabs and follow a policy of justice and 
equity, the Palestine Arabs resorted from time 
to time to violence. The first violent 
expression of Arab feeling occurred on Easter 
Sunday in April 1920; the second in May 1921; 
the third in August 1929; and between 1926, 
and 1939, an all out rebellion broke out which 
was preceded by an unprecedented six months 
strike.80 
Four principal commissions of inquiry were appointed 
directly as a result of the riots. 
These commissions were'-
The Palin Commission of 1920. 
The Haycraft Commission of 1921. 
The Shaw Commission of 1930 
The Royal (Peel) Commission of 1937.^^ 
80. Ibid., p.60. 
81. See Richard N, Verdery, Arab "Disturbances" and the 
Commissions of Inquiry' in Abu-iughod, The 
Transformation of Palestine Ed., (Evenston, 1971), 
pp.275-303. 
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The findings of these commissions were invariably the 
same, namely, 
(a) Arab disappointment at the non-fulfillment of 
the promises of independence which had been given them 
during the First World War; 
(b) Arab belief that the Balfour Declaration implied a 
denial of the right of self-determination and their fear 
that the establishment of 'a national home for the Jews' in 
Palestine will lead to their ultimate dispossession of their 
homes and homeland-
The Zionists made no secret of their intentions, for as 
early as 1921, Dr. Eder, a member of the Zionist 
Commissions, "boldly told the Court of Inquiry' that "there 
can be only one National Home in Palestine, and that a 
Jewish one, and no equality in the partnership between Jews 
and Arabs, but a Jewish preponderance as soon as the number 
on 
of the race are sufficiently increased." 
British 'Statements of Policy': 
The commissions of enquiry which were appointed to 
establish the causes for the riots were each followed by the 
82. William Ziff, The Rape of Palestine. (New York, 1938), 
p.171. 
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issue of a ' St-atement- of Policy', each commission "tried to 
interpret the meaning of 'a national home'. 
Churchill Memorandmn". 
The British Governments' first attempt at a definitive 
public statement of policy in Palestine, the Churchill 
Memorandum was issued on 3 June 1922. ^-^  'The British 
Government' in this instance was virtually the same small 
power clique around Lloyd George which had been responsible 
for the Balfour Declaration. Now their statement of policy 
was tempered by the advice of some permanent British 
officials in the Foreign and Colonial Offices. This was due 
to the perspective improved by the absence of the war 
factor in their analysis. The terms of the draft Mandate 
were being considered under lower pressure. A deviation from 
earlier Zionist formula which included the establishment of 
a Jewish state or commonwealth in Palestine, was 
84 occurring. 
The 'Memorandum' offered what was considered to be a 
forward step in the development of self governing 
3.3. Cmd. 1700, British Statement of Policy, 
84. John, Hadawi, n.23, pp.181-82. 
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ins-bi-tutions by a proposal to establish a legislative 
council containing a large number of members to be elected 
on a wide franchise. The British promise had been to 
facilitate the establishment of a Jewish national home in 
Palestine; 'the terms of tVie Declaration. ... do not 
contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted 
into a Jewish national home, nor was there anything in it to 
warrant the suggestion that Palestine was destined to become 
'as Jewish as England is English'. Moreover, 'His Majesty's' 
Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and 
85 hove no such aim in view'. 
The principal points were". 
(1) His Majesties' Government re-affirmed the Balfour 
Declaration. 
(2) A Jewish national home would he founded in 
Palestine as of right and not of sufferance, but there would 
be no imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the 
inhabitants of Palestine as a whole. 
(3) Nor did His Majesty's Government contemplate the 
disappearance or subordination of the Arab population, 
language or culture. 
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(4) The status of all citisens of Palestine should be 
Palestinian. No section of the population would have any 
other status in the eyes of the law. 
(5) His Majesty's Government intended to foster the 
establishment of a full measure of self government in 
Palestine, and as the next step, a legislative council with 
a majority of elected members would be set-up immediately. 
(6) The special position of the Zionist Executive did 
not entitle it to share in any degree in the government of 
the country. 
(7) Immigration would not exceed the economic capacity 
of the country at the time do absorb new arrivals. 
(8) A committee of the elected members of the 
legislative council would confer with the administration. 
(9) Any religious community or considerable section of 
the population claiming that the term of the Mandate are not 
being fulfilled.^^ 
Although the White Paper repudiated the idea of Jewish 
domination over the Arabs, it established a principle for 
86. Ibid., pp.182-83. 
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the regulation of immigration which v?ould in time make such 
domination possible if not inevitable. Moreover, it was more 
than a statement of formal principles and did not take into 
account one of the essential facts of the situation. The 
British Government had laid down a general policy of a dual 
obligation. The Zionists always better organised, through 
tVie privileged status of the Jewish Agency and tVirough many 
other maneuverings could tilt the balance in their favour. 
The Arabs yet hoped that a change of British policy would 
occur and ensure justice to them. 
On 24 July 1822 the Mandate for Palestine was approved 
by the Council of the League of Nations, to come into force 
officially on 22 December 1923. A last attempt by the 
Vatican to block its approval failed. The Papal Secretary of 
State, Cardinal Gasparri, submitted a memorandum dated 15 
May 1922 severely criticising the Mandate articles designed 
to give effect to the Balfour Declaration, declaring that 
they were incompatible with the Covenant of the League of 
Nations.^^ 
Nevertheless, the 'Churchill Memorandum' established 
the support of the coalition government for thf? Balfour 
87. Cmd. 1785, British Parliamentary Papers, 1922 
88. John & Hadawi, n.23, p.186. 
1 ^ ? 
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Declaration and the Palestine Mandate at the expense of the 
wartime pledge to the Arabs and paved the way for the 
acceptance of the Mandate by the League, and established the 
right of Zionists to demand British administrative, and if 
necessary, military aid in colonising Palestine. 
Passfield White Paper •-
The riots of 1929 were followed by yet another 
pronouncement. This is in form of a White Paper which became 
known as the 'Pass-field Memorandum'. This memorandum is 
important and is reproduced here". 
Many of the misunderstandings which have 
unhappily arisen on both sides appear to be 
the result of a failure to appreciate the 
nature of the duty imposed upon His Majesty's 
Government by the terms of the Mandate, The 
next point therefore which His Majesty's 
Government feel it necessary to emphasize, in 
the strongest manner possible, is that in the 
words of the Prime Minister's statement in the 
House of Commons on the 3rd April last, 'a 
double undertaking is involved, to the Jewish 
people on the one hand and to the non-Jewish 
population on the other'". 
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The statement contiriued: 
These points are emphasised because claims 
have been made on behalf of the Jewish Agency to a 
positrion in regard to the general administration 
of the country which His Majesty's Government 
cannot but. regard as gong for beyond the% clear 
intention of the Mandate. Moreover, attempts have 
been made to argue, in support of Zionist claims 
that the principal feature of the Mandate's the 
passages regarding the Jewish national Vxome, and 
that the passages designed to safeguard the rights 
of the non Jewish community are merely secondary 
considerations, qualifying, to some extent, what 
is claimed to be the primary object for which the 
Mandate has been framed. 
This is a conception wViich H.M.G. have always 
regarded as totally erroneous. However, difficult 
the task may, it would in their view, be 
impossible, consistently with the plain intention 
of the Mandate, to attempt to solve the problem by 
subordinating one of these obligations to the 
other. The British accredited representative, when 
appearing before the Permanent Mandates Commission 
on the 9th June last, endeavoured to make clear 
the attitude of H.M.G. towards the difficulties 
inherent in the Mandate. In commenting on his 
statements in their report to the Council the 
Permanent Mandates Commission made the following 
important pronouncement: 
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'From all these statement.s, two assertions emerge, 
which should be emphasised: 
(1) That the obligations laid down by the Mandate in 
regard to the two sections of the population are 
of equal weight; 
(2) That the two obligations imposed on the Mandatory 
are in no sense irreconcilable. 
"The Mandate Commission has no objection 
to rise to these two assertions which, in its 
view, accurately express what it conceives to 
be the essence on the Mandate for Palestine 
go 
and ensure its future.'" 
The Labour Government became immediately involved in a 
storm of anger from Zionist Jews throughout the world. But 
Arabs said that Britain had at last recognised their 
rights. The American Jewish Committee stated that the 
United Kingdom's 'Statement of policy' was a repudiation of 
91 pledges to the Jews. Weizman said that he would make an 
92 
appeal to the League of Nations against it. The 'New York 
89. Cmd. 3692 'The Passfield White Paper', Dated October 
19.30. 
90. New York Times, 25 October 1930, 7:4. As cited in John 
& Hadawu, n.23, p.218. 
91. Ibid., 21 October 1930. 
92. Ibid., 22 October, 1930. 
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Times' also published an alleged 'revelation' from a friend 
of MacDonald that there had been a Cabinet fight before the 
'Statement' was published, and that Passfield had forced the 
policy on the Cabinet. "This was possibly a canard put out 
to weaken Passfield and the Government's policy or to 
provide a convenient let-out for MacDonald if criticism 
became too hot." 
On account of the pressure at home and looming threat 
of financial reprisals from the United States, Romsay 
MacDonald backed down'. According to his colleague Herbert 
Morrison, he had already shown 'evidence of that remote and 
defensive attitude to those around him which in the end left 
him with virtually no friends in the real sense of the 
word', and sometimes gave the impression of 'an 
objectionable evasiveness" and a 'shilly-shallying which was 
to prove so disastrous to his reputation". 
Passfield defended his policy, denying that Palestine 
was barred to Jews. He said that the suspension of 
93. Ibid., 26 October, 1930. 
94. John & Hadawi, n.23, p.219. 
94. The Sunday Times, (London), 6 March 1930. As cited in 
John & Hadawi, n.23, p.232. 
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immigration was only contingent on unemployment in 
Palestine. Internationally he was supported by Judges 
Loefgren, Chairman of the League of Nations' Waiting Wall 
Commission, who defended British Policy as a compromise 
between the promises made to the Arabs and the Jews. 
On 14 November 30 it was announced that 'doubts have 
been expressed as to the compatibility of some passages of 
the White Paper of October with certain articles of the 
Palestine Mandate, and other passages having proved liable 
to misunderstanding', MacDonald had invited members of the 
97 Jewish Agency to confer on these matter'. 
MacDonald "Black Letter": 
The Prime Minister wrote a letter to Weizman 
"clarifying" the White Paper for him but in reality 
capitulating to the pressures which the Jewish Zionists and 
their more politically powerful gentile supporters in the 
British Parliament had brought to bear. The letter to Dr. 
Weizmann is referred by Arabs as 'Black Letter'. The 
96. New York Times, 6 November 1930. As cited in John & 
Hadawi, n.23, pp.232-33. 
97. John Hadawi,n.2, p.233. 
9'^. Richard N. Verdery, n.82, p. 293. 
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difference in -bone between the WViite Paper of 1930 and the 
"Black Letter" of 1931, is perhaps the most important 
contrast between the two documents. 'Whereas the Passfield 
White Paper and the Commission's reports that preceded it 
Viad conceived matters in terms of inhabitants of Palestine 
both Arab and Jewish, the MacDonald letter reaffirmed that 
the Mandate for Palestine reflected an obligation to the 
Jews of the world as a whole, not merely to those resident 
99 in, or currently eager to emigrate to, Palestine'. The 
'Black Letter' diluted the government strictures upon 
Zionist demand, Jewish Labour for Jewish enterprises and 
permitted further acquisition of land in Palestine by Jews 
or Jewish agencies: 
The Labour Government, lihe its 
predecessors adhered to the unsuccessful 
policy of attempted compromise between the 
aims of Arab nationalism and Zionism.... The 
Passfield Paper and the MacDonald letter 
were particularly unfortunate applications of 
the general British Policy, for they convinced 
first the Arabs and then the Jews that 
sufficient agitation and pressure could alter 
the intentions of the Mandatory. The whole 
99. Ibid. 
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philosophy of compromise was at fault. The 
effort of the London government to the both 
pro-Arab and pro-Zionist within the limited 
confines of the HolyLand was brought with 
danger alike to the Arabs, tlie Jews and the 
British, i ^ 
Jewish sources now describe the Ramsay MacDonald letter 
as in fact cancelling the Passfield White Paper of 1930. 
Weiamann aummariaes the significance of the letter in the 
following words: 
"....it was under MacDonalds' letter to me that the 
change came about in the Government's attitude, and in the 
attitude of the Palestine Administration, which enabled us 
to make the magnificent gains of the ensuring years. It was 
under MacDonald's letter the Jewish immigration into 
Palestine was permitted to reach figures like forty thousand 
after 1934 and sixty two thousand for 1935... "-^ ^^  
The Arabs regarded it as plain proof of the power which 
world Jewry could exercise in London and their confidence in 
British administration was shaken. 
MacDonald White Paper: Plagued with unrest in Palestine and 
continued Arab rebellion (1936-1939) the British Government, 
100. Hanna, British Policy, p.108. As quoted in Richard N. 
Verdery, n.82, pp.293-94. 
101- Chaim Weiamann, Trial and Error. (London, 1950), p.335. 
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on 17 May 1939, issued yet another but final 'Statement of 
Policy' which became known as 'The MacDonald White Paper. 
There was a direct attempt by Chain Weizmann to urge Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain not to publish it. The 
Statement referred to the terms of the Mandate and it 
stated, "the Royal Commission and previous Commission of 
Enquiry have drawn attention to the eonbiguity of certain 
expressions in the Mandate, such as the expression 'a 
national home for the Jewish people', and they have found in 
this ambiguity and the resulting uncertainty as to the 
objectives of policy a fundamantal cause of unrest and 
hostility between Arabs and Jews". The Government was 
convinced that, in the interests of peace and well being of 
the whole people of Palestine, a clear definition of policy 
and objectives was essential. Consequently, the British 
Government declared that neither their undertakings to the 
Jews nor the national interests of Britain warranted that 
they should continue to develop the Jewish beyond already 
reached. The Government therefore decided; 
1. That the Jewish National Home as envisaged in the 
Balfour Declaration and in previous statements of 
British policy had been established; 
102. Ibid., p.410. 
103. As cited in John & Hadawi, n.23, p.315 
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2. That to develop it further against Arab wishes 
would be a violation of Britain's undertakings to 
the Arabs and that such a policy could only he 
carried out by the use of un-justifiable force; 
3. That, therefore, after admission of a final quota 
of 75,000 more Jewish immigrants over a period of 
five years, Jewish immigration should stop. 
4. That during this period of five years a 
restriction should be placed on the acquisition of 
further land in Palestine by the Jews; and 
5. That at the end of the period of five years, self 
governing institutions should be set up in the 
104 country. 
Reaction of the Arabs and Zionists to the White Paper: 
Arab reaction to the White Paper of 1939 was mixed. A 
certain section of the population was willing to accept it 
but doubted the sincerity of the British Government; the 
other decided to reject it as not meeting fully the 
aspirations of the Palestine Arabs which was the abrogation 
of tVie Balfour Declaration and the Mandate and the granting 
of independence to the country. 
104. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Palestine Partition 
Commission, Statement of Policy (Parliamentary 
Papers, Cmd. 6019, London, 1939) (MacDonald White 
Paper), p.4. 
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'The Arab Higher Committee led by the Mufti from 
Beirut, rejected the terms of the Vfiriite Paper but on 29 May 
1939 the National Defence Party announced its readiness to 
cooperate with Britain in giving effect to them.'-^ *^^  
The Zionists unanimously condemned the proposals of the 
'MacDonald Wttite Paper'. Their reaction was immediate. In 
Palestine, 'Dr. Hersog, the Chief Rabbi, stood in the pulpit 
of the great Yeshurim Synagogue of Jerusalem and before the 
weeping congregation tore up a copy of the White Paper to 
pieces. On 17 May 1939, the Palestine Broadcasting Service 
transmission wires were cut and the Palestine Broadcasting 
studios bombed, so that the official announcement of the 
British Government's new policy could not be immediately 
broadcast to the country. The next day the head quarters 
offices of the Administration's Department of Migration wee 
set on fire, and the Government offices at Haifa and Tel 
Aviv were sacked by crowds bent on destroying every 
document of illegal immigration. 
This was the beginning of the Jewish rebellion in 
Palestine which was to partition Palestine and drive the 
105. John & Hadawi, n.23, p.321 
106. Ibid., p.320. 
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British out of the country. It was synchronised with Zionist 
political action in many countries. Even in Rumania, where a 
pro Nasi government was said to be in power, the protests of 
the Rumanian Zionist organisation against Britain and its 
proposed Palestine policy made headlines. 
The House of Commons debated the White Paper on 22 May 
1939. The policy was approved by 268 votes against 179. A 
motion supported by Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, 
that as the proposals of His Majesty's Government relating 
to Palestine, as set out in Command Paper No.6019, are 
inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Mandate and 
not calculated to secure the peaceful and prosperous 
development of political, this House is of the opinion that 
Parliament should not be committed pending the examination 
of these proposals by the Permanent Mandates Commission of 
the League of Nations', was defeated. On 23 May the House 
of Lords, after debate, approved the policy without a 
division.^^^ 
107. New York Times, 22 May 1939. As cited in John & 
Hadawi, n.23, p.321. 
108. Hansard Vol. 347, Cols. 1938-2056 and 2129-2190. As 
cited in John & Hadawi, n.23, p.321. 
109. Hansard vol. 347, Cols. 81-143. As cited in John & 
Hadawi, n.23, p.321. 
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Much wat.er had flown dovm the river between 1930, when 
the Passfield White Paper policy had been rejected in the 
House of Commons, and 1939, the acceptance of a policy to 
which Zionists were violently opposed. Weizmann wrote in his 
autobiography: "I tried to find an answer to a question 
which was to occupy me for the remainder of m_y life". Vfhy was 
it, a completely invariable rule that politicians who were 
enthusiastic of the Jewish home land during elections forget 
it completely if they were returned to power." It can he 
argued that what matter was the infoirmation available to the 
men in government, compared with the propaganda which they 
relied on when out of office. This was not only true of 
Palestine. The fact seems to be that there was now a greater 
knowledge in England of the Near and Middle East among those 
influential in making policy. Diplomatic representation of 
Arabs to London from time to time had changed the common 
misconception of Arab leaders as romantic, semi barbarous 
sheikhs. About sixty members of parliament under the 
Chairmanship of Lord Vfhiterton, who had been on Allenby's 
staff in 1918, and Colonel Cliffton Brown, later Speaker of 
the House, had formed an informal group who believed in the 
merits of Arab case. The first book in England to carry the 
110. Weismann, n.l02, pp.437-438 
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Arab point of view, together with accounts of British 
wartime promises to the Arabs, had been published in 1938, 
and this. The Arab Awakening by George Antonius, 'had 
probably done much to influence British opinion toward Arab 
nationalism. 
TVie MacDonaid White Papar, which was to be British 
policy in Palestine for the duration of the war, was an 
attempt to keep Arab national feeling temporarily placated, 
if did not actually satisfy them. The Zionists were 
embittered at its terms. But they had no choice except to 
support the British government against Hitler. This was a 
must, if the Jewish national home, after the war, had to 
grow into a Jewish state. 
With the issuance of the 19.39 MacDonaid White Paper, 
the history of inter-war Palestine came to an end. The 
British administration and the government in London 
prepared for the war and were too preoccupied to send 
investigatory commissions. The Palestinian Jews and the 
larger Zionist community bowed to the inevitable restriction 
on immigration for the duration of the war although 
clandestine immigration continued. The Palestinian Arabs, 
their peasants' revolt spent, and their titular leader a 
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fugitive, relapsed into a political quiescence. The struggle 
between the two communities on Palestinian soil subsided 
beneath the surface for the time being. -^^ 
On the outbreak of World War II, both Arabs and 
Zionists decided not to embarrass the British Government and 
to cease ail acts of violence. As attested by the Palestine 
Government, "The Arabs of of Palestine demonstrated their 
support of Democracy at the outbreak of war, and there were 
spontaneous appeals in the Arab press to Arabs to rally to 
the side of Great Britain and set aside local issues; acts 
lip 
of terrorism were roundly condemned". The Arab notables 
caused on the High Commission to assure him of their 
loyalty.^^3 
There was an unanimous agreement among the Jews of 
Palestine to put aside their opposition to British policy in 
Palestine and demonstrate their loyalty to the cause of the 
democracies. Jewish terrorist acts ceased. The Jewish agency 
issued an appeal calling on all Jews in Palestine to close 
111. Richard N. Verdery, n.82, pp.302-3. 
112. Palestine : A Survey of Palestine 1945-1946, p.57. 
113. R.I.I,A., Great Britain and Palestine 1915-1945 (N.Y. 
as London, 1946), p.128. 
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their ranks and offer their full assistance to Britain. This 
was not without a purpose. 
As the war progressed British dilemma became more 
acute. Hitler's final solution to the Jewish problem became 
known. For the British government it became unthinkable and 
impolitic not to allow Jewish immigration into Palestine at 
the end of the time prescribed by the 1939 White Paper, that 
is March 1944. The Zionists also forced the pace. They 
adopted a new program in May 1942 that called for the 
establishment after the war of a Jewish state in Palestine 
that would stretch from the river Jordan to the 
Mediterranean (the Biltmore programme). The presence in the 
United States of a politically influential Jewish community, 
which in 1943 adopted the Baltimore programme, made it 
difficult for London to pursue any policy that might be 
i 1 C 
construed as anti-Zionist. 
The Arab world achieved greater political cohesion 
during the course of the war, culminating in the foundation 
of the Arab League, in Cairo, in March 1945. The League 
114. Hadawi, n.ll, p.65. 
115. Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers 1945-
1948. (New Jersey, 1982), p.8. 
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referred to the terms of the 1939 White Paper as the 
"natural rights" of the Palestinian Arabs. This was 
notwithstanding the fact that the Palestinian's own leaders 
had rejected that document in 1939, and Amin-el-Husayni had 
collaborated with the Nazis since 1941. 
Although in 1944 a British Cabinet Committee had, under 
Churchill's direction again prox>osed the eventual partition 
of Palestine into Jewish and Arab States the scheduled 
discussion in the full cabinet had been put off following 
the assassination in Cairo of the British Minister of State, 
Lord Moyne. Churchill never returned to the Zionist cause, 
and the Palestine problem was inherited by the labour 
117 government. 
Churchill and Zionism: 
Winston Churchill may be counted among those select few 
who became legend in their own life time. In the pantheon of 
Zionist heroes, few gentiles enjoyed such a privileged 
position as Churchill. 
116. Ibid. 
117. Ibid., pp.3-9. 
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It, would be a mistake t,o think that Churchill was ever 
a consistent, convinced supporter of Zionism. It goes 
without saying that he was never ideologically cononitted, in 
the same way as HerEsi's adherents were, to the renaissance 
of the Jewish nation in Palestine, as the unique solution to 
the 'the Jewish Problem'. The periods when Churchill 
concerned himself directly with Jewish problems were 
relatively brief. These were interspersed with far longer 
spans when he had no official contact whatever. In 1934, he 
paid a private visit to Palestine, during the course of 
Middle East tour. He stayed overnight in Jerusalem, but did 
1 1 R 
not apparently meet with any Zionist representative. 
Churchill concerned himself on the Jewish problem only 
when it was interwoven with his own personal political 
fortunes or with British imperial interests. As Secretary of 
State for War, and then for the colonies after the war, 
Churchill was preoccupied with s-ecuring economy and 
retrenchment in West Asia. "Repeatedly by, but in vain, he 
urged retreat and withdrawal from the Middle Eastern 
119 Mandate, Palestine and Mesopotamia". 
118. Michael J.Cohen, Churchill and the Jews (London, 
1985), p.xvi. 
119. Ibid. 
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Balfour Declaration was disovined by Churchill. However 
it was important to him in two important aspects. First, 
Churchill was convinced that the Declaration had been 
instrumental in mobilizing powerful Jewish support for the 
Allied cause especially in the United States, whose entry 
into the war, Churchill believed, was secured partly by 
Zionist pressure. This belief for him was enduring and it 
played a pivotal role in Churchill's support for Zionism 
during World War II, prior to the American entry, after the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December, 1941. Second, 
ChurcVdll did for a time believe that Zionism might provide 
the antidote to what he believed was Jew - inspired 
Bolshevism. Jewish resources and energy might be channeled 
usefully into building up a British - oriented protectorate 
in Palestine. But Churchill took little or no account of the 
rise of Arab nationalism after World War II. 
The rise of Nozism during the mid and late 1930s 
threatened, and eventually shattered, the political order 
established by the victors of World War I. The threat to old 
order became a dominant theme during the late 1930s. Hitler 
gave the 'Jewish problem' a tragic twist and around in 
Churchill a unique personal commitment never interested at 
other junctures of his political career. Nonetheless the 
170 
Jewish suffering's took a very clear second priority during 
120 World War II. the first being the imperial interest. 
In May 1939, the Chamberlain Government issued a new 
White Paper. Churchill condemned the new policy in the House 
of Commons as a breach of faith, the 'destruction of the 
Balfour Declaration'. In this attack there was more than a 
suspicion of political opportunism in this particular 
attack. The Palestine Wliite Paper provided Churchill with 
yet another occasion to express his anti - appeasement 
message. Churchill had seized on the Zionist cause as early 
as in 1937 when, contrary to the Zionists' own wishes he had 
attacked the Peel partition plan as a betrayal of Britain's 
commitments under the Mandate. 
As war-time Prime Minister, Churchill reminded his 
colleagues repeatedly that he did not consider himself bound 
by the 1939 policy but adhered to 'his own' White Paper of 
1922. This policy had stipulated that the Jews were in 
Palestine 'as of right, and not an sufferance'. and that 
they immigrate freely subject only to the economic 
absorbing capacity of Palestine. Yet a solution to 'the 
120. Ibid., p.xvii. 
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Jewish Problem', in all its different, aspects, was in fact 
deferred by Churchill until after the War. ''•^  
As Prime Minister, Ctmrchill had taken a pro - Zionist 
stand on every issue connected with Palestine during the War 
- from the Land Transfers Bill promulgated in February 1940, 
to the various schemes for a Jewish fighting force, to the 
renewed discussion of partition itself from 1943. Yet apart 
from his success in pushing through the decision to raise a 
JewisVi brigade in September 1944, Churchill did not press to 
a positive conclusion any pro-Zionist measure. Neither did 
he seriously contemplate the dismissal of any cabinet 
• t o o 
appointee because of differences over Zionism. 
During the war, Churchilla' solemn commitments to the 
Zionist leader Chaim Weismann had retained for Britain the 
support of the moderate Zionists. This was crucial since tVie 
support of moderate Zionists led by Weiamann had blunted the 
anti-British campaigns waged by some sections of American 
Jewry. Yet Churchill ended his tenure "with the White Paper 
unabrogated, no commitment on record and Weizmann left high 
and dry, standing before the Jewish people baffled, enraged. 
121. Ibid., p.xviii 
122. Michael J.Cohen, "Direction of Policy in Palestine, 
1936-1945", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.11/3, October 
1975, pp.237-261. 
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undermined and empty-handed". It is not easy to reconcile 
all tViis v?ith the accepted viev? of Churchill as a pro-
Zionist. 
Churchill's war memoirs hint at controversies between 
him and his coiieagaes regarding the Holocaust, both before 
and after the massacre became generally known. They saw he 
was trying to live up to his sympathies for the Jewish 
people. But no contemporary statement of his can he found 
either to justify his stand or to explain his attitude 
towards suffering European Jewry. 
After 1944, Jewish terrorism seems to have alienated 
Churchill from Zionism permanently. The assassination of 
Lord Moyne a close friend of his and the British Minister of 
State, resident in the Middle East not only brought a 
strong warning from him in the House of Commons to the 
Zionist movement as a whole, but caused him also to shelve 
the new partition scheme which had already been placed on 
1 ?5 the Cabinet's agenda. 
123. Abba Eban, "Tragedy and Triumph" in Chaim Weizmann. a 
Biography by several hands, ed. M.Weisgal and J. 
Carmichael, (London, 1962), p.278. 
124. Oskar K. Rabino Wiez, Winston Churchill on Jewish 
Problems (London, 1956), pp.119 ff. 
125. Michael J. Cohen, Palestine'• Retreat from the Mandate 
(London, New York, 1976), pp.179-190. 
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On August 1, 1C46, nine days after the King David Hotel 
tragedy Churchill endorsed the Labour Party doctrine which 
divorced Palestine from the Jewish refugee problem: "No one 
can imagine that these is room in Palestine for the great 
masses of Jews who wish to leave Europe, or that they could 
be absorbed in any period which it is now useful to 
contemplate". Referring to the King David Hotel explosion, 
he added: "It is perfectly clear that Jewish warfare 
directed against the British in political will if 
protracted, automatically release us from all obligations to 
persevere, as well as destroy the inclination to make 
further efforts in British hearts". 
Labour, Bevln and Palestine Problem: 
On July 26, 1945 the Labour Party was for the first 
time in its history was voted into office with a commanding 
majority over its opponents. In a landslide victory, the 
party gained 393 seats as against 213 won by the 
Conservatives and their supporters. The Liberal Party's 
representation was reduced from 21 to 12 seats. The swing 
from Conservative to the left on such a scale was witnessed 
only twice before in British parliamentary history, in 1832 
and in 1906.^27 
126. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 426, 
cols. 1253-1257. 
127. Cohen, n.H5, p. 20. 
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"In all of the complexity of Middle Eastern issues 
facing the British Labour Government in the post war era, 
there is one individual and one theme of paramount 
significance: Ernest Bevin and his policy of non-
•J p Q 
intervention". 
An understanding of the thought and motivation of the 
Foreign Secretary, Bevin, proved the key to the problem of 
Britain and its quest for the answer of Palestine 
question. Bevin later referred to British Palestine 
policy as "his" policy, Bevin as Foreign Secretary was in 
overall control, and followed developments with a grasp of 
detail and force and personality unrivalled by his British 
contemporaries. He has often been denounced as anti Semitic. 
A close scrutiny of Bevin's temperament shows that it was 
rather the reverse. Bevin's "anti-semitic" reputation 
developed from his policy not his personal sentiment. He 
consistently attempted to avert position. He wished to 
create a binational state in which Arabs and Jews would 
create a binational state. Thus the Zionists from the 
128. Wm. Roger Louis, The British empire in the Middle East 
1945-1951. (New York, 1964), p.3. 
129- See, Allan Bullock, The Life and Times of Earnest 
Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-51 (London, 1983). 
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begining became Viis adversaries. When he v?a3 frustrated, 
often became angry, and the sometimes rose in wrath against 
the Americans as well as the Zionists. However, Bevin's 
outbursts must not be allowed to obscure the creative thrust 
and coherence of his purpose. Paradoxically, there is truth 
in the view that his "pro Arab" disposition helped to bring 
about the creation of the state of Israel. Zionists 
throughout the world were able to unite in vilifying him. 
To Bevin "partition" symbolized a bankruptcy of 
policy, the end of the road, and an admission of failure, 
though sometime, unavoidable as in the case of India. In 
Palestine he pursued the goal of the binational state with 
such tenacity that one wonders what might have happened if 
he had become Secretary of State for India in 1945 rather 
than the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.^ 
Bevin believed that the answer to the problem of Jewish 
refugees and displaced persons should be sought in Europe 
rather theua in Palestine, which he regarded as a 
predominately Arab country. He found himself caught between 
130. W. Roger Louis, "British Imperialism and the End of the 
Palestine mandate" in The End of the Palestine Mandate, 
ed. W. Roger Louis and Robert W. Stookey (London, 
1986), p.l. 
131. Ibid., p.2. 
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Jewish nationaiism supercharged by the emotions of 
Holocaust, and the anti-Zionism of the Arabs, without whose 
goodwill the British Empire in the Middle East would be 
doomed. The British could not support a Jewish state without 
alienating the Arabs. Nor could the British impose a 
settlement acceptable to the Arab countries without 
antagonising the United States. 
He believed, as did many English of his generation, 
that the British Empire was a beneficent force in world 
affairs, though the word "Empire" would have to be replaced 
in the Middle East with something that suggested less 
exploitation and more equal partnership. The British and the 
Arabs could work together to develop the region to mutual 
advantage. Economically the Middle East together with Africa 
offered just as alluring a prospect as India had in the 
past. Militarily the countries of the Middle East could be 
brought into a system of defence that would help to offset 
the manpower and military potential of the Soviet Union. 
Such in brief was Bevin's vision. He combined political, 
economic, and military strands of thought into a coherent 
general policy that sought to preserve Britain as a great 
177 
power. The Middle East was the principal pillar of Britain's 
• t o o 
position in the world. 
Bevin could not have systematically pursued his Middle 
Eastern policy without the effective partnership of the 
Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. Bevin would always take care 
to square his ideas with Attlee's before cabinet meetings. 
Together the two of them often made an unbreakable 
combination though Attlee was skeptical of Britain's 
capacity to remain a great power in the Middle East. 
Apart from these two another figure is of importance. 
He is Arthur Creech Jones who was parliamentary Under 
Secretary for the colonies from July, 1940 until October 
1946, and then Colonial Secretary until his defeat in the 
general election of February 1950. Both Attlee and Bevin 
repeated Creech Jones and listened to his advice. "Creech, 
as he was known to his friends, was sympathetic to the aims 
of the moderate Zionists. Nevertheless, he was overshadowed 
by both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary and his 
ability to work harmoniously with them explains why the 
Palestine issue within the Labour Government remained non-
controvers ial. 
132. Ibid. 
133. Ibid. 
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The Colonial Office and the Foreign Office, the two 
offices of state mainly concerned with Palestine, often 
clashed over many issues, but when ministerial policy was 
agreed upon by Creech and Bevin as well as Attlee, then it 
was virtually invulnerable. The Bevin - Attlee - Creech 
combination helps to explain why the pro Zionist voices in 
the cabinet remained ineffective. The policy of the Labour 
Government in practice appeared to he in variance with the 
Labour Party's publicly proclaimed sympathy with the Zionist 
cause. 
Bevin confronted Churchill in Parliament, who was not 
only his most powerful and persistent adversary but also his 
principal critic on the tactics and timing of withdrawal 
from Palestine. Churchill was important in the back ground 
of the Labour Government's policy toward's Palestine because 
after World War I he himself, as Colonial Secretary had 
penned the official elaboration of tVie Balfour Declaration. 
The Declaration of 1922 established Transjordan as an Arab 
territory distinct from Palestine. Palestine itself was not 
to be a Jewish "national home" but there was to be a 
national ?iome in Palestine. Jewish immigration would be 
allowed, in Churchill's own phrase, up to the limit of 
"economic absorptive capacity", which was to be judged by 
r/9 
the mandatory power. The declaration of 1922 served as basis 
of British policy for nearly two decades. When the White 
Paper of 1939 attempted to curtail and stabilize the Jewish 
population of Palestine at one-third of the Arab majority 
(with further immigration after five years dependent on Arab 
acquiescence), Churchill denounced it as a breach of faith 
with the Jews. ^'^^ 
In August 1946, he castigated Labour Government's 
handling of the Palestine problem; "It is our duty... to 
offer to lay down the Mandate live should... as soon as the 
war stopped, have made it clear to United that, unless they 
came in and bore their share, we should lay the whole care 
and burden at the foot of the United Nations 
1 35 Organisation". 
The Anglo American Cooperation emd Committee of Inquiry: 
Anglo American cooperation over Palestine proved to be 
perhaps the single most frustrating and elusive goal of the 
Labour government. A major disagreement developed in August 
1945, when President Truman requested the admission of 
1.34. Ibid., p.5. 
135. Parliamentary debates. House of Commons, August 1, 
1946, Col.1253. 
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100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine. Bevin later remarked 
that "had it not been for a succession of unfortunate 
actions on the part of United States" following the demand 
of the 100,000, the question might have bee settled. His 
point was that if the United States nd Britain had acted 
together immediately and decisively at the end of the war, 
the Palestine drama might have had an entirely different 
denouement, ^'^^ 
When President Truman called for the admission of 
100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine in August, 1945, the 
population of the country itself, according to British 
estimates, was 550,000 Jews and 1,200,000 Arabs.^^' The 
Foreign Office believed that a sudden influx of Jewish 
immigrants would destroy and last chance of reconciling the 
two corrufiunities. The Foreign Office stuck to the principle 
of 1939 White Paper and creation of a binational state. The 
Consensus in the Colonial Office was to go for partition 
recommended by Peel comrriission of 1937. The foreign office 
predomination because of Bevin. 
The report of the Ariglo American Committee of Inquiry 
and Truman's further demand for the 100,000 made things 
136. W. Roger Louis, n.l31, p.6. 
137. Ibid., p.7. 
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worse. Walter Smart, the Oriental Secretary at the British 
Embassy in Cairo, reveals the Arab side of the dilemma". 
I am struck by the superficiality and 
intellectual dishonesty of this report... the 
Committee demands the admission within less 
than a year of 100,00^ immigrants (i.e. a 
large number than have even been brought in 
within such a short period at any time in the 
past) without making any mention of the 
question of Palestine's economic capacity to 
absorb them. Of must have been perfectly 
obvious to the members of the Committee, as 
it is to all of us, that their proposals must 
result in acute political must result in acute 
political and military conflict between the 
Arabs and the Jews in Palestine and the Arab 
countries round it. 
The policy of the Labour government on the Palestine 
Question was a painstaking attempt to keep in balance the 
vital Arab.American parts of the equation. It was the need 
for American as well as Arab support that explains the 
British retract to a position of evenhanded withdrawal. 
Zionist terrorism offers a basic explanation of why the 
British were forced to retreat. On July 22, 1940, the Irgun 
Zvi Leumi blew up the British military headquarters at the 
138. W. Roger Louis, n.l31, p.8. 
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King David Hotel in Jerusalem, with heavy loss of British, 
Arab, and Jewish life. The explosion polarised the Palestine 
conflict. The explosion at the King David Hotel occurred at 
the same time that officials in the British and American 
Governments were attempting to salvage the recommendations 
of an Anglo American Committee of Inquiry. They wanted to 
implement a scheme of provincial autonomy. It would have 
provided an ambergris compromise between the two . extreme 
solution of partition and a binational state." There would 
have been a large measure of Arab and Jewish autonomy, with 
certain powers reserved to the central administering 
authority. This scheme was not acceptable to both Arabs and 
Zionists.-^^^ 
In this event President Truman became apprehensive 
about Palestine as a campaign issue in the 1946 
congressional elections and feared that he would be accused 
of "ghettoizing" the Jews in Palestine. President Truman's 
on he eve of Yam Kippur was a turning point. On October 4, 
1946, he expressed the hope for a compromise between the 
BritisVi and Zionist proposals. The Zionists, however, 
publicized the part of the statement in which the President 
139. Ibid., pp.10-11. 
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appeared to support "the creation of a viable Jewish state". 
Attlee rebuked the President: 
I have received with great regret your letter 
refusing even a few hour's grace to the Prime 
Minister of a country which has the actual 
responsibility for the government of 
Palestine.., I am astonished that you did not 
wait to acquaint yourself with the reasons for 
the suspension of the conference with the 
Arabs.^40 
The conference mentioned in Atlee's letter to truman 
was the London conference on the Middle East. The London 
conference met sporadically from September, 1946, to 
February, 1947. The Arabs stood by the letter and spirit of 
the assurances of 1939 and would yield to nothing less than 
Palestine as an Arab state. The Jews boycotted the 
proceedings because of the denial of the opposite promise of 
Jewish state. 
In the last stages of the London Conference, Bevin 
continued to guide the discussions on the basis of the plan 
140. Atlee to Truman, October 4, 1946, Foreign Relations of 
the United States 1946 (Washington, 1969), VII, pp.704-
18^ 
for provincial autonomy. At the end, the Arabs refused to 
consider Jewish self - government in any form or further 
Jewish Immigration. The Jews regarded the boundaries of 
the "cantons" that the British were prepared to allocate to 
them as totally unacceptable anc would not agree to any 
scheme not based on the premise of an eventual Jewish 
state. ^ -^^  
Termination of Mandate: In 1947, at the height of Zionist 
acts of terrorism the Mandatory Government made one last 
attempt to settle the Palestine problem by suggesting to 
both Arabs and Jews that British trusteeship over Palestine 
should continue for another five years with the declared 
object of preparing the country as a whole for 
independence.^^ 
The Arabs presented their own proposals for 
independence with guaranties for Jewish minority rights 
which were unacceptable to the British Government. The 
Jewis Agency on the other hand, rejected the Governments' 
proposals out-right and intensified its terrorist and 
sabotage activities. 
141. W. Roger Louis, n.l29, p.461. 
142. Cmd. 7088 (Proposals for the future of Palestine). 
m 
On Feb., 1947, the British Foreign Secretary announced 
in the House of Commons that His Majesty's Government had 
found, "the Mandate has proved to the unworkable in 
practice, that the obligations undertaken to the two 
irortumunities had been shown to the irreconcilable", and 
therefore axiTioriTiced it/S iiti'teTi-tioTi of givixig it -up. 
Bevin, later on, came closely to frankly admitting 
defeat, at least in the sense of failure to achieve any of 
the basic British aims. The goal in Palestine, he said, "was 
bo persuade Jews and Arabs to live together in one State as 
the Mandate charged us todo. However the facts point 
::)ppo3ite to what he said. 
L43. H.C.Deb, Vol. 433, Cols. 985-944. As quoted in Michael 
J. Cohen, n.il6, p.223. 
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'i\IS OHITKD STATES, ZIONISM AND THE PALESTINE QDESTION 
World War I and American Response to Palestine Question: 
World War I was a watershed in modem Middle Eastern 
history. It set in motion a chain of events that led to the 
fail of the Ottoman Empire, tnd released forces of 
nationalism long brewing in the subject peoples who hoped to 
achieve independence. Contrary to the hopes of the subject 
peoples were the ambitions of the European Pavers, which had 
sat at the bed side of the "Sick Man of Europe " waiting for 
his death that they might satisfy their imperial 
ambitions. War, nationalism, and imperialism drew the Unites 
States away from isolation to assume a role in Middle 
Eastern affairs. But this departure was only temporary, for 
the American people and Congress determined that the U.S. 
would not become enmeshed in the political affairs of the 
Middle East. 
During the early years of World War I the United States 
adhered to the policy of non-intervention. American 
diplomatic representatives did not even attempt to dissuade 
Turkey from entering the war as the ally of Germany and 
Austria - Hungary. But the War strained American - Turkish 
relations. Before the U.S. entered the European War, 
1. Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition 
of Turkey f1914-1924) (Baltimore, 1965), p.27. 
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officials in -the State Department began to anticipate the 
demise of the Ottoman Empire. 
The outbreak of World War I precipitated the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire. This long expected event caused the 
United States to assxime a larger role in the Middle East. 
For a time it appeared as through President Woodrow Wilson 
would have a larger voice in the Middle Eastern settlement, 
but the U.S. senate thought otherwise and it pressured the 
United States to return to the policy of non-intervention in 
Middle Eastern affairs. In the aftermath of the war which 
depleted American" domestic reserves of oil, American 
petroleum interests, with the support of the U.S. 
government, engaged in the post war quest for the rich oil 
resources that lay under the sands of Middle Eastern 
countries. 
The primary interest that concerned the U.S. in the 
Middle East during the war was the protection of the 
missionary institutions. At the beginning of the war, the 
2. Ibid., pp.29-31 
Thomas A. Bryson, American Diplomatic Relations With the 
MiddlQ E^gt. 1794-1974- A S^rv^y (New Jersey, 1977), 
p.57. 
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missionaries faced a financial crisis. The missionaries not 
only counted on the services of Ambassador Morgenthay, but 
they could also rely on President Woodrow Wilson, whose 
administration restored the open door to pre-eminence in 
American - Middle Eastern relations and once again gave 
priority to the interests of the missionary. The influence 
of relief officials and missionaries of the policy making 
level increased during World War I. 
flilson Era: 
Wilson and Zionism: The Zionism issues also intruded into 
American foreign policy considerations. The World Zionist 
Organisation aspired to the creation of Jewish national home 
in Palestine. In 1914 there were some 20,000 Jews in the 
Zionist organisations in the United States, but with a total 
Jewish population of over 3,000,000, this was a small 
percentage. Zionism did not expand in the American Jewish 
community until after the outbreak of war. Notable converts 
to Zionisms were Loius Brandeis who became in 1916 a 
Supreme Court Justice, Judge Julian W. Mack, Rabbi Stephen 
S. Wise, and Felix Frank-furter," also later to become an 
4. Ibid., p.59. 
5. Ibid., p.61. 
6. William Yale, The Near East: A Modern History (Michigan, 
1958), p.265. 
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Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Brandeis became an 
ardent Zionist in 1912, and he cultivated Wilson's interest 
"7 
in the aspirations of World Zionism. Later Frankfurter and 
Rabbi wise also exercised considerable influence on the 
American President. It was behind //ilson's leadership that 
the American diplomatic machinery responded to the plea of 
American Zionists for aid to the hard-pressed Jewish 
community in Palestine. American diplomats were the sole 
advocates for Jews in Palestine. Ambassador Morgenthau, an 
assimilationist, not sympathetic with Zionist goals, was 
o 
their chief hope, and he responded to their call for help. 
The initial Jewish problem centered round the fate of 
same 50,000 Russian Jews in Palestine. With Russia at war in 
Turkey, the Turks determined to expel these Jews. Morgenthan 
advised the State Department of their plight on 25 December 
1914, and the U.S. Navy made the cruiser Tennesee available 
to lift some 6000 Jewish refugees to Alexandria. Most of the 
remaining Russian Jews agreed to accept naturalization as 
Ottoman subjects to avoid expulsion. To make matters worse 
7. Frank E. Manuel, Th9 Ree^litj^s fif American Palestine 
Relations (Washington, D.C., 1949), p.116. 
8. Ibid., p.120. 
9. Ibid., p.123. 
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for the Jews, the commanding officer of the Tennesee filed a 
report that Turkish nationalists were determined to destroy 
the Zionist movement in Palestine. An official proclamation 
was issued to that effect in January 1915. The influence of 
Ambassador Morgenthau and the diplomatic agents of the 
Central Powers were responsible for Djemai Pasha's calling 
off Turkish persecutions of Jews by March. Further, American 
Jews proffered the economic aid to Palestinian Jews that 
made the difference between survival and extinction. 
The American Joint Distribution Committee, a Jewish 
philanthropic organisation, took care of the Jews in the 
Ottoman Empire. The State Department obtained the necessary 
permission from the Turks and from the British and the 
French for the dispatch of relief shipments to Palestine 
Jew. In 1915 Zionists asked the State Department to use its 
good offices with the Turks and the Allies to permit 
shipments of petroleum so necessary for the operation of 
irrigation pumps in the orange groves. The British and 
French refused saying the Turks might confiscate the fuel 
for their war effort. 
10. Ibi.d, pp.127-131. 
11. Ibid., pp.142-144. 
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But U.S. government officials aided the Palestinian 
Jews in other ways. Ambassador Morgenthau facilitated the 
transfer of money to them when the war brought a halt to the 
normal movement of funds. The State and Navy Departments 
aided the channeling of medical supplies and food. 
Thus prior to American entry into World War I, the 
Protestant missionary lobby and American Zionists had 
exerted sufficient pressure on official government circles 
to obtain a more active American role in Middle Eastern 
affairs. But the high points of Protestant and Zionist 
utilization of political pressure came after the U.S. 
declared war on Germany in April 1917. Although in his 
annual message to Congress in December 1917 wilson urged a 
declaration of War on Austria, he elected not to ask for a 
declaration on Turkey, even though British, French, and 
1"? Italian officials would have welcomed such a move. 
Why did Wilson omit Turkey ? It seems that he was 
primarily motivated by two considerations. First, American 
military advisers opposed entry into the conflict in the 
12. Ibid., pp.144-146, 
13. U.S. Congress, Congressional Records. 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 
pp.18-21. 
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Middle East because it would drain off forces needed on the 
Western front. * Wilson also considered the arguments of the 
Protestant lobby, which claimed that war with Turkey would 
end all relief efforts and cause the closing of missionary 
15 institutions. ^ It is safe to as. ume that consideration of 
a humanitarian and strategic nature dictated Wilson's 
decision. 
Zionist influence on Wilson was important as 
demonstrated by the abortive 1917 Morgenthan mission to seek 
a separate peace treaty with Turkey and by President 
Wilson's consent to endorse a Jewish national home in 
Palestine. 
The former ambassador to Turkey suggested to Secretary 
of State lausing in May 1917 that he believed Turkey wanted 
a separate peace. Such a move would on the surface at least, 
benefit hard-pressed Palestinian Jews. Morganthau's idea 
was broached to Wilson who was interested. The State 
Department arranged for Morganthau to travel to Switzerland 
to contact Turkish diplomats. But American Zionists opposed 
14. Evans, n.l., p.42. 
15. Bryson, n.3, p.63. 
16. Ibid., p.63. 
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this move. Justice Brandies know of its purpose, and he 
advised Dr. Chaim Weiamann, the leading Zionist in Britain, 
who promptly told British Foreign Secretary Arthur J. 
Balfour. The two agreed that the Morgenthau mission should 
be scotched, for an anticipated British offensive against 
the Turks in Palestine would do for more to assure the 
future of a Jewish national home. 
Brandies arranged for Felix Frankfurter to accompany 
Morgenthau to ascertain that the latter would not make an 
agreement compromising the Zionist goal. Acting through 
Balfour, the Zionists arranged for Morgenthau and 
Frankfurter to meet Dr. Weizmann at Gibraltar where he 
1 7 deterred Morgenthau from his task. 
Wilson, Brandies and Balfour Declaration: During the months 
just before Balfour Declaration was issued (November 2, 
1917). President Woodrow Wilson of the United States was 
under great pressure to join with Britain in enunciating the 
policy of a Jewish national home in Palestine. The American 
17. William Yale, "Ambassador Henry Morgenthau's Special 
Mission of 1917". Wild Politics. 1 (1944). 30-8-20. As 
cited in Bryson, n.3, p.63. 
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government had previously had no political experience and 
knew next to nothing about the conflict of interests that 
was building up between Britain ar.d France, the two powers 
and the Arabs, and the Palestinians and the Zionists the 
focal point of which became Palestine. ° 
The beginning of the United States Government's 
involvement in Palestinian affairs had came in 1914, when 
war broke out between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire, 
and the Palestinian Jewish community applied to American 
consular agents for protection. President Wilson's interest 
in Zionism was nurtured by the men who surrounded him, 
particularly Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandies. ^  
President Wilson was mightily attracted by the idea of 
becoming he protector of minorities and persecuted peoples 
abroad including the Jewish community in Palestine. "His 
advisers interested in the crasser political dividends, 
publicised the President's interest in the welfare of Jews 
living in Palestine, counting Jewish votes in the 1916 
18. Michael, E. Jansen, The United States And The 
Palestinian People (Beirut, 1970), p.7. 
19. Ibid. 
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elections and introducing vote-getting in American elections 
into United States' consideration of Palestine policy."^^ 
However, President Wilson hesitated to commit the 
United States to the Balfour Declaration as he 
apprehensive of participating in the predetermination of the 
future of a country with which the United States was not at 
war. 
In January 8, 1918, President Wilson delivered his 
famous address in which he set forth his "Fourteen Points" 
and the terms of the peace settlement with the Ottoman 
Empire. Point 12 was specifically designed to prevent 
European Powers from seizing and "exploiting" the former 
peoples and territories of the Empire. It states: 
The Turkish portions of the present 
Ottoman empire should be assured a secure 
sovereignty, but nother nationalities 
which are now under Turkish rule should 
be assured an undoubted security of life 
a/id an absolutely unmolested opportunity 
of autonomous development. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Ray A. Billington, Bert J. Loewenberg, Seunuel H. 
Brockunier, (ed.), The Making of American Democracy. 
Readings and Documents (New York, 1950), p.410. 
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Finally, on August 31, 1918 the American Zionists 
increasingly anxious about the President's policies towards 
the 'other nationalities' in former ottoman domains were 
able to secure Wilson's guarded approval of the Balfour 
Declaration to a letter from Rabbi Stephen Wise, the 
President expressed his "satisfaction" over the growth of 
the Zionists movement in the United States and over the 
policy of a Jewish national home in Palestine enunciated by 
the British government in the Balfour Declaration. "^  When 
Wilson embarked on his efforts to negotiate a just and 
humane peace after the war, he had certain predispositions 
towards a Zionist Palestine, but the shape American policy 
would take as a result of his preference had not yet been 
determined. 
Then on September 21, 1918 the Secretary of State, 
Robert lauring , in a memorandum prepared for the American 
delegation to the Peace Conference, suggested that the 
Arabs should receive full or partial sovereignty over 
whatever state or states they might establish but that 
Palestine should be put under a protectorate or a mandate 
22. Jansen, n.l8, p.8 
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Palestine was obviously not to be included in any 
independent or partially independent Arab area. The destiny 
of Palestine was reserved. 
Louis Brandies: Almost immediately after the outbreak of 
war, the Federation of American Zionists called an 
extraordinary conference to consider the prevailing 
situation. The Conference met in New York on 30 August 1914 
and resulted in the setting up of an adhoc body under the 
name of 'The Provisional Executive Committee for General 
Zionist Affairs", with Brandies as Chairman. The Provisional 
Committee, towards the end of 1914 suggested to the Zionist 
executive in Berlin that the headquarters of the 
Organisation should be transferred to the Unites States."^  
The Committee succeeded in kindling the imagination of 
the Jewish masses, but it also attracted from a very 
different milieu supporters of the quality and standing of 
men like Felix Frankfurter who later on become Justice 
Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court and Julian W. Mack, a 
judge of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. This hastily 
improvised body could never have accomplished what it did 
23. Ibid. 
24. Leonord Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London, 1961), 
p.190. 
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without outstanding leadership. It was to its immeasurable 
advantage that it had for its first chairman so commanding a 
personality like Brandeis. ^^  
As Chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee 
Brandies, committed himself for the first time to an active 
part in Jewish affairs. 
He told Balfour at their interview in 1919 that until 
he became interested in Zionism his whole life 'had been 
free from Jewish contacts and traditions. In a conversation 
with Felix Frankfurter, Brandies elaborated that he had 
first become interested in Zionism when, "as an American, he 
was confronted with the vast disposition of the vast number 
of Jews, particularly Russian Jews, that were pouring into 
the United States". A Zionist pamphlet which he came 
across infused in him the interest for the study of the 
Jewish problem and to the conviction that Zionism was the 
answer. 
Braiideis told Balfour that he had come to Zionism, 
'wholly as an American. This theme he repeated again and 
25. Ibid., pp.191-192. 
26. A.T. Mason, Brandeia (New York, 1946), p.442. 
27. Stein, n.24, p.192. 
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again in his wartime speeches as Chairman of the Provisional 
Committee. Some of them are in queer contract to his views 
that he upheld earlier in his career. He said in an address 
delivered in 1905: 
There is room here for men of any race, 
of any creed, of any condition in life, 
not enter for Protestant Americans or 
Catholic Americans or Jewish Americans 
nor for German Americans or Russian 
Americans .... Habits of living or 
thought which tend to keep alive 
difference of origin, or to classify men 
according to their religious beliefs are 
inconsistent with American ideals of 
no 
brotherhood and are disloyal. 
He spoke the opposite ten years later: 
Every Irish American who contributed to 
Hdvciclns Home Rule was a better man and 
a better American for the sacrifice 
involved. Every American Jew who aids in 
advancing the Jewish settlement of 
Palestine will likewise be a 
better man and a better American for 
doing so.^^ 
28. Mason, n.26, p.442. 
29. Stein, n.24, p.193. 
?00 
Brandies emphasized on this theme in his many other war 
time speeches. "My approach to Zionism was through 
Americanism .... Gradually it became clear to me that to be 
good Americans we must be better Jews, and to be better Jews 
we must become Zionists." Loyalty to America demands 
that each American Jew become a Zionist. For only through 
the ennobling effects of its stirrings can we develop the 
best that is in us and give to this country the full benefit 
of our gieat inheritance." The Jewish renaissance in 
Palestine will help us to make towards the attainment of 
American ideals of democracy and social justice that large 
contribution for which religion and life ave peculiarly 
fitted the Jew. Let no one of you if he be a true American, 
shirk his duty."^^ 
In politics Brandeis had started as a Republican, but 
he had broken away from his party and, after veering 
towards. Progressive Republicanism, had eventually come down 
on the Democratic side as a supporter of Woodrow Wilson in 
"3-I 
the Presidential campaign up 1912."^ -^  He was recognized as an 
important recruit and was considered for office when the tie 
30. Brandeis on Zionism. (Washington, Zionist Organisation 
of America, 1948), pp.29, 49-50, 54, 88. 
31. Mason, n.26, p.376. 
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came for President. Wilson to select his first cabinet. 
Faced with strong opposition from various quarters some of 
it from the moneyed interest and some of it of an anti-
semetic hue Wilson decided at the last moment to drop 
33 Brandeis, from his list. Brandeis never held political 
office, but his association with Wilson developed into a 
relationship, which gave him an irfluential position as one 
of the President's most highly esteemed unofficial 
advisors. In 1916, Wilson, having nominated Brandeis to 
fill a vacancy in the supreme court, encountered some 
opposition in the Senate. 
He wrote in support of the appointment : 
I have known him. I have tested him by 
seeking his advice upon some of the most 
difficult and perplexing public questions 
about which it was necessary for me to 
form a judgement. I have received from 
his counsel, singularly enlightened, 
singularly clear sighted and judicial and 
above all, full of moral stimulation.... 
32. Ibid., See also A.S. Link, Wllgpn, Ihfi New Freedom 
(Princeton, 1956), pp.10 -134. 
33. Mason., p.387. 
34. A.S. Link, n.32, p.95. 
35. Mason, n.24, p.192. 
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That Brandeis stood high in Wilson's confidence and 
esteem, was a common knowledge. The prestige of his name, 
enhanced by his close relations with the President, was an 
asset of which full use was made by the Zionist leaders, in 
op 
London, in their dealings with the British government. His 
reputation as one of the Wilson's most trusted advisers 
materially influenced the course of events in so far as it 
improved the standing of the Zionists and gave them added 
37 claim to attention. 
Strange as it may appear, though it seems clear that 
when, early in September 1917 Wilson was first sounded by 
the British Was Cabinet as to his views on a pro- Zionist 
pronouncement, he looked for advice, not to Brandies, but 
to his still more intimate confidant, Colonal House. After 
consultation with Colonal House, he sent a discouraging 
reply to which Brandeis cannot possibly have been a party. 
On the other hand, there is reason to believe that Brandies 
had something to do with Wilson's second thoughts when a 
further enquiry on the same subject reached Washington from 
London a few weeks later. This time Wilson let it be known, 
36. Stein, n.24, p.192, 
37. Ibid., p.19. 
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through House that he would favour the proposed British 
declaration. 
It seems to have been House who finally persuaded him 
to assent, but in the interval between the two British 
enquiries Brandeis had intervened to some purpose, though it 
looks as though his influence had been exerted through 
House rather than by a personal approach to the President. 
Chaim Weizmann and his London colleagues had hoped that 
Brandies would be able to induce Wilson actively to press 
their case on the British government. This did not happen, 
but in so far as Brandeis helped to swing Wilson from 
discouragement to approval of a British assurance to the 
Zionists, he rendered a signal service to the Zionist cause. 
Wilson's September message had come near to killing the 
Balfour Declaration. Had his reply to the second British 
enquiry been equally chilling, it is quote possible the 
Declaration would have never seen the light. 
38. Ibid., pp.196-97 
39. Ibid. 
40. Ibid., p.197. 
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Ori November 2, 1917, came the well knovm Balfour 
Declaration, promising the World Zionists a national home 
land for the Jews in Palestine. This, incidentally, was the 
first occasion on which the United States - already involved 
in the war since April 6, 1917 became involved in the 
political affairs of the Arabs. 
According to William Yale, President Wilson's 
agreement to the Declaration caxae during Lord Balfour's 
visit for one month to the United States starting April 
22,1917. Lord Balfour at that time met Justice Louis 
Brandeis who was then a leading figure in the American 
Zionist movement, and a trusted advisor to President Wilson. 
Brandeis had already won the sjnnpathy of President Wilson to 
the Zionist cause, and assured Lord Balfour that the 
President was actively sympathetic to a Jewish home in 
Palestine. 
Therefore, when the Balfour Declaration was issued in 
the form of a note from Lord Balfour to Lord Rothschild a 
41. Faiz S. Abu-Jaber, American-Arab Relations From Wilson 
to Nixon (Washington, 1979), p.3. 
42. Captain Yale was a member of the American King Crane 
Commission sent by President Wilson in 1919 to 
investigate the wishes of the Syrian people as to the 
final political settlement in Syria. 
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leading English Zionist - on November 2, 1917, it had the 
approval of the British Cabinet as well as the approval of 
the President of the United States. Yet Wilson insisted 
upon adding upon adding the modifying clauses to the 
declaration before he accepted it. The President later 
publicity acknowledged the Balfour Declaration of in a 
letter addressed to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise.* 
The carefully prepared text, known as the Balfour 
Declaration, set the stage for more than thirty years of 
conflict among Arabs, Jews, and British troops in Palestine. 
There is no evidence that Wilson saw the final version of 
the statement before it was communicated to lord Rothschild. 
What is clear is that the preoccupied wartime President, did 
not consider the affair of particular concern to U.S. 
Wilson's attitude typified the American approach to 
Palestine for the next two and half decades. While sympathy 
for the Zionist movement was occasionally expressed by 
policy makers, Palestine was seen as a British 
43. Sydney N. Fisher, The Middle East (New York, 1960), 
p.371. 
44. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in WQCICI Affairs 
(New York, 1958), p.81. 
45. Dan Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision (Los Angeles, 
1983), pp.1-2. 
206 
responsibility and care was taken to avoid any official 
commitment to the creation of a Jewish national home in that 
county. 
Wilson and Paris Peace Conference: In 1918, Wilson showed 
his interest in the future of the Arabs in the form of the 
famous 'Fourteen Points'. Point twelve indirectly refers to 
the Arabs, as well as to other minorities in the Ottoman 
Empire. 
It states". 
The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire 
should be assured a secure sovereignty, but other 
nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be 
assured an undoubted security life and an absolutely 
47 
unmolested opportunity of autonomous development". 
President Wilson's idealism, as illustrated in this 
point and his self determination policy expounded in Point 
Five, seem to be in consistent with his acceptance of the 
46. Early sympathetic, but non-committal, pronouncement on 
Zionism by American foreign foreign policy makers can 
be found in Reuben Fink, ed., America and Palestine 
(New York, American Zionist Emergency Council, 1944). 
47. R.S. Baker and W.E. Dodd, The Public Papers of Woodrow 
Wilson (New York, 1927), 111, pp.160-61; See also R.S. 
Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (New York, 
1922), 111, pp.23-41. 
207 
Balfour Declaration as modified. To Arab leaders like Prince 
Faisal, the son of Sherif Hussain and the Chief spokesman 
for the Arab cause in the Paris Peace Conference Wilson's 
twelfth point was interpreted later to foreshadow and 
nullify the Balfour Declaration and all the Allied secret 
agreements during the war. For a policy of self 
determination would of once block the Zionist aims in 
Palestine, as well as the imperial powers ambitions in the 
area. The Jews in Palestine then constituted at best not 
more than 10 per cent of the population and a policy of 
counting heads would favour Palestines inclusion in an Arab 
state as pledged to Sherif Hussain of Mecca by the High 
Commissioner of Egypt, Henry McMahon, in 1916. Therefore, 
neither the Zionists nor ..e representative of Great Britain 
were later happy with the expression's of Wilson's idealism. 
"Had it been pushed to its logical conclusion, the 
President's program would have conflicted with practically 
every one of the secret agreements with the exception 
perhaps, of the British Arab accord.' ° Wilson's numerous 
remarks in which he warned against the disposing off the 
48. Lenczowski, n.44, p.88. 
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Middle East among the great powers did not get a favourable 
reception among the Allies. ^  
At the Paris Peace Conference, Prince Faisal met with 
three major forces at work in opposition to Arab 
aspirations. The British, the French, and the World 
Zionists. Only in President Wilson he found a sympathetic 
listener. Wilson opposed annexation saying this would 
discredit the proposed League of Nations. At length, Prime 
Minister Jan Smuts of South Africa produced the Mandate 
concept, a compromise between imperial annexation and 
Wilsonian self determination. The proposal was accepted.'^  
There were claims and counter claims. The subject 
peoples of the Ottoman Empire were anxious to have their 
day, and during the month of February they presented their 
cases. On 6th February Prince Faisal asked for the creation 
of Arab confederation. Zionists urged that the Balfour 
Declaration be carried out, with Britain acting as 
Mandatory. 
49. Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace 
Conference. 1919. Vol. Ill, (Washington, 1943), 
pp.2113-214. (Hereafter FRUS). 
50. Bryson, n.3, p.65. 
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King Crane Commission: With such a situation the conference 
reached an impasse. At that point a letter from President 
Howard Bliss of the American University of Beirut suggested 
to President Wilson the possibility of sending a commission 
of inquiry to Syria to determine the wishes of the people. 
This suggestion was harmonious with Wilson's concept of self 
determination, and, at the -President's Insistence, the 
Supreme Allied Council agreed on 20 March to send such a 
commission to Syria. In fact Wilson insisted on such a 
commission, and despite intense Zionist objections voiced by 
Professor Felix Frankfurter, and British and French refusal 
to participate in such a commission. Initially known as the 
Inter - Allied Commission on Mandate in Turkey, the fact 
finding body ultimately became an American venture because 
the British and French elected not to participate. The 
President appointed Dr. Henry C. King, President of oberlin 
College, and Charles R. Crane of New York a prominent 
business man. other members of the commission were Professor 
Albert H. Lybyer, Dr. George R. Montgomery, Captain William 
Yale and Captain Donald M. Broodie. Between May and July, 
51. Harry N. Howard, The King-Crane Commission: An American 
Inquiry in th^ Middle East (Beirut, 1963), pp.24-26. 
52. Abu Jaber, n.41, p.5. 
9 
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1919, "the King-Crane Commission made a six v?eeks tour of 
Syria and Palestine, held hearings and on August 28, 1919, 
C O 
presented their report to the President. "^  
The King-Crane report testified to the high regard the 
Arabs of Syria and Palestine had for President Wilson and 
the United States. According to the report, the Commission 
found the inhabitants of Syria and Palestine insistent on an 
independent and united Arab state, and recommended that 
Prince Faisal be made head of such a united Syrian state. 
Failing to achieve complete independence, the great majority 
of the Syrians were found to favour the United States coming 
in as a mandatory power rather then any other power.'' 
TTie recommendation of the Commission's report were not 
followed and in fact were not even discussed by the Paris 
Peace Conference. " It was simply buried in the archives of 
the American delegation, and ignored by the conferees. It 
was not published until 1922, long after the peace 
Kg 
settlement." 
53. See Henry Harry N. Howard, n.51 for full text of the 
recommendations of the King-Crane Commission is found 
in Antonius, Appendix II, pp.443-458. 
54. Abu Jaber, n.41, p.6. 
56. Lenczowski, n.44, p.92. 
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This neglect of the Commission's report is attributed 
to President Wilson's failure to convince the American 
Senate of the soundness of the Versailles Treaty, as is well 
known, affected the whole general question of America's 
involvement in world affairs between the two World War. 
Wilson never saw the report. In Wilson's absence from Paris, 
the Commission's report was simply not pressed by the rest 
of the American delegation and was ignored by the major 
powers, who proceeded later in the San Remo Conference of 
April 24, 1920 to divide greater Syria into French and 
British mandates. As these mandates were allocated, the 
Unites States on August 24, 1921, made clear in an "Open 
Door Policy" statement that she expected her interests and 
the "fair and equal opportunities which it is believed the 
United States should enjoy in common with the other powers" 
cry 
to be safe guarded. 
The O.S. And Palestine Till 1939: 
Following the award of the Palestine mandate to Great 
Britain in 1920, Congress passed a resolution endorsing the 
Balfour Declaration, the sponsor of the resolution in the 
56. Mandate for Palestine (Washington: U.S.Government 
Printing Office, 1927), pp.49-50. 
?.n 
House of Representation was at point out that passage of the 
measure would involve no commitraent to an "entangling 
alliance or to any obligation to use military or naval force 
or the expenditure of any money." The legislation was 
described as "merely a expression of sympathy and favourable 
attitude in establishing in Palestine a refuge for the 
prosecuted Jews of the World".'^  
U.S.A. was not a member of the League of Nations, but 
it secured "most favoured nation" status in Palestine by 
concluding a convention with Great Britain in 1924. Under 
this agreement the United States recognized the legality of 
the British administration in Palestine and in return was 
guaranteed equal treatment with members of the League of 
Nations in matters pertaining to that country. After being 
disillusioned with Britain that it would not "secure the 
establishment of a Jewish national home" the Zionists in 
American argued that the Anglo-American Convention empowered 
Washington to veto administrative measures in Palestine that 
57. U.S. Congress, Congressional Record. Proceedings and 
Debates, 67th Cong., Ilnd Session., June 30, 1922, 
p.9799. 
58. Convention between the U.S. and U.K. reproduced in 
Reuben Fink, (ed.) America and Palestine (New York, 
1944), p.485. 
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it considered violations of the original League of Nations 
directive. This point of view was never accepted by the 
British or American governments. A public memorandum 
issued by the Department of State in 1938 sought to clarify 
Washington's view that it had no right to prevent changes in 
the terms of the Palestine mandate. Shortly afterward, 
President Roosvelt made the same point in a letter to the 
Mayor of Hartford, Connecticut. 
American aloofness from Palestine during the interwar 
period was a product of a generally low level of involvement 
with the Middle East as a whole. Historically, sustained 
American contact with the region was imbued with Christian 
missionary fervour, to convert the Islamic peoples to 
Christianity. However after World War 1, Washington helped 
open the way for the development of private American 
commercial interests in the Middle East. Although economic 
relations of American with the countries of the region 
remained minimally important, the policy makers were 
anxious that Americans not suffer economic discrimination. 
59. Dan Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision. Origins and 
Implications of American Involvement with the Palestine 
Problem (U.S. 1983), p.2. 
60. Frank E. Manuel, n.7, p.307. 
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The conventions between the mandatory powers in the Middle 
fi 1 East and the United States were designed to ensure this. 
Noted result of Washington's preoccupation with 
commercial rights was American participation in the hunt for 
Middle East oil. Despite the successful introduction of an 
American presence into the Middle East oil industry, 
Washington continued to show little desire to enhance its 
political influence in the area. On account of this the 
overhall American trade with the region remained modest in 
the years before world war II. 
Not withstanding the government's preference for non 
involvement in the Middle Eastern affairs, circumstances 
soon conspired to give the United States an important role 
in the political life of the region. One such factor was 
the radical alteration in relations between the Zionist 
movement and the British government that occurred in the 
spring of 1939. Feeling themselves forsaken by London, 
Zionist leaders looked to the large and potentially 
influential American Jewish community to hring the United 
States into an active partnership with their cause. 
61. Tschirgi, n.59, p.3. 
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Another set of forces helping to proposal the United 
States into a position of influence in the Middle East was 
unleashed in September 1939 by the outbreak of World War II. 
The war years witnessed a revolutionary change in the 
nature of American interest in the Middle East. In an 
immediate sense Washington's traditional concern with 
established philanthropic, cultural, religions, and academic 
enterprises was quickly superseded by military 
considerations as vast tracts of the area became potential 
or actual battlegrounds between Allied and Axis forces 
Almost simultaneously, American policy makers began 
attributing more value to Middle Eastern Oil, in which they 
go 
recognized an important military asset. 
The end of the war did not reinstate the old cultural 
interests as the primary focus of American policy in the 
Middle East. American non-intervention had died at Pearl 
Harbor. However, in the Middle East it was not immediately 
replaced by any comprehensive framework for the formulation 
of foreign policy, still certain concrete objectives were 
seen as constituting definite interests in the Arab world. 
Chief among these were the security of American access to 
62. Ibid., p.4. 
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Middle Eastern oil and the preservation of cordial relations 
with the Arab Middle East.^^ 
While these regional interests were generally accepted 
as valid by American policy makers ever before the end of 
World War II, there was no clear cut policy formulation 
towards Palestine question. The time was ripe for a long 
time objective in american foreign policy not mere nilitary 
expediency."^ 
In brief 1939 stands as a watershed in the American 
approach to the Palestine problem. On the on hand, the 
termination of the Anglo-Zionist alliance in Palestine led 
directly to the creation in the United States of a large, 
vocal, and influential pressure group. This group was 
active in roping Washington as champion of the Zionist 
cause. On the other hand, the accelerated development of 
American interests in the Middle East needed to satisfy 
Arabs about U.S. objectives towards Palestine. Both options, 
Zionists or Arab, helped foreclose non-involvement in the 
Palestine controversy as a real option for the United 
States. 
63. Ibid. 
64. Ibid. 
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Hoosvelt and His Ad9ilnistra1;ion: 
Roosvelt and 1939 white paper: On the eve of the London 
conference, Zionists launched a campaign to obtain official 
American support against any alteration of British policy 
that might harm their position in Palestine. The Zionist 
leadership from abroad coordinated its efforts with its 
movements within America, The objective was to get the 
support of the American President Franklin D. Roosvelt. 
American political system is such that the keyrol© in 
the execution of the foreign policy rests with the 
President. This reason led Zionists on winning over the 
WViite House. "If American intervention was to come in time 
to prevent a harmful shift in British policy, Zionists' 
66 arguments had to be taken straight to the President". 
Moreover, Zionists drew encouragement from Roosvelt's 
67 
reputation as a friend of the Jewish people. 
Although Ro<?svelt's suppo.-t was the fist priority for 
Zionists they did not ignore efforts to mobilize friendly 
opinion in other branches of government or among the 
general public. Both Congress and the State Department were 
65. Ibid., p.17. 
66. Ibid. 
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urged to speak out against the impending shift of British 
policy in Palestine. At the same time, Zionists promoted 
popular interest in their views through a variety of 
propaganda projects. 
Zionist pressure to intercede at this juncture failed 
for ail practical purposes. The White Paper was issued on 
May 17, 1939. Roosvelt did not open the issue with Britain. 
An enquiry into the President's reaction to the White Paper 
issue is an indicator of subsequent American involvement 
with Palestine imbroglio. However before we take into 
account the perspective of the President we have to take 
care of the conflicting views of the Congress and the 
Statement, on Palestine tangle. 
The D.S. Congress and Palestine'- To quote Frank E. Manuel, 
"the Department of State and Congress, of course, never 
thought alike on Palestine affairs under any administration 
68 because they moved in different orbits.' J.C. Hurewitz. 
Wrote, "Congress was sensitized to American public 
opinion."^^ 
68. Manuel, n.7., p.276. 
69. J.C. Hurewita. The Struggle for Palestin. (New York, 
1950), p.226. 
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The pro-Zionist public opinion in the United States was 
visible when the Congress reacted to the British White 
Paper. Just before the collapse o2 the London Conference, 
the Palestine issue was brought the Senate by Arizana's 
Henry Ashurst. He is a telegram, sent earlier to Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull, had urged the President and the State 
Department to impress upon Great Britain that "Catastrophe" 
would result were the Balfour Declaration violated. "^  
Again a pro-Zionist joint statement was given by 28 
Senators. This was a considered opinion of l/3rd of the 
senate and merited some attention. The joint statement 
called upon the British government to abandon any attempt of 
liquidating the Mandate in Palestine "based upon the Balfour 
Declaration". It further stated that a change in British 
policy might result in "a new state dominated by a narrow 
71 [non-Jewish] majority." It ignored the fact that the then 
Jewish community in Palestine constituted only l\3rd of the 
whole population. 
70. U.S. Congress, Congressional Record. Proceedings and 
Debates of the 76th Congress, First Session, Vol.84, 
Part 3, Senate (Washington, D.C. U.S. Government 
printing office, 1939), March 16, 1939, p.2799. 
71. Ibid., March 17, 1939. p.2915. 
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The statement emphasised on both the Balfour 
Declaration and the 1924 Anglo American Convention on 
Palestine as binding commitments for Britain and U.S. to 
allow the Zionists, when they co. onized Palestine. The 28 
senators failed to perceive any ambiguity in the Balfour 
Declaration or they were ignorant of the fact that the 
Anglo-American convention did not empower the United States 
to prevent alterations in the Palestine mandate. 
Publication of the White Paper on May 17, brought forth 
dogmatic statements, all of which were pro Zionist, in both 
the House and the Senate. 
In the House, Representatives Everett Dirksen and Ralph 
Church voiced indignation over the Vfhite Paper. 
Representative Bender drew applause when he labeled the 
White Paper " a surrender to [Arab] force and violence", and 
called upon the U.S. "to demand" that London rescind its new 
policy.''^ ^ 
This is significant to note that observations made by 
Senators and Representatives against the White Paper in the 
first half of 1939 did not include any reference to 
72. Ibid., House, May 22, 1939, p.5901; May 23, 1939, p.5997. 
73. Ibid., May 22, 1939, pp.5930-31. 
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possible American participation in the administration of 
Palestine ensuring the success of Zionism. "Congressional 
sympathy for Zionism stopped short of a willingness to 
assume active responsibility in Palestine; Congressional 
humanitarianism did not include a willingness to open 
American borders to the persecuted."'* 
An important feature of the approach of the Congress 
towards Palestine problem was that it was not based upon 
consideration of the issued at stoke within Palestine 
itself. It was also not based to any great extent upon 
consideration of international repercussions occasioned by 
the Arab-Zionist quagmire. Instead the action of the 
Congress was influenced to a great extent by an 
orchestrated public opinion. As the Zionist movement in 
American developed into a well organized and efficient 
pressure group after 1939, Congress became apparently more 
vulnerable to the sophistry of Zionists. 
Department of State and Palestine". Manuel's earlier 
metaphorical distinction between the Congress and the State 
Department seems to be correct: the two did more in 
74. Don Tschirgi, n.59, p.27 
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different "orbits". Whereas the Congress viewed the 
Palestine problem in terms of its domestic importance the 
State Department looked into the issue of its international 
implications. 
The prevailing State Department outlook on Palestine 
can be gauged by a memorandum sent by the Chief of the 
Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Wallace Murray to 
Secretary Hull and Undersecretary Sumner Welles: 
It is altogether desirable that the United 
State Goverriment refrain from injecting itself 
in any way into the London discussions and 
wait until a solution has been reached or, 
failing such a solution, until the British 
Government announces its own plan of 
procedure. '^  
Zionist attempts to obtain Roosvelt's help were opposed 
by Undersecretary of State Welles on grounds that in the 
deteriorating political situation in Europe it was not 
advisable for the United States to challenge the British 
government. Although Welles was sympathetic towards Zionist 
76 aspirations, he arrived at this conclusion reluctantly. 
75. Murray to Hull and Welles, February 9, 1939. As quoted 
in Dan Tschirgi, n.59, p.29. 
76. Welles to Murray, May 5, 1939. As cited in Dan 
Tschirgi, n.59, p.30. 
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The turn of international scenario in the spring of 
1939 led Secretary of State Hull to brush off Zionist 
requests for support. Hull resigned in the fall of 1944. 
Till then fiuli maintained a rigid and restricted outlook an 
the legitimate scope of U.S. interest in Palestine: 
"Our relations to Palestine rested on December British 
mandate Treaty of December, 3,1924, whereby the United 
77 
States had recognised Britain's Mandate...". 
However, t?te advice given to the President by the State 
Department after 1939 pertaining to Palestine was based on 
international political considerations, rather than on 
restrictive narrow interpretation of 1924 agreement with 
Britain. Moreover, long before Hull left office events 
pointed to the fact that neither State Department nor the 
White House could avoid the Palestine issue by citing the 
Anglo-American Convention. It became progressively difficult 
for Washington to avoid the Palestine question by parroting 
the conception of American interests that had been 
formulated 20 years earlier. 
77. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York. 
1948), Vol. II, p.1528. 
78. Dan Tschirgi, n.59, p.31.. 
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The President: As the chief executive authority of foreign 
policy of America, President Franklin Roosvelt became the 
focal point for the conflicting views, advice and pressures 
from v?hich the American government's reaction to the White 
Paper was distilled. "In many ways the President's approach 
to the limited question of the White Paper presaged that 
which the White House, would follow during the next 
79 decade." 
The White Paper controversy had put the President in an 
uncomfortable position. On the one hand, Roosvelt was aware 
of the British desire to revise its Palestine policy on 
account of strategic considerations, the President was also 
receptive to arguments advanced by his pro-Zionist 
intimates. Yet he did not agree with Congressional calls for 
strenuous pressure upon the British. Nor did he accept the 
State Department's advice that strict detachment should he 
followed.^^ 
As regards the White Paper Roosvelt did not act 
according to the advices he received. The tentative 
overtures he made to the British government through 
79. Ibid., p.35. 
80. Ibid. 
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Ambassador Kennedy were against the advises of the State 
Department. Roosvelt gave Zionists an exaggerated picture 
of his efforts on their behalf. This was also alone to an 
extent to appear in tune with a well-publicised and popular 
cause. "Yet the President does not appear to have been 
engaging in a completely cynical display of dissimulation 
in his relations with American Zionists. TTie truth of the 
matter seems to be that in the spring of 1939 he had not 
81 decided how to react to the White Paper.' 
After the release of the white paper on May 17, 1939, 
Roosvelt continued to recognise that Palestine was a British 
matter. Nevertheless, he privately expressed the belief that 
"the British are not wholly correct in saying that the 
framers of the Palestine Mandate could not have intended 
that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state 
against the will of the Arab population of the 
an 
country." Only four months earlier Roosvelt had assured 
Ibn-Saud 'that the Government has never taken any position 
different from that which it has maintained from the 
81. Ibid. 
82. Hull, n.77, 1530. 
go 
beginning toward this question.' Now Ibn Saud has left to 
himself to interpret what American policy had been. 
Roosveit recognized: 
While the Palestine Mandate undoubtedly 
did not intend to take away the right of 
citizenship and of taking part in the 
Government on the part of the Arab population, 
it ... did intend to convert Palestine into a 
Jewish Home which might very possible become 
preponderantly Jewish within a comparatively 
short time". 
For these reasons the President felt that "it is 
something that we cannot give approval to by the United 
States", even though " there are some good ideas in regard 
a c 
to actual administration of government". 
Roosveit in described his own reaction: 
My snap judgement is that the British plan for 
administration [as embodied in the White 
Paper] can well be the basis of an 
administration to be set up and to carry on 
83. Roosveit Papers, Personal Paper File 3500, (FRDL, New 
York). 
84. Hull, n.77, p.65. 
85. Ibid. 
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during the next five year; that during the 
next five years the 75,000 additional Jews 
should be allowed to go to Palestine to 
settle; and at the end of five years the 
whole problem could be resurveyed and at that 
time either continued on a temporary basis for 
another five years or permanently settled if 
that is then possible I believe that the Arabs 
could be brought to accept this because it 
seems clear that 75,000 additional immigrants 
can be successfully settled on the land and 
because also Arab immigration into Palestine 
since 1920 has vastly exceeded ^he total 
Jewish immigration during this period. 
The President's comment on Arab immigration into 
Palestine was of course, erroneous. Actually between 1920 
and 1939, 306, 049 Jews immigrated into Palestine, while 
during the same period the figure for Arab immigration was 
B7 18,630. This also shows that Roosvelt had a deficient 
factual grasp of the Palestine question. The memorandum 
also revealed his ambivalence toward the White Paper. In 
1939 the President was of the belief that the right 
administration of the Palestine Mandate would ultimately 
result in the formation of a Jewish State. However, the 
contradiction between this belief and his sudden realization 
gave rise to uncomfortable dilemma that he exhibited toward. 
86. United States, Department of State, ZEUS, Vol. IV, 
p.757. 
87. See foot note, n.73, in Dan Tschirgi, n.59, p.277. 
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the White Paper. He took refuge in favour of immediate 
necessity. 
Roosvelt's response to the White Paper showed his 
understanding that any policy purposefully directed toward. 
Palestine problem should take into consideration the 
political future of Palestine. White responding to the White 
Paper he consciously opted for a policy of expediency, but 
he did so in the belief that it was adequate only as a 
8fl temporary measure. 
Roosvelt and the Palestine Besolution: On January 27, 1944, 
two identically worded resolutions were introduced in the 
House of Representatives. The proposal measures called for 
the United States to use its good offices and take 
appropriate measures, to the end that the doors of Palestine 
shall be opened country, and that there shall be full 
opportunity for colonization, so that the Jewish people may 
ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic 
go 
Jewish commonwealth. A similar measure was introduced in 
88. Dan Tschirgi, n.59, p.37. 
89. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Hearings on H.R. 418 and H.R. 419, p.l. As cited in Dan 
Schirgi, n.59, p.98. 
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the Senate four days later, jointly sponsored by Robert 
Wagner and Republican leader Robert Taft. 
The resolution as presented was almost identical with 
the Baltimore Programme^ which had called for the 
establishment of a Jewish commonwealth. An interesting 
aspect in the Congressional resolution was the substitution 
of the word "reconstitute" in place of "be established the 
obvious intention was to create the impression that a 
Jewish commonwealth had once existed and that its resolution 
was only proper. This phraseology enabled those so disposed 
to view a modern Jewish state as a fulfilment of Biblical 
92 prophecy. 
The resolutions placed the Roosvelt administration in a 
quandary. Still determined to avoid any commitment on 
Palestine, the White House could not ignore the adverse 
effect that its out-right opposition might have on the 
Democratic Party in the November elections. The problem was 
aggravated by the impending Allied invasion of Europe and 
90. Ibid., p.99. 
91. Biltmore Progreime discussed in Chapter II. 
92. Richard P. Stereno, American Zionism and U.S. Foreign 
Policy 1942-1947 (New York. 1962), pp.38-39. 
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the need to avoid any out-break in the Middle East that 
would complicate the military situation. On account of these 
factors, the administration, started, a secret, well 
coordinated campaign to prevent Congressional approval of 
the Palestine resolutions. Slightly over six weeks after the 
measures were first introduced, these obstructive tactics 
were successful. However, the actions of the White House 
raised serious questions in the minds of leading Zionists 
about Roosvelt's attitude toward their cause. 
In order to offset Zionist anger over the scuttling of 
the resolutions Roosvelt received the Co-chairman of the 
American Zionist Emergency Council, Rabbis Stephen Wise and 
Abba Hilled Silver, on March 9, 1944.^ "^  This was some 
consolation to them. Roosvelt met with wise and Silver. The 
President apparently promised that he would speak out 
clearly in support of Zionism at a later date. In the mean 
time, he authorized them to make the following statement: 
The President authorized us to say that the American 
Government has never given its approval to the White Paper 
of 1989. 
93. Dan Tschirgi, n.59, p.98. 
94. Stevens, n.92, p.80. 
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The President is happy the doors of Palestine are today 
open to Jewish refugees, and that when future decision are 
reached , full justice will be done to those who seek a 
Jewish National Home, for which our Government and the 
American people have always had the deepest sympathy and 
today more than ever, in view of the tragic plight of 
hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees. 
It is interesting to note that on the very day when he 
received the Rabbis Roosvelt wrote concerning the 'volume of 
protests' from the Arab world stirred by the impending 
resolution. he elaborated, "what happens if delicate 
international situations get into yarty politics."' He was 
also happy that the resolutions were under control in the 
House.^^ 
It is quite obvious that party politics had influenced 
the President's announcement to the Rabbis. For not only, 
was the Democratic Party concerned, with the coming 
95. Zionist Organisation of America, 47th Annual Report 
(Washington, D.C., 1944), p.62. 
96. Roosvelt Papers, Official File 700. (FDRL, New York) 
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elections, but the President and Rabbi Wise were friends 
of long standing. Wise had supported the President in all 
of his campaigns and had even made numerous addresses 
throughout the country on Roosvelts behalf, Wise had acted 
as a consultant on problems affecting Jews and it was 
expected that Roosvelt would give him sympathetic hoaring. 
However, Roosvelt was not going to btj cornered. 
Encouraged by their favourable reception at Wliite House 
Wise and Silver drafted another statement on March 13, 1944, 
for issuance by the President. The suggested declaration 
supported free and unrestricted entry of Jews into 
Palestine with full opportunity for colonization", and also 
stated that the purpose and intent of American policy 
towards Palestine was to see a Jewish commonwealth 
constituted in that country. No reply was sent to this 
communication, and on Hull's advice, the President merely 
made a general declaration on March 24 dealing with European 
refugees. "^ 
97. Stevens, n.92, p.8. 
98. Roosvelt Papers, Personal Paper File 3992. (FDRL, New 
York). 
99. Stevens, n.92, p.105. 
100. Roosvelt Papers, Official File 700. (FDRL, New YOrk). 
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Arab reaction to the Statement of the President of 
March 9 was prompt. Roosvelt's reply attempted to straddle 
the issue. He admitted that he was correctly quoted. The 
President also pointed out that his statement had mentioned 
a Jewish national home rather than a Jewish Commonwealth. 
Furthermore, although the United State had never expressed 
approval of the Vfliite Paper, it had never, on the other 
hand, " taken a position relative to it.' Hull remarked: 
In General the President at times talked both ways to 
Zionists and Arabs, besieged as he was by each camp. Rabbis 
Wise and . Silver believed that the President had made 
pledges to them. The State Department made no pledges. ^ 
Election of 1944: Hull's suggestion to the President on July 
26, 1944, advising that the leaders of both parties refrain 
from making statements during the election campaign which 
might "tend to arouse the Arabs or upset the precarious 
balance of forces in Palestine".'^ "^  This was not paid 
attention to. by either parties. 
101. Hull, n.77, p.1936. 
102. Ibid. 
103. Ibid., p.3500. 
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In June the Republican National Convention approved a 
resolution that declared: 
In order to give refuge to millions of distressed 
Jewish men, women and children driven from their homes by 
tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to their 
unrestricted immigration and land ownership, so that in 
accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour 
Declaration of 1917, .... Palestine may be constituted as 
free and democratic commonwealth. We condemn the failure of 
the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine 
carry out the provision of the Balfour Declaration and the 
mandate, while he pretends to support them.-^^ 
The Democrats became increasingly anxious. They also 
bid for Jewish votes and were at pains to counter the 
Republicans Apprehensions increased that failure to have a 
competitive Palestine plank in the Democratic platform would 
seriously hurt the President's prospects in the New York 
Jewish community. Judge Bernard A. Rosenblatt underlined the 
importance of the Jewish vote in the crucial areas: 
104. New York Times, June 28, 1944. As quoted in Dan 
Tschirgi, n.59, p.107. 
CJ Of) 
New York is entitled to 47 electoral votes, while only 
266 electoral votes are necessary to elect a President. 
Whether the vote of the State of New York goes to one party 
or another land that may be by relatively few votes in a 
population of over 13 million) will make a difference of 14 
votes in the electoral college, so that it may be readily 
understood why a presidential contest may hinge on the 
political struggle in the State of New York, and to a 
lesser extent in the large states of Pennsylvania (36) 
Illinois (27), or Ohio (23).^"^^ 
The Democratic platform also adopted the Palestine 
blaink that outdid the Republican one. Although shorter, the 
Democrat's pronouncement called for a "Jewish Commonwealth" 
and was, therefore, more pleasing to the Zionists'-
We favour the opening of Palestine to 
unrestricted Jewish immigration and 
coloniEation, and such a policy as to result 
in the establishment of a free and democratic 
Jewish Commonwealth. 
105. Bernard A. Rosenblatt in Zionist Review, November 29, 
1946, p.3. As cited in Stevens n.92, pp.82-83. 
106. New York Times, July 21, 1944, As cited in Dan 
Tschirgi, n.59, p.109. 
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Conipet,i"tioii for Jewish vote did not abate. In early 
October the Republican Presidential candidate, Thomas Dewey, 
promised that as president he would work toward opening 
Palestine to unlimited Jewish immigration and land ownership 
and for the country's "reconstitution" ... as a free and 
democratic Jewish Commonwealth". 
On October 15 Roosvelt tVirough a message reinforced 
the position taken by the Democratic Convention in July. The 
President repeated the text of the Democrat's plank and 
added • 
Efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means 
of effectuating this policy as soon as practicable, i know 
how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and 
prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and 
democratic Jewish Commonwealth. I am convinced that the 
American people give their support to this aim and if re-
elected, shall help to bring about its realization. 
Indeed it has a tribute to the effectiveness of the 
techniques set in motion by Dr. Silver that tVie Biltmore 
107. Dan Tschirgi, n.59, p.109. 
108. FDR to Wagner, October 15, 1944, Wagner Papers. As 
cited in Stevens, 92, pp.60-61. 
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Program had at last found an echo in a presidential 
statement". ''^  Roosvelt who uptil now had vigorously tried 
to avoid any uncompromising support to the Zionists fell to 
the Democratic election fears in 1944. 
Post election policy: Roosvelt won the elections. Zionists 
once again pressed for goverioment action for pro-Zionist 
Congressional resolutions. In the mean while Edward 
Stettiriius had replaced Cordell Hull as secretary of state. 
Stettinius wished to discuss the issue with the 
President. ^ When the Secretary of State brought up the 
question with Roosvelt a few days later, it was decided to 
inform Wise that the administration felt that it was not 
wise to consider the resolutions this time. Stettinius 
therefore also informed the Zionists of the administrations 
position. ^ Zionists leaders were deeply divided over how 
to react to these signs of official recalcitance. 
The President was also well infoxmed of the Arab unrest 
produced by pro-Zionist declarations of Republican and 
109. Stevens, n.92, p.84. 
110. Dan Tschirgi, n.59, p.109. 
111. Ibid. 
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Democratic candidates. There entered an additional factor. 
This was the growing Soviet interest in the Middle East. 
However the President still had an open mind on the 
Palestine issue: 
Give me an opportunity to talk with Stalin and 
Churchill. There are all kinds of scheme - crack pot and 
otherwise being advanced. Perhaps some solution will come 
out of this whole matter. Naturally I do not want to see a 
war between a million or two, people in Palestine against 
the whole Muslim world in that area-seventy million 
strong.^^^ 
The President's mention of Stalin and Churchill 
referred to his impending journey to Yalta. The tripartite 
summit meeting,held between February 4, and 11, brought 
forth Zionist demand for a definite action by the 
administration. Senator Wagner reminded the President that 
the discussions abroad might be "of fateful significance for 
the Palestine issue and the future of Jews as a people". 
The Senator argued that "if Arab consent is to be a 
prerequisite of any political settlement [in Palestine] 
112. Ibid., p.114. 
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there can be no hope of justice to the Jewish people." He 
said what had to be done was to establish a Jewish state 
with "determination and speed," for the Arabs would accept 
•t t "a 
an "accomplished fact". ^  
Nonetheless, the President had already come to 
conclusion that prevented him from falling into line with 
the strategy advocated by Wagrxer. Retaining a firm faith in 
his own diplomatic abilities, the President had decided to 
meet with Ibn Saud in order to explore possibilities for 
some agreed solution to th Palestine problem. 
Ibn Saud: At the end of the Yalta Conference, during which 
the topic of Palestine did not arise, the President went to 
Syez Canal, where without prior announcement he met Ibn Saud 
abroad the American warship Quinsy on February 14, 1945. 
Ibn Saud was straight forward in his opinion towards 
Zionism to which he was opposed. To Roosvelt's enquiry 
about immigration of Jews to Palestine Saud said they return 
to lands from which they had been driven, in his opinion, 
those who for various reasons could not do so should be 
113, Ibid. 
114. Ibid., p.115. 
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given "living space in the Axis countries which oppressed 
lie 
them." According to the official American memorandum of 
Roosvelt's conversation with Ibn Saud, the King then 
elaborated on the Palestine issue: 
His Majesty expounded the case of the Arabs and 
their legitimate rights in their lands and stated that the 
Arabs and the Jews could never cooperate, neither in 
Palestine, nor in any other country. His Majesty called 
attention to the increasing threat to the existence of the 
Arabs and the crisis which has resulted from continued 
Jewish immigration and the purchase of land by the Jews. His 
Majesty further stated that the Arabs would rather die than 
yield their lands to the Jews. " 
When Ibn Saud ended these remarks with an appeal for 
American support, Roosvelt replied". 
He wished to assure His Majesty that he would do 
nothing to assist the Jews against the Arabs and would msike 
no move hostile to the Arab people. He reminded His Majesty 
115. Ibid. 
116. Ibid. See also Francis Perkins, The Roosvelt. I knew 
(New York, 1946), pp.87-89. And Grace Tully, FDR My 
Boss (New York, 1949), pp.352, 53. 
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that it was impossible to prevent speeches and resolutions 
in congress or in the press which may be made an any 
subject. His reassurance concerned his own future policy as 
Chief Executive of the United State. 
Roosvelt seemed deeply impressed by the firmness of Ibn 
Sauds' views. The President later remarked that of "all the 
men he had talked to in his life, he had least satisfaction 
11 fl from this iron willed monarch". " While returning to 
Washington Roosvelt told Secretary of State Stettinius that 
he looked forward to a conference with Congressional leaders 
1 1 Q 
to "re-examine our entire policy in Palestine."^^^ 
Zionists were caught unawares over the surprise meeting 
with Ibn Saud. Zionist's apprehensions and anxieties 
increased on March 1, when the President addressed the 
Congressional audience: 
Of the problems of Arabia I learned more about the 
whole problem, the Muslim problem, the Jewish problem by 
117. Ibid. pp.115-116. 
113. Elliot Roosvelt, As he saw it (New York, 1946), p.245. 
119. Edward Stettinius, Roosvelt and the Russians. (New 
York, 1849), p.288. 
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talking with Ibn Saud for five minute than I could have 
learned in an exchange of two or three dozen letters. 
The President's comments after coming from Yalta raised 
another controversy. Democratic Senator from Colorado, Edwin 
Johnson used scathing language: 
With all due respect to the President and King Ibn 
Saud, I must say that the choice of the desert king as 
expert on the J e wish question is nothing short of 
amazing I imagine that even Fala [Roosvelt's pet dog] 
121 
would be more of an expert•^ '"^  
This statement of the Senator is an indicator fo pro 
Zionist thinking in U.S. Johnson finds Ibn Saud irrelevant 
to Palestine problem while he himself sitting in America 
feels appropriate to pass judgements on the fate of 
Palestinians who constituted on over whelming majority. The 
very existence of Palestinians and that too in overwhelming 
majority , was jarring in the Zionist scheme of things. 
120. New York Times, March 2, 1945. As cited in Stevens, 
n.92, p.90. 
121. Joseph B. Schechtman, The United States and the Jewish 
State Movement (New York, 1966), p.110. 
?43 
The Zionist reaction led to the return of Dr. Silver 
and his more militant policies. '^^ The anger abated by mid-
March, when Rabi Wise was received at the White House and 
authorized' to issue the following statement in the 
President's name: 
"I made my position on Zionism clear in October. That 
position I have not changed and shall continue to seek to 
bring about its earliest realization." 
This statement led to strong reaction from Arab world 
in the form of numerous protest to oonong which one was from 
Ibn Saud. In response to a letter from Ibn Saud, the State 
Department reassured the king that no decision would be 
reached without consulting Arabs and Jews and assured the 
King the Roosvelt would take no action "which might prove 
hostile to the Arab people." Similar replies were 
forwarded to Syrian and Iraqi leaders. 
On April 12, 1945, Roosvelt died. His association with 
the Palestine question may aptly he described as 'self 
contradictory involvement. 
122. Stevens, n.92, p.90. 
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Roosvelt and Zionian: David Niles, a White House functionary 
once confessed to "serious doubts in my mind that Israel 
would have come into being if Roosvelt had lived". 
Roosvelt was in a habit of turning lose his political 
imagination. Roosvelt had a vision for Palestine, more 
ambitious than his British allies or even contemporary 
Zionism dared to advocate. "As a factor in policy 
determination Roosvelt's extravagant notions evaporated with 
his death .... But they are highly revealing of premises 
tVi&t American idealists brought to consideration of 
126 Palestine for the coming postwar era..." " 
The President, as early as 1938, had complained to 
Cordeli Hull that, in the Balfour Declaration, "The British 
made no secret of the fact they promised Palestine to the 
Jews. Vn-iy are they now reneging on their promise?" The 
statement is an indicator of Roosvelt's vision and thinking 
on Palestine: Britain and the World at large had promised 
Palestine to the Jews. 
125. Peter Grose, "The President versus the Diplomats", in 
W. Roger Loius and Robert W. Stookey, The gnd of the 
Palestine Mandate (ed.), (London, 1986), p.35. 
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A plan started taking form in his mind. He visualised 
the transfer of entire Arab population to a nearby land. Two 
hundred thousand to three hundred thousand Arabs should be 
resettled, at a cost of some $ 300 million. Britain and 
France should together put up one-third of that, the United 
States another third and wealthy Jews of the Western 
democracies the rest. Twice he raised this notion with 
British representatives, only to the firmly told that no 
amount of financial inducement would move the Palestinian 
Arabs.^28 
The President was unconvinced and told Zionist friends 
early in 1939, as they reported, that "as soon as he was 
somewhat relieved from the pressure of other affairs, he 
might try to tackle the job.-^ *^^  Thus emerged a second theme 
in Roosvelt's Palestine vision*, once the pressure of war 
were lifted, he would himself move in to resolve the dilemma 
that had resisted the efforts of statesmanship before. 
Roosvelt first met Chain Weiamann, he pressed his 
Zionist visitor on the economic absorptive capacity of 
128. Grose, n.l25, p.35. 
129. Ibid. 
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Pales-tine. Roosvelt asked breezily, "What, about the Arabs? 
Can't that he settled with a little baksheesh?" Weizmann 
explained to the President that uprooting the entire Arab 
population would not be quite as simple as that". ^^ 
During 1942, Roosvelt, during Christmas season 
expressed his thoughts on Palestine to his neighbour and 
Treasury Secretasry Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr., who remembered 
Roosvelt's ramblings vividly. 
Vfiiat I think I will do is this. I would 
call Palestine a religious countiry. Then 
I would leave Jerusalem the way it is and 
have it run by the Orthodox Greek 
Catholic Church, the Protestants and the 
Jews - have a joint committee run it....1 
actually would put a barbed wire around 
Palestine, and I would begin to move the 
Arabs out.... I would provide land for 
the Arabs in some other part of the 
Middle East....Each time we move out an 
Arab we would bring in another Jewish 
family.... But I don't want to bring in 
more than they can economically 
support.... It would be an independent 
nation just like any other nation.. 
Naturally, if there are 90% Jews, the 
Jews would dominate the government... 
130. Ibid., p.36. 
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There are lots of places to which you 
could move the Arabs. Ail you have to do 
i-s drill a well, because tViere is this 
large underground water supply, and we 
can move the Arabs, to places where they 
can really live. . . .'•^*-
The most revealing portrayal of the Roosvelt vision, 
however, came after-not before - the election. It was 
reported by an associate totally aloof from any possible 
ethnic aspiration, Edward R. Stettintus the man who had 
replaced Secretary Hull. Roosvelt spoke of his thinking in 
no uncertain terms. Stettinius noticed in his diary of 
November 10, 1944, "Palestine should be for the Jews and no 
Arabs should be in it". "He has definite ideas on the 
132 subject... It should be exclusive Jewish territory".*"^ 
In a confidential talk, after an election there was no 
need for the President to disguise his true sentiments. 
These sentiments, as talked to Stettinius, envisaged a 
Jewish Palestine in the original meaning of the Balfour 
Declaration as he understood it. Roosvelt envisioned that 
the Arabs must be moved out of Palestine, whether they liked 
it or not, whether with "baksheesh" or resettlement funds, 
131. John Morton Blum, Fr^m th^ M<?rK^ ttthan Diatifia, Vol. 
Ill, Years of War, 1941-4, ed., (Boston, 1967), p.208. 
132. The EifiEifis QJ EdKfird R. Stettinivta. Ix:^ 1943-1946 
(New Yor, 1975), p.170, As cited in Grose, n.l25, p.36. 
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Palestine should be made exclusive Jewish territory. He 
intended "to point out to Ibn Saud what an infinitessimal 
part of the whole area was occupied by Palestine and that he 
could not see why a portion of Palestine could not be given 
to the Jews without hainning in any way the interests of the 
Arabs".^^^ 
Nowhere in Roosvelt's record is there an indication 
that, the President envisaged the unilateral proclamation of 
a sovereign Jewish state such as occurred in May, 1948.^ 
Roosvelt's Middle Eastern policy implied coexistence between 
Jews and Arabs. This sounds like the binationalism that 
became the banner of the State Department and of all who 
opposed the notion of a Jewish state. But Roosvelt did not 
think of Palestine alone when he thought of Arab-Jewish 
cooperation. Like the most extreme Zionists, he determined 
that Palestine itself would be secure and exclusive for 
Jewish nationalism. Arab nationalism would find its full 
expression in the newly independent Arab states .of Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. Together these new nations on the 
133. Schechtman, n.l21, p.110. 
134. Grose, n.l25, p.38. 
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Middle East, the Jewish state and the Arab states - would 
form a wide binational federation to promote their mutual 
development. 13 D 
Given the restive nature of the West Asian society, 
expecting a harmonious cooperation, was a far cry. Roosvelt 
was bugged with a big question mark how to promote 
cooperation between the two communities. What could Arab 
nationalists and Jewish nationalists do to strive towards 
their own aspirations without crushing the aspirations of 
others? There were the questions Roosvelt was pondering 
when his days came to an end and the problem became the 
responsibility of another. 
From Truman to the O.H.O. 
The biographers of Harry S. Truman have produced 
contrasting biographical portraits of him. Reading through 
in biographies a picture emerges that he was a man of great 
contradictions. He was not nearly so ignorant as some 
contemporary observers thought of him, but neither does his 
record quite fit in with the legend some latter day 
historians have constructed. 
135. Ibid. 
136. For contradictory portrayal of Harry S. Truman, see A. 
Steinberg, The Man from Missouri (New York, 1962), R. 
Donovan, Conflict and Crisis (New York, 1979). 
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Truman had little preparation for the position into 
which President Roosvelt's death catapulted him. It took 
time to grow into the job. Though no scandal tarnished 
Truman's image he had retained certain characteristics which 
were the hallmark of a 'machine bred politician'. Robert 
Denovan has defined these as "intense partisanship, stubborn 
loyalty, a certain insensitivity about transgressions of 
political associates and a disinclination for the 
companionship for intellectuals and artists". Most of 
his friends were allegedly "plain, obscure, even mediocre 
men who shared his love of politics and poker". There were 
of course exceptions to this generali2sation, Dean Acheson 
being the most obvious. ** 
Truman may have been unsophisticated in international 
affairs, but he quickly adopted an approach to the Palestine 
question. This enabled him ultimately to steer clear though 
tempestuous course between the whirlpools of Zionism and 
British imperialism.^^^ 
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To his domestic Jewish constituency he persistently 
expressed compassion for the refugees. At the same time he 
resisted coTtanittnents that might alienate the Arabs and 
jeopardize the supply of Middle Eastern oil. To the British 
he revealed a characteristic American suspicion of 
imperialism and the usual British 'stunt' of deviousness and 
delay. If any one thing was clear in his mind it was the 
necessity to avoid being sucked into Middle Eastern 
troubles that would involve American troops. To Zionists he 
made public pronouncements to resolve simultaneously the 
problems of the displaced persons and the Jewish national 
home, but in fact he offered tangible American assistance 
only in the form of transport for the 100,000 Jews to 
Palestine. He resented Zionist pressure, but he never 
forgot that the three million Jews of New York constituted 
the largest metropolitan Jewish population in the entire 
would and that their vote might be decisive in a national 
election. Like Bevin, Truman had a remarkable capacity for 
occasional indiscreet and honest comment. When asked for an 
explanation of his pro-Jewish policy he once replied: "I 
have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for 
255^ , 
the success of Zionism. I do not h::.ve hundreds of thousands 
of Arabs in my constituent's." 
This statement of Truman shows his intense pragmatism 
towards a political imbroglio. It aims at his pro- Zionist 
stance though not on account of human considerations, which 
he was not devoid of but down to earth practical 
compulsions. 
Nevertheless one comes across quite frequently, a wide 
discrepancy between Truman's private opinions and his public 
utterances. He came to the Presidency a moderate 
conservative, but had inherited a liberal mandate and a 
liberal set of advisors. The gap between compulsive public 
profession and genuine emotional commitment was responsible 
for much of his erratic performance. His impulsive 
spontaneity, followed frequently by embarrassing retraction, 
gave rise in Washifigton to popular quip: "To err is 
Truman".^^ 
Truman wanted to be the master of his own Palestine 
policy. Nonetheless, these were conflicting demands within 
140. Ibid. 
141. Cohen, n.l37, p.41. 
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his administration and contradictory pledges given by his 
inimitable predecessor. Roosvelts' right hand, had promised 
sympathy for the Jewish national home while Viis left hand 
conveyed assurances that he would take no action which might 
prove hostile, to the Arab people". 
During Truman's presidency the theme of continuity may 
be found in his concern for the Jewish vote and his 
reluctance to commit American troops. To Truman's critics he 
appeared to lunge from crisis to crisis, and in the spring 
of 1948 Vie did in effect lose control of American policy 
towards Palestine, but when he regained it he acted 
decisively in favour of partition with results comparable to 
F.D-R.'s great triumphs in world politics. 
Truman succeeded as a President in the last weeks of 
the war in Europe, when the Western world was in Europe, 
when the Western world was discovering Nazi death camps. 
There is no reason to doubt that Truman too was genuinely 
moved by the plight of those who had survived Nasi 
occupied Europe. However, Truman had other mundane reasons 
for airing his sympathies for the Jewish victims. 
142. Louis, n.l39, p.421. 
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As a nonelected president eager to 
succeed in his own right, and indeed, as 
a highly unpopular President during his 
first term, Truman could hardly have 
failed to be less than hypersensitive to 
the anticipated effect on the many Jewish 
voters of his policy regarding the Jewish 
refugee's or the displaced person (DP) 
problem.-^^^ 
White House aides: At the VHnite House, the two most 
influential aids regarding Palestine were Clark Clifford and 
david Niles. Califford has been credited with reorganizing 
the shambles in the administration. Niles has been referred 
to as the administration's portable wailing wall", in 
reference to his function as liaison between minority groups 
and the President. 
Clifford, who served Truman as special counsel from 
1946 to 1950, and went on to become a successful Washington 
lawyer and Secretary of Defense in the 1960s, undoubtedly 
held great sway over the President. He became Truman's 
advocate in debates with the State Department over 
143. Cohen, n.l37, p.45 
144. Ibid., p.46. 
9r' 5^5 
Palestine. The memoirs of Eliahu Eiath (Epstein), who served 
at the time as head of the Zionist Organization's Washington 
office, reveal that both Clifford and Miles were briefed 
regularly by Elath and his office. It is evident that 
Elath's material often provided the basis of Califford's 
arguments against the State Department's view.-*-^ ^ 
Much later, at the end of 1976, Clifford attempted to 
vindicate Truman's (and his own) Palestine policy, before a 
meeting of American historians. His lecture was defensive in 
tone, claiming that Truman had been guided by a broad 
national strategy, influenced heavily by humane, religious 
sentiment toward the Jews, in which political factors played 
but a minor role. 
Clifford failed to mention any of the specific actions 
that Truman took with elections in view. Clifford is guarded 
enough not to mention his and or Niles connection with the 
Jews. 
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In November 1947, Clifford submitted an interesting 
memorandum to the President regarding the influence of the 
Jewish vote in the United States: 
The Jewish vote, insofar as it can be thought of as a 
block is important only in New York. But (except for Wilson 
in 1916) no candidate since 1876 has lost New York and work 
the Presidency, and its 47 votes are naturally the first 
prize in any election". 
Clifford memorandum, which "beceune the blueprint for 
the 1948 campaign waged by Truman," was consciously "based 
solely on an appraisal of the politically advantageous 
course to follow". Clifford wrote an apologia in 1976 and 
selected the following extract from the same memorandum: 'In 
the long run, there is likely to the greater gain if the 
Palestine problem is approached on the basis of reaching 
decisions founded upon intrinsic merit". 
It is quite possible that the "Jews electoral weight" 
thesis was being fed to the White House regularly by the 
147. Clifford, n.l46, p.43. 
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Zionist office in Washington Berriard Baruch, the Jewish 
financier to more than one President thought the electoral 
importance of the Nevf York Jews alone outweighed by far the 
entire Arab lobby; 
You, let me have the Jewish vote of New York and and I 
will bring you the head of Ibn Saud on a platter ! The 
administration will sell all seven Arab states if it is a 
question of retaining the support .... of the Jews of New 
York alone; never mind the rest of the country. 
Such smouldering arrogance bears testimony to the fact 
that American Presidency was reduced to the whims and 
fancies of local electrorates who could inject fear in the 
most powerful executive of the World. Dare you ignore us i 
was the attitude among the Zionist lobbyists in America. 
The role played by David Niles was same what different 
from that played by Clifford. Niles was the behind the 
scenes liaison between the President and the Zionists. The 
son of Russian Jewish immigrants, Niles had begun his 
governmental career during World War I as a clerk in the 
Department of Labor, graduating to administrative assistant 
149. Z. Ganin, Truman. American Jewry, and Israel. 1945-
1948. (New York,1979), p.101. 
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•to Roosvelt, specializing in minority problems. Truman kept 
him on, and Niles served him well during the frequent stormy-
episodes involving Palestine. Niles took upon himself the 
task to protect the President from the Zionist lobby. When 
the President made at a decision displeasing to the 
Zionists, Niles would tell them that the "career people" at 
the State Department had misled the White House. 
Niles position in the White House was anomalous. George 
Elsey was U.S. Noval Reserve officer at the White House, 
1942-1947 and assistant to Clifford, 1947-1949 has claimed 
that Niles was a most secretive individual. He rarely 
confided to his White House colleagues what he told the 
president, or what he had recommended. 
What made Niles and his White House connection so 
valuable to the Zionists was the rapport that existed 
between leaders of the Jewish movement and the 
administrative assistant. Niles worked closely with the top 
echelon of Zionist leadership, the Jewish Agency's 
Executive. Eliahu Epstein,who later changed his name to the 
Hebrew Eliahu Eilat, was the Jewish Agency's Executive 
150. Cohen, n.l37, p.49 
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Taember and Agency's administrative arm labeled Miles as "our 
friend" in the White House. Correspondence dealing with 
the Jewish strategy and their battle to win Truman's favour 
linked lines with Epstein, Meyer Weisgal, Nahum Goldman, and 
Stephen Wise, ail members of the powerful Executive. 
Concerted attempts were made by the Zionists leadership 
to keep Niles apprised of Jewish Agency's every move. 
Following a private conversation with Lord Inver Chapel, the 
British Ambassador to the U.S.A., Nahum Goldman wrote a 
confidential report for distribution to members of the 
executive. Goldman also recommended that a copy be sent to 
Niles for his perusal. Accordingly, Niles was aware that 
Britain was likely to turn the Palestine problem over to the 
United Nations at the same time that Zionists learned of the 
Plan.154 
A memorandum Niles wrote for the President on May 27, 
1946, provides an excellent example of his advocacy of a 
pro-Zionist policy and his ability to use his position to 
ensure that the Zionist cause received hearing by the 
152. Snetsinger, n.l48, p.36, 
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Presiden-t. Niles advised Tnaman not, to he disturbed from 
supporting Jewish claims for fear of losing the friendship 
of the King of Saudi Arabia. "You know that President 
Roosvelt said to same of the privately he could do anything 
that needed to be done with Ibn Saud with a few million 
dollars."^^^ 
The person who diligently argued the Zionist cause at 
the higher level of government, the accolgade Niles 
received were well deserved Moshe Sharett, while serving as 
the Israeli Foreign Minister reflected on the 'inestimable 
assistance' and fa-reaching effectiveness" of Niles's 'White 
House labors,"^ Forestal noted that the State Department 
was "seriously embarrassed and handicapped by the activities 
of Niles at the Wlriite House in join directly to the 
President on matters involving Palestine. •'•"' 
State Department'- The State Department stood in opposition 
to the White House aides. The officials of the State 
Department could not reconcile what they felt to be their 
duty with the President's political ambitions. The 
155. Ibid., p.39. 
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Depar-bmerfts innumerable warnings about the damage that would 
result to American interests in the Middle East if the 
President resorted to a policy which went against the 
I C Q 
interest of the Arabs. 
Truman was cautioned by Secretary of State Edward 
Stettinius that the Zionists would undoubtedly try to commit 
the President to their own programme for Palestine. This was 
resented by Truman. "In their patronizing tone, appropriate 
from a board of senior prefects to a new boy in the lower 
forms, the diplomatic officers committed an indiscretion 
159 they would never live down in Truman's mind.' 
Truman recalled: 
m those days no body seemed to think I was aware of 
anything .... a communication from some of the striped 
pants' boys warning me .... in affect telling me to watch my 
step, that I did not really understand what was going 
on over there and that I ought to leave it to the 
'experts'....".^^^ 
158. FRUS, Vol. VIII, 1945, 90 per cent of the section on 
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WYien it, came "to Palesl^ ine "the situation as it existed, 
was of mutual contempt between the White House and State 
Department. Nonetheless like Roosvelt, Truman also 
considered the Presidential prerogative as absolute. Both 
Roosvelt and Truman believed that the functions of the 
Cabinet stopped at giving advice. But the advisers retained 
their influence with him not because their membership in the 
Cabinet, but because of their close personal relationship 
with him.^^^ 
The State Department felt that they had been unfairly 
deprived of their rightful role in the policy making 
process. F. Wilson, t,he wartime head, has contemptuously 
remarked'-
The information that the professionals gave the 
Presidents however^ was complete and their advice was sound. 
Subsequent events have borne them out. It is no exaggeration 
to say that our relations with the entire Arab world never 
recovered from the events of 1947-1948, when we sided with 
the Jews against the Arabs. •^ '^  
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The Near Eastern Division experts did not believe that 
Truman had even begun to grasp the essence of the issues 
involved. The division's Chief of Research at the time Harry 
N. Haward, asserted later that the President had not 
understood the situation in the Middle East, nor the 
Palestine problem nor the Balfour Declaration. 
Nevertheless, Truman, given his understanding of 
Palestine and the Middle East, really did believe as he 
stated in his memoirs. He writes that he could at one and 
the same time support Zionism, protect his own political 
future, and safeguard the national interest in the Middle 
East.164 
The point to remember here is this, the Arab oil had 
not become a major factor in the economy, and the balance of 
mutual dependence weighed heavily in American's favour. A 
study of American Saudi relations during this period has 
concluded that the oil of Saudi Arabia and the Middle East 
played little, if any, role in Truman's final consideration 
of the Palestine problem. However Arab oil did play a 
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significant role in the Marshal plan in European economic 
recovery though later on. It can be visualised that State 
Department deliberately exaggerated the risks of the Arabs 
denying their oil the West, when they knew that Ibn Saud had 
atleast no intention of doing such thing. This irked the 
President and he lifted the Palestine problem out of their 
domain.^^^ 
On the initiative of a moderate Zionists leader, Nahum 
Goidmann, some interest was generated in tVie State 
Department and Pentagon for the partition of Palestine 
between a Jewish and an Arab state. However, the Anglo-
American Committee of Inquiry rejected such a departure and 
offered instead the possibility of a binational state. In 
this state "Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not 
lfi7 dominate Jew". Subsequent Anglo-American talks between 
Hei-bert Morrisson and Henry F. Grady refined the formula 
further. The Committees recommendations were basically a 
federal system of two autonomous states with a strong 
166. Cohen, n.l37, p.54. 
167. The Anglo American Committee and its working has been 
dealt in the third chapter of this dissertation. For 
analysis of the recommendations of the said committee, 
see M.S. Agwani, The United States And The Arab World. 
1945-1952. (Aligarh, 1955). See Appendices, no.I for 
the Text of the recommendation in the same book. 
:^ 65 
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central government under British direction. The admission 
of tVie 100,000 was made conditional upon the acceptance of 
the report as a whole. 
Faced with the Zionist opposition Truman hesitated. 
However he remarked, "I cannot believe that the gap between 
the proposals which have been put forward is too great to be 
bridged by men of reason and goodwill. To such a solution 
1 fi9 
our government could give its support". 
Critics in Britain and America have charged that Truman 
could follow only the partisan politics of the United States 
as for example the Yorn Kippur statement on the 4th October 
1946 in which the President offered soothing assurances of 
fidelity to American Jewry on the eve of their solemn 
holiday. ^ '^ '^  
The 4th October 1946 represented an important date in 
the history of the Zionist movement and British imperialism 
in the Middle East, In the summer and autumn of 1946 the 
breeze of 'partition' developed into what the British 
168. Proposals for the Future of Palestine, July 1946-
February 1947, Cmd, 7044 (London: HMSO, 1947), pp.3-8. 
169. FRUS, 1946, VII, pp.679-82. 
170. Yom Kippur statement and the British reaction has been 
discussed in the Ilird chapter of this dissertation. 
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Ambassador in Washington, Lord Inverchapel, referred to as a 
'whirl wind' . It gained great moiaentum when Truman etc. 
appeared to give support to 'the creation of a viable Jewish 
state in control of its own immigration and economic 
policies in an adequate area of Palestine instead of the 
171 
whole of Palestine'. The principal drafter of the 
statement was Dean Acheson in the State Department and for 
all its comforting tone, it most specifically did not 
endorse the Zionist demand for a Jewish state in 
Palestine.-^ "^ ^ 
The President probably did not grasp all of the nuances 
of his own statement If read carefully, it pleaded for 
compromise than as a full blown endorsement of partition. 
Nevertheless the American press unanimously emphasized the 
apart about partition, as if this only represented the 
President's stand. Not a single newspaper has pointed up 
this part of the statement, 'binding of the gap' and all the 
headlines carried by the papers read "Truman's Support of 
Jewish State".-^^^ 
171. Louis, n.l39, p.439. 
172. FRUS 1946, Vol. VII, pp.703-5. 
173. Louis. n.l39, p.439. 
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Vririat dominated Truman's mind was another facet of 
Jewish problem that occurred after the war. There remained, 
a massive number of refugees, largely Jews from Eastern 
Europe who had no desire to return to the anti Semitism of 
their former homes. The State Department considered this 
matter separate from the Palestine tangle, but for Truman 
this became the heart of the matter. 
This situation of the displayed persons of Europe 
specially brought to t?ie fore front in such a way that it 
attracted President's serious attention. This episode which 
is one of the greatest unresearched turning points in the 
formulation of American's Palestine policy, known as the 
Harrison fact finding mission to Europe. A few alert 
Zionists spotted the Harrison mission as a useful 
instrument in their campaign, and his views were helpful to 
them even though they were not justified by the facts at 
175 the time of his investigation. 
Harrison Mission: Treasury Secretary Morgenthau had urged 
Truman during his first month in office to raise the problem 
of the displaced persons before the Cabinet. But the 
President let it drop. A short time later he agreed to the 
174. Grose, n.125,p.40. 
175. Ibid., See note. n.l9. p.58. 
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proposal to send an emissary on an investigation of the DP 
camps. 
The State Depairtment succeeded in vitoeing Horgenthau's 
pro Zionist candidate for this mission and nominated instead 
Earl. G. Harrison. Recognising in Harrison a man completely 
unacquainted, for all his general experience, with the 
particular sublties of this mission, Meyer W. Weisgal a 
close associate of Weiztu^nn suggested to Morgenthau that the 
envoy be accompanied by someone "thoroughly steeped in the 
Jewish situation". He proposed the name of Joseph J. 
Schwartz. Schwarts belonged to an organisation which was non 
Zionist, sometimes even anti Zionist. Yet Weisgal knew this 
man. Weisgal wrote, although Dr. Schwarts is on the staff of 
the J.D.C. (Joint Distribution Committee), we have absolute 
17fi faith in his integrity and Zionist convictions. 
It was not that Harrison was unaware of the Zionists 
interest converging on him. John Pehle told him frankly that 
his investigation had been urged by "Political Zionists" who 
were interested to know the desire of these people to 
emigrate from Europe. He was won over by them at last. 
Harrison's report to Truman, submitted late in August 1945, 
176. Ibid., p.41. 
177. Ibid. 
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conveyed "the DP plight, in vivid •terms. "We appear to be 
treating the Jews as the Nazsis treated them, " Harrison 
noted (Truman underlined the passage). "They are in 
concentration camps in large numbers under our military 
guard instead of S.S. troops. One is led to wonder whether 
the German people, seeing this, are not supposing that we 
are following or at least condoning Nazi policy," Then 
Harrison takes a step further to make judgement about the 
ultimate fate of the DPi. He concluded that "Palestine is 
definitely and pre-eminently the first choice."^ 
Truman made the Harrison's report public and it created 
a sensation. However what made the lasting impact was 
Harrison's political conclusion that he drew: Never before 
and against all the arguments of Britain and the State 
Department, Truman was shown that the difficulties of 
Europe's surviving Jews and the political future of 
Palestine were aspects of the same problem. Perhaps the 
impact of Harrison's report was great. What he saw in the 
Harrison's report was a moving portrait of human beings. 
"The misery it depicted could not be allowed to continue", 
he said. If Palestine was what they wanted and no other 
178. Department of State, Bulletin (September 30, 1945), 
pp.455-63. 
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country was coming forward with resettlement offeis least of 
all the United States - then Palestine it should be." 
Truman dispatched a copy of the Harrison report to the 
British Prime Minister Atlee, by passing all the avenues of 
diplomacy and saying, "The main solution appears to lie in 
the quick evacuation of as many as possible of the non-
repatriable Jews who wish it, to Palestine. If it is to be 
effective such actions should not be delayed". It is 
ironical that Truman -wanted to disgorge the gush of 
humanitarian feelings towards the Jews, in Palestine at the 
cost of Palestinians. 
There appeared to be another school of thought in the 
United States which consoled itself with the idea that in 
supporting the Zionist cause they were indirectly 
undermining "British imperialism" in the Middle East.^°^ 
However, the United States had considerable stakes in 
the Arab countries. The investment of capital to build oil 
industry there was huge. There was a lurking fear of Soviet 
expansionism and America shared the apprehensions with 
179. Truman, n.l64, p.138, 
180. Ibid., p.140. 
181. Agwani, n.l67, p.71. 
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Britain. The Truman Doctrine had shifted the care of Western 
resistance to Moscow from London to Washington. Whether 
this important departure changed American's attitude towards 
the Arab countries who had been wedded to the cause of Arab 
Palestine ? The events which allowed the submission of 
that problem to the United Nations suggest a negative 
183 answer. 
182. Ibid. 
183- Ibid., pp.71-72. 
CHAPTER-V 
SOVIET ONION, ZIONISM AND THE PALJESTINE QUESTION 
Jewish History in Russia Dpto the Russian Revolution: 
Russia was the least tolerant of the Jews from the 
beginning of her history. Caars, being fanatic Chistians, 
during the 15th and 16th centuries, had ruthlessly put down 
a movement for conversion to Judaism. The rulers of the 17th 
century .such as Peter the Great, though moderate in his" 
dealings with the Russian Jews, was hot at all liberal. The 
succession of Empresses to the Russian throne was another 
era of fanatic policies towards them. Catherine I in 1727, 
Anne in 1739, and Elisabeth in 1742, all issued special 
decrees expelling tVie Jews from their domains'" 
Russia got through three successive partitions of Poland 
(1772, 179.3, 1795). Consequently, the largest chunck of 
that land became part of Russia. Thus Russia which was the 
least disposed to welcome the Jews, but ruled in the 19th 
century over the largest section of the Jewish people. The 
number of Jews in Russia equaled, if not outnumbered all 
other Jews combined in the world. 
The Jews now lived under Russian rule all over the 
Western province of the empire which were previously 
1. Cecil Roth, A Short History of the Jewish People (London, 
1969), p.35. 
2. Ibid., p.356. 
3. Ibid. 
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governed by Poland. The Jews living in these provinces 
during 18th and 19th centuries were culturally backward in 
comparison to the Jews living in Western Europe. They were 
not familiar with the famous names of West Europes persons 
of eminence who were born as Prime Minister, Desraeli and 
Recardo. They still took recourse to their religious leaning 
and their intellectual field was confined to Talmud and 
allied literature. While wearing dresses they chose to be 
conservative and lagged a century behind in fashion. Barring 
a few rich merchants the majority of Jews were occupied in 
petty trading, in keeping and fanning. A majority of Jewish 
population was miserably poor. 
From the very beginning the Caars of Russia adopted a 
policy which was to confine the Jews to the newly acquired 
Western provinces (Pale of Settlement) and to prevent them 
from spreading to other parts of the empire. On account of 
this policy more than twenty thousand Jews were expelled 
c 
from the villages of Maghilev and Vitebsk alone." The 
climate made the situation worse. This was put in an 
impressive way by Elon: 
4. Ibid., p.357. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., p.358. 
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"na-bure i-bself joined forces with the sterile 
apparatus of Csarist oppression to inflict a 
terrible punishment on people and country 
alike as though for some primeval sin. 
7 Survival was an achievement". 
TVie Jews of Russia enjoyed a new lease of life with the 
accession of Alexander II (1855-1881). The young ruler, was 
described by Desraeli as 'the most benevolent prince that 
a 
&-ver ruled in Russia. Czar Alexander II initiated a 
consistent policy of reform. By mid-19th century, a sort of 
messianic movement appeared in Russia itself. Almost at this 
time Alexander II ascended the Czarist throne and a 
vigorous programme of reforms, including humane approach to 
the Jews was started. He rejected his father's policy of 
enforced conversion to Christianity. He abolished the Jewish 
military cantonment, the six-year pre-conscription horror of 
Russian Jewish life. He permitted larger number of Jews to 
settle in the interior of the country. He allowed three 
classes of Jews to settle in that area: the merchants who 
7. Amos Elon, 'Th^ Israelis Founders and Sons. (London, 
1971), p.42. 
8. Roth, n.l, p.359. 
9. Howard M. Sacher, A History of Israel. From the Rise of 
Zionism to our Time (Oxford, 1977), p.8. 
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vyere capable of paying heavy taxes, the graduates of 
Universities, and artisans recommended by the police of the 
Pale as 'well-behaved'^^ 
Jews, by and large, welcomed these reforms. The liberal 
policy of the Czar gave acceleration to an internal cultural 
movement which was becoming formidable among the Jews of 
Eastern Europe for three generations. The Jews started 
enjoying liberal ideas and freeing themselves from the webs 
of parochial Jewish education. This secular awakening is 
known in Jewish history as the 'Haskalah', the mid 
nineteenth century period of East European Jewish 
1? 
'enlightnment. 
Haskalah: 'Haskalah' is a word derived from the Hebrew 
'sechel' which means intelligence or understanding. It 
signifies the effort of Jewish scholars and intellectuals 
(Maskilim) to 'enlighten' the masses of Russian Jewry. 
Haskalah movement was a parallel to a Jewish movement called 
10. Ibid. p.8 
11. Solomon Grayzel, A History of the Jews (Philadelphia, 
1948), p.606. 
12. Sacher, n.9., p.8. 
13. Grayzel, n.ll, p.607. 
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'Aufklaerung', in Germany at that time. But these movements 
differed fundamentally and significantly. The German-
movement grev? in German environment and for German speaking 
peoples, but Haskalah was rooted in Hebrew language and 
thought emphasized history and theology, while Haskalah 
manifested itself most strikingly in Hebrew literature. 
Those days among the East European Jews there was an 
inner urge to self - understanding and enlightenment. These 
Jews were also affected by external political situation. 
For the Russian Jewish essayist, Moshe Lillienblum and for 
the Haskalah poet, Judah Leib Gordon, there were normalcy in 
sight, an enrichment to be gained from discourse with the 
16 surrounding gentile population". Gordon wrote, "Be a Jew 
at home and a man in the street. That is Jews should observe 
their traditions in the privacy of household and synagogue 
1 7 
but live a full, healthy, Russian life in the outer world. 
The most influential of the early advocates of Haskalah 
in Russia was Issac Levinsohn (1788-1869). His thoughts were 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid., p-609. 
16. Sacher, n.ll, p.8. 
17. Ibid. 
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similar to what Moses Mendelsothn of Germany was preaching. 
Both of them laid emphasis on reason called upon the Jews to 
amalgamate themselves in the general culture of their time 
and defend Judaism, as well as to widen their mental horizon 
which was the need of the time and to reconstruct their 
1 fl 
economic foundations. 
The changed temper of these authors bore testimony to 
the fact that Alexander's reforms and prevailing literal 
conditions were positively influencing the Jews. The pursuit 
of secular knowledge was gaining pop- larity among the 
Russian Jews. Some wealthy Jews and intellectuals organised 
a society for the promotion of culture among the Jews (1863) 
with its headquarters in St. Petersburgh. Its purpose was to 
import secular knowledge among the Jews. "By placing its 
faith in cultural emancipation and secular activity on 
Russian soil, Haskalah literature at first de-emphasized the 
19 traditional messianic yearning for Zion". Zion then, as 
envisaged by the Haskalah writers, became a kind of mythic 
idyll in the words of Levinsohn, "the land where muses 
dwell, where each flower is a psalm, each cedar a song 
divine, each stone a book and each rock a tablet". 
18. Grayzel, n.ll, p.609. 
19. Sacher, n.9., p.8. 
20. Ibid., p.9. 
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While Alexander II was liberal towards the Jews, he was 
an autocratic ruler in general. The result was that 
terrorism emerged in Russia, In 1379 an attempt was made to 
blow up his train, and shortly thereafter an explosion 
shattered a part of his winter place. He did all to crush 
these revolutionaries but at the same time he tried to 
satisfy them by bringing about more reforms and conceding to 
a few of their demands. However, he fell victim to a 
terrorist bomb. His successor Alexander III {1331-94), 
showed himself a strong-willed monarch who promptly 
announced his intention to avenge his father's murder and to 
21 preserve the autocratic regime. 
The reign of Alexander III is known as the period of 
unprecedented oppression in modern Russian history. The new 
Czar saw in the ethnic minorities a constant danger to his 
authority. Almost immediately therefore, the non-Russian 
races i.e. Poles, Estonians, Latvians, Finns, Armenians and 
Turkmenians began to be discriminated in public employment 
22 
and in educational and cultural spheres. 
21. Wallace Ferguson & Geoffrey Brown, A Survey of European 
Civilization (3rd ed.), Part II (Massachusets), p.186. 
22. Sacher,n.9., p.12. 
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The Jews again faced great hardships on account of new 
rules and regulations. In 1681 a chain reaction of 
officially inspired pogroms started all over the densely 
populated Jewish hinter land of Southern Russia. On May 3, 
1882 in the form of temporary regulation Alexander III 
issued a new series of anti-Jewish decrees. They were not 
however temporary as they continued in effect, with mounting 
stringency until the March Revolution of 1917. 
These oppressions of the Russian regime did not yield 
the desired result. 
"The more the Jews of Russia were oppressed, 
the more they clung to their distinct ways; 
the more they were thrown together into areas 
of forced residence of ever - diminishing 
siae, the more they sought refuge in the 
narrow confines of orthodox religion or in 
Messianic dreams or in radical avenues of 
.. 24 escape . 
The avenues of escape for the Russian Jews were three. 
The most popular one was the migration to America. New York 
23. Ibid. 
24. Emos Elon, n.7., p.58. 
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was considered for these Jews a new Jerusalem beyond the 
seas. Politics was the second avenue of escape. Revolution 
was the ultimate aim of the politically-oriented Jews. 
Historically, tViey were the most urban of all the ethnic 
groups of Russia and Poland. Therefore they were well versed 
with the nuances of politics. The third avenue of escape was 
Jewish nationalism. It was a reaction not only to Jewish 
suffering but also to the emergence of other national 
movements. The Jewish nationalism was very much influenced 
in particular by German romanticism.'' 
Jewish Nationality and Soiafiet Politics : The Jews living in 
the Western paorts of the Gsarist Empire in the 19th century 
were possessing their own language, religion, civil 
administration, judicial institutions and educational 
system. For historical, cultural and political reasons the 
Jews also developed a distinctive economic and social 
structure. The Jewish population was confined to a limited 
area, the Pale of Residence which included the former Polish 
25. Ibid., p.58 
26. Ibid., p.61. 
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provinces incorporated into the Csarist Empire in the 1770'a 
and 1790'3 Bylorussia and Lithuania, the northeastern 
Ukraine, and areas near the Black Sea which had been 
colonized by the Russian in the early part of the 19th 
century. From among the Jews only a privilege minority of 
highly skilled artisans, rich merchants, certain veteran of 
the armed forces, and, for a time, university graduates, 
were permitted to live outside the Pale. 
The overwhelming majority of the Jewish population was 
forced to reside within the Pale (Table I). Of tVie people 
who lived in that area, more than four-fifths of the Jewish 
population lived in urban areas, and Jews constituted nearly 
40% of the urban population. One third of the Jews lived in 
the Shteties, or market towns which were small semi-urban 
communities in which the Jews had settled in' the first 
decade of the 19th century after being driven out of the 
?7 
villages by imperial edicts.^ 
The urbanization of the Jewish population preceded the 
urbanization of the Slavic population of the Pale by nearly 
a century. Towns with a Jewish population of 10,000 to 
27. Solomon M. Schwarz, The Jews in the Soviet Uaism 
{Syracuse, 1951), p.11. 
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second half of the 19th century. Those with Jewish 
populations ranging from 25,000 to 50,000 increased by 400 
percent, and those with a Jewish population of over 50,000 
increased by 500%. While the Jews in the various provinces 
of the Pale constituted between five and fifteen percent of 
the population, they formed between twenty five and 90% of 
the urban population. " In 1897 over half the urban 
population of Bylorussia and Lithuasia was Jewish and in 
the Ukraine Jews constituted nearly one third of the urban 
population. Outside the Pale Jewish urbanization was even 
more pronounced. Over 80% of the Jews living in St. 
Petersburg province and 90% of all Jews in the province of 
Moscow resided in the provincial capital. 
The government restrictions placed on Jewish residence 
were complemented by vocational and professional 
restrictions Jews were excluded by law from public service. 
Jewish agricultural colonization, which had been growing 
slowly but steadily during the 19th century, was set back 
by the May laws of 1882, issued by Tsar Alexander III, which 
28. Zvi Y, Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet 
Politics. The Jewish Section of the CPgU 1917-1930 
(Princeton, 1972), p.18. 
29. Salo W. Baron, The Russian Jew un<jgr Tsars and 
Soviets (New York, 19640, pp.82-83. 
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forbade Jews to acquire rural property. The 'numerous 
clauses' system prevented most Jews from obtaining secondary 
and higher education, effectively barring them from the 
professions, though there were some prominent Jewish 
attorneys. Enforced residence in the Pale prevented them 
from entering the heavy industries being built outside the 
Pale (Table II). 
The overwhelming majority of Jews employed in industry 
and handicrafts were actually artisans who were either self-
employed or worked in small factories and workshops. At the 
end of the 19th century, of 300,000 Jewish industrial 
workers, 250,000 were employed in workshops and only 50,000 
were in medium and large scale factories. Forty three 
percent of the artisans were in the various branches of the 
31 garment industry. 
The artisans and the middlemen of all types, who 
constituted will over half the economically active Jewish 
population, led precarious economic existence. Confinement 
within the Pale meant that economic competition was fierce. 
On the late 19th century in Kurak and larslav provinces, 
30. Gitelman, n.28, p.19. 
31. Ibid. p.20. 
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where no Jews were allowed to reside, there was less than 
one artisan for every thousand inhabitants. In Kiev 
province, within the Pale, there were 2.6 artisans for the 
same number of inhabitants. 
"As a rule Jewish artisans were deprived of capital, 
equipment, stocks of raw materials and cheap credit 
facilities, and quite often worked for the account of 
middlemen supplying materials and accessories or acted as 
commission agents or subsidiary suppliers for manufacturers 
and wholesalers; or simply were exploited home workers as 
well as sweat shop sub-contractors for some what bigger 
jobbers".*^^ No wonder that many artisans joined impoverished 
traders and shopkeepers in the miserable crowd of 
Luftmenshn, those without enough income to support 
themselves and their faunilies, but with enough hope to 
loiter about the market square looking for the big break 
that only rarely came along. It was estimated that in many 
communities forty percent of the Jewish population consisted 
of Luftmenshn and their families. In 1898 nearly 20% of the 
32. Louis Greenberg, The Jews in Russia (New Haven, 1944), 
p.166. 
33. Schwarz, n.27, p.19. 
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Jewish populataon in the Pale applied for Passover 
Charities. In, 1900 an investigative commission in Odessa 
found that 63% of the Jewish dead were buried at the expense 
of the Jewish community. All in all, it was estimated that 
at the turn of he century between 30 and 35% of the Jewish 
population depended on relief provided by Jewish welfare 
institutions. ^ For some of these misery was relieved by 
emigration from Russia, some 70% of them going to U.S. More 
than half of these emigrants were artisans. 
Many of those who remained sought economic relief in 
the rapidly developing industries of the Russian Empire. In 
the early part of the 19th century there were only a few 
hundered Jewish industrial workers, but by the turn of the 
century there were approximately 50,000. In cities such as 
Odessa, Vilna, Bialystok, Warsaw, and Lods, the Jewish 
proletariat was a social and economic force to be reckoned 
with. Jews were concentrated in light industry, particularly 
in the related textile and garment industries. A micro study 
34. Baron, n-29, pp.114-115. 
35. Schwarz, n.27, p.18. 
36. Yakhinson, n.31, p.20. 
;^ 86 
of the Jewish Labor structure is provided by the statistics 
for the city of Bialystok in 1887 (Table III). 
The Jewish workers suffered all the disabilities of a 
laboring class in an industrializing, early capitalist 
social and economic order. Working hours were incredibly 
long, wages abymabiy low, conditions abominably oppressive. 
In Gomel in the late 1890's the working day was 16 to 17 
hours; in Minsk sugar refining factories in the early 1900's 
Jewish girls worked a twenty-hour day; in Dubravna weavers 
also worked a twenty-hour day. In 1900 the average worker's 
37 
wage was twenty four rubles a month. Workers were 
frequently what were non-views their conditions not paid on 
time and sanitary conditions in tVie factories and workshop 
were very bad. 
Despite political and economic discrimination a few 
individual Jews managed to attain economic affluence and 
social influence. In 1904 Jews owned on third of all sugar 
factories in the Ukraine. On the eve of World War I Jewish-
owTied factories were producing 52% of all the sugar produced 
in the Ukraine. Jews were also prominent in the 
37. Gitelman, n.28, p.22. 
38. Ibid., p.23 
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developmen't of water transport, the oil industry and in 
banking. In 1914 sizable number of the directors of St, 
Petersburg banks were Jews. 
These men represented only a very thin layer of the 
privileged, while the great majority of Jews remained 
imprisoned within the Pale and its poverty, a self-contained 
and distinct community. But there were signs which showed 
that the cultural isolation of the Jews was being slowly 
eroded. The Haskalah, or Enlightenment movement of the early 
and mid- nineteenth century had preached acculturation into 
the dominant Russian Culture. Same had heeded to this call 
and had gone so far as to convert to Russian orthodoxy and 
assimilate completely. The programs of the 1800's had 
halted this trend, as Jews turned away from a culture which 
they perceived as not only alien but also hostile. In 1898 
there were 375,000 children in Jewish religious schools, or 
kheders, six times as many as the number of Jews enrolled in 
Russian schools. In 1897 ninety seven percent of the 
Jewish population listed Yiddish as their mother tongues. At 
39. Baron, n.29, pp.105-11 
40. Ibid. 
41. Gitelman, n.28, p.47. 
?M 
•the same time, however, ever thirty percent of Jewish men 
and 16% of Jewish women could read the Russian language, 
while only 21% of the general population was literate. 
Whereas in 1886 only 29,526 Jews had attended Russian 
schools. By 1911, 126,976 Jewish students were enrolled in 
such scViools. "^  As late as 1840 only 48 Jews were enrolled 
in Russian primary schools and secondary schools, and only 
15 attended universities. It were these people, having made 
contact with thie world beyond the Pale, who first became 
aware of the possibilities of modernization, 
secularization,and assimilation. Nearly all of them felt a 
need to involve themselves in the economic social and 
cultural life around them, and many participated in 
political life as well. This made them painfully aware of 
the backwardness of Russia and her Jewish population. Most 
were convinced that with entities were in desperate need of 
modernization. As regards the Jewish people, some believed 
that modernization could be achieved only through 
42. Schwarz, n.27, p.13. The literacy of the general 
population is discussed in Michael T. Florinsky, 
Russia: A History and Interpretation (New YOrk), 1961, 
vol. II. 
43. As late as 1340 only 48 Jews were enrolled in Russian 
primary schools and secondary schools, and only 15 
attended Universities. Baron, n.29, pp.143-45. 
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secularization and, assimilation; others agreed upon the need 
for secularisation, but rejected assimilation; still others 
argued that modernization could be attained at the cost of 
only limited secularisation of certain areas of life, and no 
assimilation at all. The assimilators would either convert 
to Christian faith and thereby remove the legal and social 
impediments to their complete integration into Russian 
society, or they would simply adopt the Russian culture and 
try as best they could to integrate themselves into whatever 
segment of Russian society they chose. It they had a taste 
for politics, they were likely to join either liberal or 
revolutionary movements which pursued broad objectives and 
which only incidentally concerned themselves with "the 
Jewish question" if at all. Those who rejected assimilation 
but aimed at the modernization of the Jewish population 
devised various strategies for the attainment of their 
objectives. These strategies were crystallized into 
programmes formulated and enunciated by political parties. 
The first political party to attempt a synthesis of 
general political goals, whose attainment would ensure both 
the modernization of the Jewish and general populations and 
the preservation of Jewish identity, was the General League 
of Jewish Horkingmen in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia known 
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as the "Bund", The Bund was a Marxist party which, for a 
time, was an integral part of the Russian Social Democratic 
Labor Party (RSDLP), througVi it ran afoul of that party's 
and particularly Lenin's - ideas on the organisation of the 
party and of the future socialist state. The Bund's position 
and its historical evolution had profound implications for 
the nature and structure of the Russian Social Democratic 
Labor Party - and perhaps for the course of Russian history 
as well as for the Bolshevik policy toward the Jews in 
Russia. It was in the course of his struggles with the Bund 
that Lenin concretized his organisational theories. The 
conflict with the Bund moulded and trained the highly 
disciplined, cohesive monolithic party which came to be 
identified as a uniquely "Leninist" one. This some 
experience helped shape the future of Russian Jewry. 
Consciously rejecting the Bund's national programme for the 
Jews, the BolsVieviks tried to formulate a policy which would 
preclude a recrudescence of Bundist notions and aspirations 
among the Jewish masses, while at the same time achieving 
the economic, political and cultural modernization of 
44. The name was originally "General League of Jewish 
Workingmen in Russia and Poland". It was elaborated in 
1901. Ferdinand Lassalles "Allgemeiner Deulscher 
Arbeiterbund" was the inspiration for the name. 
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Riasaian Jewry and their integration into the Soviet polity. 
In the pre-revolutionary period RSDLP policy was based on 
the naive belief that the revolution would solve the Jewish 
problem automatically. Since the Jewish problem was created 
by the injustices of the capitalist order and the idea of 
Jewish nationhood was but an exaggerated response to these 
injustices, both anti-Jewish discrimination and the 
"unscientific" notion of Jewish nationhood would be swept 
away by the majestic, impartial, liberating winds of 
Revolution. Gitelman has written, 
"The revolution did indeed come but both the 
Jewish people and the Jewish problem refused 
to go away. Confronted with these facts the 
Bolsheviks adjusted to them rather gracefully. 
A highly pragmatic Jewish policy was evolved 
the specifics of which were dealt with by the 
Jewish sections of the Soviet Communist party. 
But this did not end the conflict between 
socialist and national aspirations, it merely 
shifted its locale." 
The history of the Jewish sections, and indeed the 
history of Soviet Jewry, is one of constant balancing 
45. Gitelman, n.28, pp.25-26, 
46. Ibid. p.26-
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adjustment, and coordination of Jewish national motives and 
ideals with those of Communist ideology in its Soviet 
expression. Many of the Jewish sections' activists were 
former Bundists, and within the sections the old disputes 
and the old alignments on the national question continued. 
Further more, the Jewish sections in effect implemented for 
the party a national programme which could easily be 
construed as the heretical national - cultural autonomy of 
the Bund. This irony was compounded by the fact that Lenin's 
writings on the Bund and on the claims of the Jews to 
nationhood were taken much more seriously by ex Bundist in 
the Jewish sections than they were taken by the Communists 
Party as a whole. Stained with original sin, the Ex-Bundist 
felt obliged to be more catholic than the Pope and to pursue 
their national programme, with the greatest caution, even 
when urged to holder actions by other Party leaders. For 
these reasons, in order to understand the history of the 
Jewish Sections - in Russian, the Evseklsu (or Evsektsia, 
the singular form commonly used in Soviet Russia, even in 
reference to many sections) - it is necessary to examine the 
evolution of the national programme of the Bund and Lenin's 
A 7 
criticism of it. 
47. Ibid., pp.26-27. 
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TABLE I 
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF TBE JEWISH POPULATION IN THE 
RUSSIAN EMPIRE 1887* 
Region Jewish Population Jewish Percentage 
of total 
Thousands % Population 
In the Pale Poland 1321.1 25.3 14.5 
(10 Provinces) 
Northwest (3 Lithuanian 1422.4 27.3 14.1 
and 3 Biiorussian provinces) 
South West (Ukraine West of 1768.6 33.9 12.4 
the Dnieper-4 provinces and 
Bessarabia) 
Southeast (Ukraine East of 387.2 7.4 4.5 
the Dnieper - 3 provinces 
and the Crimea) 
Total 25 provinces 4899.3 93.9 11.6 
Outside the Pale 316.5 6,1 0.4 
Grand Total 5215.8 100.0 4.1 
* Solman M. Schwarz, The Jews in the Soviet Union 
(Syracuse, 1951), p.11. 
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TABLE-II 
OCCOPATIONAL DISTRIBDTION OF JEWS. 1897* 
Percentage of 
Occupation Economically Active Jews 
Industry and Handicrafts 36.3 
Traders, Storekeepers, peddlers etc. 31.0 
Manual Labourers, domestics, private 11.5 
employees 
Official and professionals 4.7 
Communication and transport 3.0 
Agriculture 2,4 
Profession Unspecified 7.6 
Military 3.5 
100.0 
* As cited in Zvi Y. Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet 
Policies. Th^ jQWJgh S^PtJQP of th^ CPSU 19^-^930 
(Princeton, 1972), p.19. 
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TABLK-III 
JEWISH WCffiKERS IN BIALYSTOK, 1887>i( 
Type of Number of Workers Total Percentage 
Factory Factories of Jews 
Jews - Christian 
Textile 60 774 449 1223 63 
Weaving 4 101 117 218 48 
Dyes 4 88 95 183 48 
Shawls & 9 276 123 399 69 
Scarves 
Blankets 2 27 25 52 54 
Gloves & 2 12 - 12 100 
Stockings 
Tobacco 4 527 - 527 100 
Pigskin 3 162 - 162 100 
Products 
Breweries 1 10 - 10 100 
Tanneries 1 20 4 24 84 
Box Making 1 41 - 41 100 
Lumber Miles 1 10 1 11 91 
Machine Shops 4 20 1 21 95 
Flour Miles 3 27 10 37 73 
Total 
* As cited 
Politics. 
in Zvi 
99 2095 
Y. Gitelman. Jewish 
825 2820 
Nationality 
thQ CPSU 
72 
and Soviet 
1917-1930 
(Princeton, 1972), p.22, 
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The Jews In Russian Hevolution: 
When Czarism fell in March 1917 one of the first acts 
of its successor, the Provisional Government, was to abolish 
all legal restrictions on the Jews. 'All the limitations on 
the rights of Russian citizens imposed by hitherto existing 
laws on the basis of religion, creed or nationality are 
hereby revoked', the government's decree stated. This was 
followed by an extraordinary political and cultural 
efflorescence amongst the millions of Russian Jews. This was 
unprecedented, but very short lived, two years at most. 
It is difficult to give a precise estimate of the 
number of Jews under Csarist rule at the outbreak of the 
Revolution. According to 1897 census 5.25 million Jews 
resided in the Russian empire. According to an estimate of 
the Jewish Statistical Society (Petrograd, 1917), 3,837,000 
Jews lived in European Russia (excluding the Kingdom of 
Poland which until the war formed part of the Russian 
empire), in the areas not conquered by the Germans. In the 
Caucuses; Siberia, and Central Asia, the 1897 census 
recorded a population of 105,000 Jews constituted slightly 
43. S.Ettinger, 'The Jews in Russia at the outbreak of 
Revolution' in Lionel Kochan, The Jews in Soviet 
Russia since 1917. (ed.), (London, 1970), p.14. 
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over 50 per cent of the combined urban population of 
LitViuania and White Russia. The census of 1897 also showed 
that in the Ukraine the Russians formed 35.5% of the urban 
population followed by the Jews (30%) and Ukrainians 
(27%).'*^ 
As soon as the Revolution brokout, the mutual aid 
societies (which had grown in the years of wartime hardship) 
began to take soundings with a view to summoning a national 
congress of Russian Jews. The Jewish political parties, too, 
awoke to new life, after years of weakness in the years 
preceding the war and during the war itself. The socialist 
parties (the Bund, the 'United' Poale Zion), the Zioni:its 
and even the religious camp were flooded with new members. 
These parties redrafted their programmes, established new 
branches and new institutions, and embarked on a wide range 
of activities. Most of the Jewish bodies saw that the first 
essential thing was to summon a nation-wide Russian -Jewish 
Congress- This was to create autonomous institutions for 
Russian Jewry and frame demands from the state, in 
anticipation of the meeting of that constituent assembly 
dreamt of by most of Russia's liberal and revolutionary 
49. Ibid. 
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parties. At the local level, communities were soon set up in 
towns and villages, and their institutions were 
democratically elected by the local Jews. The same period 
saw the awakening and flourishing of journalism and 
publishing in Russian, Hebrew and Yiddish, and the 
establishment of a comprehensive system of Jewish education, 
from kindergarten to teachers' seminary. All the while, in 
the political developments of the turbulent period, and in 
the leadership of the main political parties, Jews played a 
prominent part. This period in the history of Russian Jewry 
has not yet been properly investigated."* 
How could this development be accounted for ? There had 
been no preparation among the Jewish public in earlier 
years. The very legal existence of Jews had ceased to be 
recognized by the authorities in 1844. In a memorandum 
presented to the government by a committee for Jewish 
affairs at the time it was stated that the Jews did not 
cooperate with the authorities. They lived according to the 
Talmud, regarded their residence in Russia as exile, and 
)0. The introductions by V. Slutski and Ch. Shmeruk to 
Jewish Publications in the U.S.S.R., 1917-1960 issued 
by the Historical Society of Israel, Jerusalem, 1961, 
give some idea of the range of publications. 
239 
awaited the coming of the Messiah."* In the 1840s the Jews 
of Russia had no cultural or public organisation or any 
periodical of their own. Only a few individual Jews of that 
day attended schools and universities. Even in the last 
years of the century, only 1% of the Jews in the country 
gave Russian as their mother tongue: for 97% it was Yiddish, 
The same census, in 1897, revealed that only 24.6% of the 
Jewish population could read and write in Russian."" 
What, then, were the factors that led to the 
extraordinairy, unexpected activity of Russian Jews in 1917? 
It is clear that one factor was the sudden end to long as 
continued oppression, combined with the immediate release of 
hitherto suppressed economic and social forces. Other 
factors were the attitude of the Russian Government and 
Russian society to the Jews, the demographic and economic 
changes among the Jews themselves since the beginning of the 
19th century,and their own social and ideological 
deve1opment. 
51- Lionel Kochan, The Jews in Social Russia since 1917 
(ed.), (London, 1970), p.15. 
52. Ettinger, n.48, p.19. 
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The Jewish question had became one of the central 
political questions of Russia in the 20th century - the 
touch-stone of difference between reactionary and 
progressive. The struggle sharpened and the situation of the 
Jews worsened when the World War I broke out, particularly 
after the defeats suffered by the Russian army on the 
eastern front. The Csarist government sought to explain away 
these defeats by blaming 'traitors' disloyal to Russia chief 
among them the Jews. 
The situation of the Jews was desperate; clearly, only 
the fall of the Csarist regime could save them. The 
feelings of relief with which they greeted the February 
Revolution, the fall of the Czar, and the assumption of 
power by liberal leaders can be easily understood. The Jews 
of Russia were in a state of terror and Messianic 
expectation, and the deliverance from oppression that came 
with the revolution burst all bounds and gave impetus to a 
53 huge independent Jewish activity. 
What forms did the political and social activity of 
Russian Jewry take at that time ? It will not be possible to 
53. Ibid. 
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judge of that action unless we try to uncover its deeper 
roots. Jewish political thought took shape mainly in 
medieval Europe, when the Jews were allotted the place a 
religious - social corporation within general society. The 
Jewish community in Europe developed from co-operation 
between a Jewish leadership that was concerned with 
maintaining internal discipline in the Jewish society, and 
the authorities who saw that leadership as a means of 
achieving fiscal objectives and as a tool for administrative 
control of the Jews. The co-operation between the Jewish 
leaders and the authorities became the distinguishing mark 
of the Jewish legal status in the eyes of the surrounding 
people and sometimes caused great suffering to the Jews in 
times of outbreak of riots. Within Jewish society also, 
reliance on the government and loyalty to it became a clear 
and established tend. 
The change came with the appearance of Hassidic 
movement in the second half of the 18th century, and with 
the increased support given by the goverrunents of Russia and 
Austria to the plans of the Jewish Maskilim (followers of 
the enlightenment) to weaken internal Jewish autonomy. The 
Jewish public reacted with great hostility to these trends 
and to the intervention of the government in its internal 
30?, 
affairs. The Haskalah (enlightenment) movement among eastern 
Europe Jewry was confined to a small section of the rich and 
part of the youth, and did not reach the mass of Jewry. In 
1870sand 1880s enlightened young Jews were already devoting 
tVien other to political and social movements utterly opposed 
to that cooperation with the authorities preached by the 
Maskilim of the previous generation. Some of these young 
people turned to the Russian revolutionary movement and 
became an important element in it; others became leaders of 
the Jewish national movement, still others began to work for 
socialism among the Jews, in their own language, emphasizing 
54 their specific problems. 
A deep ideological gulf divided the holders of these 
opinions. No reconciliation was possible between those who 
sought as revolutionary change in the existing political 
order of Russia and those who despaired of Russia entirely 
and saw redemption in he establishment of a special Jewish 
state. There was, however, one similarity between the 
opposing groups. The common factor was that botVi distrusted 
the government's intentions towards the Jews and saw it as a 
hostile element without which or against which - the 
solution of the 'Jewish' problem would have to come. 
54. Ibid. p.24. 
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When the first Zionist Congress met in Basle in 1897 
and in the same year the first all-Russian Congress of the 
Bund (The Jewish Social Democratic Union) took place, giving 
expression to both national and social radicalism, the 
enthusiasm around among the Jews of Russia was vast and 
over-whelming. It was as though, overnight almost, this 
great mass of people had awoken from its political slumber 
and had begun to develop ideologies, examine political 
programmes, and even establish political groups and parties, 
55 
workers' funds, trade unions and mutual aid societies". 
It was not long before the efforts were made to merge 
national and social radicalism into the one movement of 
Zionist - Socialist ideology. 
The Kishinev pogrom of March 1903 marked another 
turning point in this process. It then became clear to the 
Jews that government was indifferent to the preseirvation of 
public order and Jewish lives. At this juncture there 
originated Jewish secret organizations in self-defence. The 
Revolution of 1905-7 gave sharp and far-reaching expression 
to this movement. 
Ibid. p.25. 
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This was a period of revival and ferment in the 
political life of Russia; councils, unions and political 
parties were built, strikes multiplied, demonstration were 
held, armed rebellions arose. In all these events the Jews 
played a leading part. The non-socialist elements among them 
combined into the Union for the Attainment of Equal Rights 
for Russian Jewry. Their aim was to prepare a plan for the 
national organisation of all Russian Jews; they also wished 
to establish a 'club' of Jewish representatives within the 
Duma, or at least to instruct these representatives on 
questions affecting the Jews. The Jewish members of the Duma 
were chosen from all Russian lists, and it was necessary to 
reach an agreed position on Jewish matters."^ 
The socialist forces among the Jewish public organized 
strikes and demonstrations, and set up fighting squads to 
repel the pogrom. The years of the Russian Revolution thus 
served as a new stage in the public awakening of the Jews of 
Russia; they began to organize for action in the political 
sphere and through their strength came to realize that they 
must take their fate into their own hands. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid. 
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The political coup of June 1907, that limited yet 
further the powers of the Duma, dealt revolutionary and 
literal forces in Russia a bitter blow. It also silenced the 
political activities. The outbreak of the World War I 
intensified their despair. The pent-up forces within Russian 
Jewry were only waiting for a political change in order to 
renew their social and political activity with great 
vigour. The change came, when the Revolution broke out in 
February 1917.^^ 
The renewed activity in conditions of freedom derived 
from the experience gained in the Revolution of 1905. It was 
clear to many Jews representing various sections of the 
Jewish public that the Jewish people of Russia was a 
separate national unit whose rights must be secured. All the 
spokesmen of the Jewish parties saw the future of Russia as 
a federation of free nations, enjoying autonomy within the 
wider political framework. They first planned to summon a 
Congress of elected representatives of the whole of Russian 
Jewry (the All - Russian Jewish Congress) which would draw 
up the political programme. The main debates centered on the 
precise form and limits of national autonomy, on the links 
58. Ibid., p.26. 
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with other sections of the Jewish people, outside the 
borders of Russia, and on the attitude to the Zionist idea, 
i.e. the effort to establish an independent Jewish state in 
the land of Palestine. In the elections to the Congress in 
which only small section of Russian Jewry took part, the 
Zionists and the religious groups won a decisive majority. 
The election to democratic communities set up in many places 
produced similar results. The Zionist influence grew even 
stronger when the Balfour Declaration was published in 
November 1917. It swept Russian Jewry to a peak of 
enthusiasm. The socialists only constituted a minority 
though they were dynamic and they had close connections with 
Russian political parties and those of other national groups 
inhabiting the empire. ^  
Two powerful forces opposed the vision of a federal 
Russia granting autonomy to all its peoples, the separatist 
ambitions of some nations, notably the Ukrainian, within 
whose borders lived most of Russia's Jews, formed one source 
of opposition. The second was the centralizing tendency of 
the Bolshevik party, though in theory it recognized the 
59. Ibid., pp.26-27 
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right of peoples to national autonomy. The Jewish parties 
in 1917 went some of the way with the Ukranian parties, in 
the hope that the latter would not finally, sever their 
connections with Russia. Their hopes were in vain: Ukranian 
separatists not only cut themselves off from Russia and took 
up arms against Russia; in the process they perpetrated mass 
murders of Ukrainian Jews. 
Only the utter failure of the Ukrainian attempt at 
independence restored the Jews to security and, for most 
part, to the boundaries of Russia. But most crucial for the 
fate of Russian Jewry was the policy of the Bolsheviks. 
Soviet Theory on the Jews 
Soviet theory on the Jews proceeds from the theories of 
nationality and religion. These are logical and simple in 
principle but the more they are pursued in detail the more 
complex and self contradictory they become. So far as the 
theory of national minorities is concerned, this problem has 
been solved by the construction of socialism which ends the 
60. E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution. (London, 1950), 
Vol. I, pp.286-279. 
61. See J. S. Reshestar, The Ukrainian Revolution 
(Princeton, 1^52). 
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exploitation of minor nationalities by abolishing the 
exploiting classes of all Soviet nationalities. They now 
consist of state industrial workers, Koikhos peasants, and 
intellectuals, working harmoniously, irrespective of 
nationality, in the common aim of constructing communist 
society.^^ 
Socialism encourages for strictly socialist purposes, 
the flowing of national cultures, but in mature communist 
society the national culture will be absorbed in a common 
culture to which all will have contributed. However, each 
nation has its own state, a Union or Autonomous Republic 
within the U.S.S.R. Before the Revolution, the struggle for 
national equality of rights must subserve the class struggle 
which is the engine of Revolution. After the legal and 
practical granting of national equality by the revolutionary 
state it must subserve the construction of socialism, and 
subsequently of full communism, which is the raison d'etra 
of the revolutionary state. 
As for religion, this is a set of irrational beliefs 
and practices deriving from the need to make life tolerable 
62. Jacob Miller, 'Soviet Theory on the Jews', in Lionel 
Kochan in The Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917 (ed.) 
(London, 1970), pp.45-46. 
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in the conditions of alienation and exploitation of class 
society. Religion in the U.S.S.R. is thus a survival from 
earlier periods which must disappear in the conditions of 
the rational society which will provide fully for the needs 
of the human personality. The Jews satisfy the theory of 
religion, but not that of nationality, since they live 
scattered throughout Soviet territory and thus cannot have 
their own state. In any case, for the same reason they are 
undergoing rapid assimilation and therefore do not need a 
national state within the U.S.S.R. It Vias been, and is, open 
to the Soviet Jews to dwell in a compact territory of their 
own within the U.S.S.R., namely the autonomous region of 
Biro Bidahan, but they have not chosen to do so. The 
existence of the state of Israel is irrelevant, accordingly 
except that as an arm of American and British Imperialism, 
which seeks to subvert Soviet Jews. Its language, the 
traditional religious vehicle of Jewry, is also 
63 
reactionary. 
Elaborate Treatment of the Jewish Question: An elaborate and 
comprehensive theory on the Jews is difficult because that 
63. Ibid. 
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•there only a few systematic expositions in classical 
Marxism, pre-revolutionary Bolshevism, or in the Soviet 
Period. ** The most systematic classical treatment was a 
review written by the young Marx in 1843, well before the 
main features of Marxism as a system were formulated. This 
is a long review, entitled "Zur Judenfrage' of some writings 
by Bruno Bauea. The review was written when Karl Marx was 
twenty five years old and appeared in his Deutsch 
Franzosische Jahrbucher in 1844. This document has been and 
remains something of an embarrassment to Marxits because of 
its apparent extreme antisemitism. Marx identifies Judaism 
or Jewry as the embodiment of huckstering and the power of 
money generally. The Jews thus represent an element which 
has destroyed the cohesion of society, replacing the proper 
relation of the human personality to other people and to 
things by the mediating factor of the market and of money, 
which atomises society. In the second part of the review, 
Marx dealt with an article by Bauer on "The Capacity of 
Present Day Jews and Christians to Become Free". His 
solution is a return of the Jews to social cohesion. This 
64. Ibid. 
65. The review is translated and annotated by T.B. 
Bottomore in his Karl Marx. Earlv Writings (London, 
1963). 
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involves the elimination of Judentum, which has conquered 
Christendom. "The Document bristles with statements pitnily 
and strikingly expressed, which at their face value are 
oddly similar to the most extreme anti-Semitic views and 
could provide excellent slogans in the service of anti-
Semitism.• Marx wrote: 
* What is the worldly cult of the Jew ? 
Huckstering. What is his worldly god ? Money. 
* In the Final analysis the emancipation 
of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind 
from Judaism.' 
* Money is the Jealous god of Israel, 
beside which no other god may exist.... The 
god of the Jew has been secularized and has 
become the god of this world. The bill of 
exchange is the real god of the Jews'. 
* The chimerical nationality of the Jew is 
the nationality of the trader and above all of 
the financier.' 
* The tenacity of the Jew is to be 
explained, not by his religion, but rather by 
the human basis of his religion - practical 
need and egoism.' 
66. Miller, n.62, p.47, 
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These apparently anti-Semitic denounciations of Marx, 
though embarrassing due to their being in extreme terms, can 
be accommodated in the Marxist theory. Marx in his younger 
days was highly Heleglian in his style and he used the 
concepts of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Here we may 
interpret tlriat alienation of the Jews which they wanted to 
maintain as a separate identity can be taken as thesis which 
Marx wanted to advance through an antithesis of the negation 
of alienation and to develop it into synthesis of social 
cohesion Marx's thesis is that the Jews like the Gentiles, 
can become fully human again only by the restoration of 
social cohesion under the Gentiles. This is, the effect, the 
Soviet thesis that socialism is the only way of solving the 
Jewish problem. 
The Jewish Nationality Question: An early as 1903, Lenin 
wrote in the Party's central organ, Iskra (The Spark) that 
the very idea of a Jewish nationality was 'manifestly 
reactionary', and in conflict in the interests of the Jewish 
proletariat'. Ten years later this theme was reasserted by 
Stalin in the pamphlet 'Marxism and the National Question'. 
The main document in Bolshevik thought on the Jews 
before 1917 is Stalin's essay of 1913, Marxism and the 
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fi7 National Question. This represented the authoritative 
Bolshevik view. This was also consistent with Lenin's 
occasional observations on the subject. It received Lenin's 
approve and was in fact written under his guidance when the 
Bolsheviks were clarifyiftg their basic policy on national 
go 
minorities. 
According to this document Stalin firmly denies the 
status of nationhood to Jews since they lack certain 
constituents of nationality as conceived by him. He writes, 
"A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of 
language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up 
eg 
manifested in a community of culture". 
Stalin asks: 
-..what,..national cohesion there be...between 
the Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian and 
American Jews ?.... If there is anything 
common to them left it is their religion, 
their common origin and certain relics of 
national character... But how can it be 
seriously maintained that petrified religious 
67. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Qytestlon 
(London), Martin Lawrence, no date). 
68. Miller, n.62, p.48. 
69. Stalin, n.67, p.8. 
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rites and fading psychological relics affect 
the 'fate' of these jews more powerfully than 
the living social, economic, and cultural 
environment that surrounds them? And it is 
only on this assumption that it is generally 
possible to speak of the Jews as a single 
nation. "^ ^ 
The Jews in Russia are heading for inevitable 
assimilation. Not only do they possess no integral territory 
but the fact of the matter is primarily that among the Jews 
there is no large and stable stratum associated with the 
soil, which would naturally constitute the nation, serving 
not only as it 'frame work' but also as a 'national market'. 
Of the fire or six million Russian Jews, only three to four 
percent are connected with agriculture in any way. The 
remaining 96 per cent are employed in trade, industry, town 
institutions and in general they live in towns; moreover 
they are spread all over Russia and do not constitute a 
majority in a single province. 
Thus, interspersed as national minorities in areas 
inhabited by other nationalities, the Jews, as a rule serve 
'foreign' nations as manufacturers and traders and as 
70. Ibid. p.10. 
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members of the free professions, naturall7 adopting 
themselves to the 'foreign nations' in respect to language 
and other things. All this, taken together with the 
increasing reshuffling of nationalities characteristic of 
developed forms of capitalism, leads to the assimilation of 
the Jews. The abolition of the Pale would only serve to 
71 hasten this process. 
It is the process of inevitable assimilation which 
creates a struggle against it, reflected in the policy of 
the Bund for Jewish national autonomy. 
If there is no democracy in the country there 
can be no guarantee of 'the complete freedom 
of cultural development of nationalities'. One 
may say with certainty that more democratic a 
century is the fewer are the 'attempts' made 
on the 'freedom of nationalities, and the 
greater are the guaranties against such 
'attempts'. Russia is a semi Asiatic country 
and therefore in Russia the policy of 
'attempts' not infrequently assumes the 
grossest form, the form of programs. 
71. Ibid., p.36. 
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The Bund's aim of securing special Jewish rights, suuh 
as Saturday as the day of rest, is retrogressive; 
It is to be expected that the Bund will take 
another 'forward step' and demand the right to 
observe all th^ ancient Hebrew holidays... The 
maintenance of everything Jewish, the 
preservation of all the national peculiarities 
of the Jews, even those that are patently 
noxious to the protetariat, the isolation of 
the Jews from everything non-Jewish, even the 
establishment of special hospitals - that is 
7? the level to which the Bund has such. 
Stalin freely accepts the principle of cultural right: 
"There can be no possibility of a full development of the 
intellectual faculties of the Tatar or Jewish worker if he 
is not allowed to use his native language at meetings and 
73 lectures, and if his schools are closed down". But this 
point is made with a warning that the struggle for minority 
rights is, under the conditions of rising capitalistm always 
a stmggle of the Bourgeosic of the minority nation against 
that of the dominant nation, a struggle into which the. 
proletariat of the minority is drawn by its bourgeoisie 'And 
this creates a favourable soil for the lying propaganda 
72. Ibid., p.42. 
73. Ibid., p.17. 
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regarding "harmony of interests", for glossing over the 
class interests of the Proletariat and for the intellectual 
enslavement of the workers. This creates a serious obstacle 
to the work of uniting the workers of all nationalities.' * 
However, Stalin does not go quite so for as the then 
traditional social democrat attitude on the question of 
national cultures. 
The Russian social democratic view, which the Bund 
contradicted by its tendencies to preserve and stimulate 
Jewish culture, amounted to the abolition of all ethnic 
restrictions and inequalities but without stimulating or end 
endeavouring to preserve national cultures, because their 
existence hindered international working class solidarity. 
This view reflected the cosmopolitan education of the more 
articulate Bolshevik leaders and their impatience with any 
obstacles to the unity of the proletariat throughout the 
Russian empire, and indeed the world Lenin's statements of 
this position with reference to the Jews are particularly 
pungent, not only because they are made in the struggle 
against Bundist particularism as a betrayal of Marxism. He 
and his type saw the Jewish traditional ethos as the extreme 
74. Ibid. 
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embodiment of backward exclusiveness. Assimilation meant 
more than the emancipation of Jews. The construction of 
socialism takes precedence over the national ideal, even if 
it leads to complete assimilation. The overriding task is to 
assist the Jewish masses to take part in the building of 
socialism. 
Biro - Bidshan Project: The Jews did not constitute majority 
in any of the Republics of the Soviet union, the Antonomous 
Republics, Antonomous Regions, or National Areas. They are 
dispersed all over the country and constitute a minority in 
all those territories which together form the Soviet Onion. 
This according to the theories of Lenin and Stalin on the 
nationality problem, which still influence Russian policy, 
the Jews are not a nation in spite of their official 
designation as a nationality. 
The Soviet leaders had the realization, during the 
first decade after the Revolution, the great hardship in 
which the Jewish community was placed. The problem was 
aggravated by the economic disaster which affected many Jews 
in the Ukraine and Byelorussia - their main places of 
concentration - as a result of the First World War. 
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The idea that the Jews should take up agriculture and 
enjoy a measure of territorial concentration was actively 
encouraged by Mikhail Kalinin, the then President of the 
U.S.S.R. A special committee was established to give 
assistance to those Jew who were prepared to go back to the 
land. Another mass voluntary organisation - 'Oset' was 
formed to assist Jews who wished to become farmers. Special 
areas in the Southern Lukraine were designated for this 
purpose. Three Jewish national districts were established in 
the Kherson and Dnepropetrovsk regions and two in the 
Crimea. Since there was a very acute competition for land 
in these areas very few Jews could be absorbed. Moreover the 
nature Ukrainian and Tatar populations were hostile to the 
invading Jews. Anti-Semitic propaganda was widespread 
amongst the peasantry, which the Soviet authorities combated 
7fi 
with great vigour. 
Settlement of the Jews in Biro-Bidzhan was another 
project to 'normalise' the Jewish position in the U.S.S.R 
through territorial concentration. Three major reasons 
75. Solomon Rabinovich, Jews in the Soviet Union (Moscow, 
1967), p.45. 
76. Chimen Abramasky, Ihs Biro-Bidzhan Project in Lionel 
Kochan, in The Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917. (ed.), 
(London, 1970), p.68. 
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guided an experiment whose purpose was the establishment of 
a Jewish autonomous region in the Soviet Far East. One was 
to bring about a solution of Russia's Jewish problem by 
giving the Jews a homeland and creating a Jewish nation. The 
second reason was to arouse sympathy among Jewish 
communities abroad for the project of a "Soviet Jewish 
State', The third was to increase the defence potential of 
the O.S.S.R. by recruiting setters for an exposed Far 
Eastern recruiting setters for an border area. 
The Biro-Bidzhan project was received with greater 
enthusiasm in certain Jewish circles abroad than in Moscow 
or Kiev. "In the light of growing anti-Semitism in Europe 
and the increasing restriction on Jewish immigration into 
Palestine, the new project was looked upon as a chance for a 
national life in the Soviet Union, a new hope for Jewry in 
the U.S.S.R., where Jewish life was on the decline since the 
communist revolution". " Dr Chalm Weizmann, the President of 
the World Zionist Organisation - greeted the Biro-Bidahan 
plan as a 'station' on the road to the Jewish homeland in 
Palestine. But subsequent events have proved that life in 
77. S. Levenberg, 'Soviet Jewry: Some Problems and 
Perspectives' in Lionel Kochan, The Jews in Soviet 
Russia since 1917 (ed.), (London, 1970). 
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7Q the Far East had little national appeal for Soviet Jewry. 
In 1942 Biro-Bidzhan had a population of 100,000 due to 
the influx during the war of people of whom less than a half 
were Jews. But the area never become an important centre 
of Jewish agricultural settlement, because urbanisation 
proceeded at a quick pace and more than a quarter of its 
population lived in the capital. According to 1959 census 
the Jews occupied only 8.8% of the whole population. 
Why are these so few Jews in Biro Bidzhan? The 
following reply was given by a Jewish contributor to the 
81 official Soviet Novosti Agency: ^  
By the end of the thirties, especially in the 
War years, there was no longer any need for 
Jews with jobs to move. Why should a person 
living in Vinnistsa, Kiev or Sverdlovsk, leave 
a place where he has lived for a long time 
give up his permanent job, and acquaintances ? 
There may have been other reasons. And, of 
course, Soviet power is not to blame for the 
fact that tens of thousands and not hundreds 
of thousands went to Biro-Bidahan. 
79. B.Z. Goldberg, The Jewish Problem in the Soviet Uniim 
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Who, then, is to blame ? whatever the answer, the fact 
is that the attempts at Jewish territorial concentration 
ended in failure. 
TViis lack of a Jewish national centre puts the large 
Jewish community in the U.S.S.R., into a category of its 
own. Its situation cannot be compared with any of the 
national groups which form a majority in one of the 
territorial units of the Soviet Union. 
Another factor which has no important impact on the 
position of the Jewish population -- apart from the lack of 
territorial centre -- is its special socio-economic 
structure. Whereas 45 percent of the inhabitants of the 
U.S.S.R. lived in rural areas 96 percent of the Jews 
go 
resided in urban centres . In the mid -1930 over 10 percent 
of the Jewish working population was engaged in 
agriculture. 
However, Biro-Bidahan project failed In April 1958 
Khrushcher gave an interview to the correspondent of the 
82. U.S.S.R. in Figures, p.7 as cited in S.Levenberg, n.77, 
p.35. 
83. J.P.Cole, Geography gf the U.S.S.R. (Penguin, 1967), 
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French newspaper Figaro, in which he stated that the 
Biro Bidzhan project failed because Jews were incapable of 
collective work; they were individualists and not inclined 
to do agricultural work. 85 
The project, born of contradictory trends in policy, 
executed haphazardly, and without due consideration for 
Jewish feelings and sentiments, was doomed to failure. 
D.S.S.R. and Zionism: 
WVien the Bolshevik Party came to power in October 
1917, there already existed a powerful deep-rooted Zionist 
movement. 
Among the Kussian Jewry Zionism as and idea and as a 
movement predates Herat's Judensta&t and the emergence of 
the World Zionist Organisation. The early writings of Parez 
Smolenskin, Moahe-Leib Lilienblum, and Leon Pinsker, 
contained nearly all the basic elements of the classical 
Zionist concept. The first conference of Hovevei Zion 
(Lovers of Zion) met at Katowicz in 1884, thirteen years 
before the first Zionist Congress in Basle, and practical 
85. S. Levenberg, n.77, p.74 
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coloniaation work in Palestine started even before that 
date. There were in Russia at that time some 80 Hovevei Zion 
groups in 50 towns. ° The precursors of the first 'Aliyah' 
were the Biluim, the fourteen Jewish students from Kharkov 
who landed at Jaffa in 1882. The second 'Aliyah' (1903-15) 
was predominantly Russian. The majority of the forty 
settlements that existed in Palestine before the World War I 
87 
were created by Russian Jews. 
Russian Jewry had responded overwhelmingly to Herzl's 
call. Of the 197 participants in the First Zionist Congress 
(1897), 66 were from Russia. Next year, the movement counted 
373 local groups. At the fourth Congress (1900) Russian 
Zionists were represented by more than 200 delegates, and at 
the fifth (1901) they played a leading part in the formation 
of the 'Democratic Faction', which demanded that more 
attention be given to Jewish national education and 
op 
culture. The first all Russian Zionist conference met in 
1902 at Minsk, with the participation of 500 delegates, 
86. J.B. Schentman, 'The U.S.S.R., Zionism, and Israel', in 
Lionel Kochan, Ed., The Jews in Soviet Russia ed., 
(London, 1970), p.99. 
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88. Ibid. 
Q 25 
89 
representing some 75,000 shekel holders. At the sixth 
Zionist congress (1903), the Russian delegation constituted 
the bulk of the 177 who opposed Herzl's proposal to appoint 
a commission to investigate the British Government's Uganda 
offer and walked out after the proposal had been accepted. 
By the time, Russian Zionism with its 1.572 local groups was 
a major force in the World Zionist Organisation. 
Russian Zionists were an Ideologically alert and 
diversified movement After Herat's death, the majority of 
the seventh Zionist Congress (1905) decisively rejected the 
Ueganda project. The dissenting minority created a world 
wide Jewish Territorialist Organisation but this failed to 
capture the imagination of the Zioni-st masses in Russia. It 
found considerable and active support in labour circles. The 
Zionist Socialist Party (Z.S), founded in 1904-06, branded 
the Palestine solution as Utopian, and devoted its main 
attention to problem of Jewish migration which, it believed, 
would automatically develop into a movement of colonization, 
and thereby solve the Jewish problem. Another socialist 
group with a Zionist background emerged in 1905-60. It 
opposed both the Palestinian and other territorialist 
89. Ibid. 
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solution of the Jewish problem, and advocated Jewish 
national autonomy in Russia, based on an elected Jewish 
national assembly. They were called 'Sejmists' from the 
Polish term Sejm (Diet). Both groups later merged in a 
limited Socialist Party, known as the Fareinikte. By the 
spring of 1917, their combined membership was estimated at 
13,000.^^ 
Palestine - oriented Labour Zionism has been 
represented since 1900 by Poale Zion, whose Zionist concept 
was strictly materialistic, expressed in market terms. For a 
time they worked within the general framework of the Zionist 
organisation. Later, emphasis was increasingly put on 
proletarian class consciousness, which barred continued co-
operation with the middle-class Zionist movement. Since 1903 
an intermediate position had been occupied by the Tzeirei 
Zion groups. Their orientation was socialist, non Marxist, 
and with no stress on the class struggle. Tzeirei Zion 
constituted the back bone of the pioneer movement in Russia, 
and were predominantly represented in the second 'Aliyah'. 
From 1901 the religious wing in Zionism was represented by 
Mizrachi. 
91. Oscar I. Janowsky, The Jews and Minority Rights. (New 
York, 1933), pp.218-19. 
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Prior to 1905 Revolution, the Russian Zionists 
consistently abstained from activ-^  participation in the 
country's general political life. The all Russian Zionist 
convention in Helsingfors, Finland held in November 1906 
reversed this stand. A comprehensive and imaginative 
Helsingfors Programme" encompassed all aspects of Jewish 
interest in Russia. It offered, on the one hand, an organic 
synthesis between the struggle for Jewish civic and national 
rights in the country, and the upbuilding of the Jewish 
op 
homeland in Palestine, on the other. 
In Czarist Russia, Zionism was an illegal movement and 
like all other political parties was largely handicapped in 
its expansion. But the Soviets confronted a strong well-
organised Zionist movement. With some 1200 local groups and 
93 a membership of 300,000, it enjoyed virtual hegemony in 
Russia's Jewish community. 
The Zionist cause could expect little understanding, 
let alone sympathy, from Russia's new rulers. As early as 
1903, Lenin wrote in the party's central organ, Iskra (The 
Spark), that the very idea of a Jewish nationality was 
92. Ibid. 
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"manifestly reactionary" and 'in conflict with the interests 
of the Jewish proletariat'. Ten years later, the verdict was 
reasserted by Stalin in the pamphlet Marxism and the 
National Question. Nevertheless, in its early stages, the 
new regime did not noticeably affect Zionist activities. A 
"Palestine Week" proclaimed in the spring of 1918, was 
successfully conducted in hundreds of Jewish communities. A 
concerted effort was made to mobilize private initiative and 
capital for the upbuilding of Palestine. Within a year of 
the overthrow of the Czarist regime, Zionist activities were 
in full swing throughout Russia. In the London Zionist 
Review of October 1918, Isaak A. Naiditch, a leading Zionist 
and Vice-chairman of the Moscow Jewish Council, was able to 
relate that the Jewish Commissariat (Yevkom), established in 
January 1916 as a subdivision of the people's Commissariat 
for National Affairs, "which at first proclaimed the 
combating of Zionism... as one of its chief tasks, has up to 
now accomplished nothing of £iny consequence". ^  
Yevkom's early absence of a noticeably anti-Zionist 
record was primarily the result of its personal composition. 
94. This has already been discussed under the sub-heading. 
The Jewish Nationality Question of this chapter. 
95. Schechtman, n.86, pp.101-102. 
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It was staffed in the main by men who had virtually no 
specifically Jewish national background and who had no 
motivation for militant anti-Zionist action. They saw their 
personal mission in winning the Jewish masses for the 
communist cause through appeals in Yiddish. The Yevkom had 
neither time nor incentive or particular inclination to 
indulge in a sustained anti-Zionist crusade. However, 
since the Zionists suspected any non-communist political 
formation and also by way of precaution the leadership 
dropped the Helsingfors programme. A Zionist conference, 
attended by sixty delegates, met in Moscow on 5-8 May 1918, 
and hailed the Balfour Declaration as the first step to 
international recognition of a Jewish Palestine, but passed 
a resolution calling for strict neutrality in Russia's 
97 internal political affairs.'^ 
The year 1918 passed in relative tranquillity. But the 
Jewish sections of the Communist Party known as the 
Yevsektsia, established simultaneously with the Yevkom and 
composed of virulently anti-Zionist former militants of the 
Bund and the Fareinikte, turned communist, had by the summer 
96. Ibid. 
97. Ibid., p.102. 
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of 1918 begun to denounce "the counter -revolutionary 
qa 
essence' of Zionism". 
In the second half of 1919, the Yevesktaia sternly 
condemned the government's failure to act vigorously and 
speedily against Zionism and Zionists. The conference of 
Yevsektsia and Yevkom groups in Moscow,held in June 1919 
urged the dissolution of the 'counter - revolutionary... 
clerical and nationalistic Zionist organisation...', an 
instrument in the hands of entente imperialism in its war 
99 
against proletarian revolution'. 
As early as that, the central Soviet authorities showed 
no inclination to yield to Yevsektsia's prodding. The year 
1919 was the most critical in the life of the new regime. 
Fully absorbed by the desperate struggle against the 
advancing anti-Soviet armies, it was not inclined to pay 
attention to such a relatively 'innocuous' movement as 
Zionism, i ^ 
Yet alarmed by the Yevsektsia conference, the Central 
Committee of the Zionist Organisation, in July 1919, 
98. Ibid. 
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submitted to the all Russian Central Executive Conunittee of 
Soviets (Vtsik) a memorandum avoided any mention of the 
essence of Zionist ideology maintaining that Zionist 
activities were merely directed at transforming Jewish small 
merchants into farmers and artisans in Palestine. In reply 
to this request, the Vtsik on 21 July resolved that since no 
decree of the Vtsik or the Council of People's Commissar had 
declared the Zionist party as counter revolutionary, and 
since the cultural and educational activities of the Zionist 
organisation did not contradict the decisions of the 
communist party, the Presidium of the Vtsik instructed all 
Soviet organisations not to hamper the Zionist party in its 
. . 101 
activities. 
The Zionist Central Committee rather optimistically 
interpreted this resolution as an implicit legalissation of 
Zionism in the Soviet Union. Actually, it was but an 
equivocal and relatively phrased expression of official 
tolerance; it remained valid as long as no other Soviet body 
declared Zionism and Zionists to be counter - revolutionary. 
The Yevsektsia was increasingly damaged by the apparent 
semi-tolerance of the Soviet authorities and urged total 
101. The Zionist REview, London, July and November 1918. 
332 
proscription and liquidation of Zionism. In July 1920, its 
third conference declared that there was 'no longer any 
ground for a cautions attack on Zionism. It is necessary to 
put an end to the vacillation of the official attitude 
towards the general Zionist party and to all its cultural 
and economic organisations. It is essential that a total 
liquidation be carried out, not with standing the socialist 
phaseology of the Tzeirei Zion and Zionist socialist.^ 
There was no uniformity in the Soviet Government's 
response to Yevsektsia's pressure, though throughout 1920 
harassments took place in other Jewish centres, usually in 
the wake of Yevsektsia inspired newspaper articles and 
denunciations; Zionist students were frequently expelled 
from the universities as "ideologically alien elements". On 
the other hand, there were communities where Zionist 
activities continued un-hampered. 
In the early stages of the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) 
inaugurated by Lenin in 1921, the general relaxation of the 
regime's administrative pressure made life easier for the 
Zionist groups as well. For some eight months they enjoyed a 
102. The American Jewish Year book, Vol.21, pp.280-1 
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measure of respite from extensive harassment. Yevsektsia 
angrily protested at the government's "leniency". Their 
daily Ernes (The Truth) of 13 January 1922 called for 'a 
corapaign to exterminate Zionism in the O.S.S.R. forever'. 
Repressions were resumed by mid - 1922. The main target 
was the Tzeirei Zion party. Two illegal Tseirei Zion 
conferences, called with consummate conspirational 
precautions, went undetected. But the third conference, in a 
Kiev synagogue on 30 April 1922, was raided by the Cheka on 
the fourth day of its deliberations. Fiftyone persons were 
arrested, and thirty - seven of them appeared on 26 August 
before the Soviet military court. The indictment read: 
The Tzeirei Zion is a popular wing of the 
Zionist party, which, under the mask of 
democracy, seeks to corrupt the Jewish youth 
and to throw them into the airms of the counter 
revolutionary bourgeoisie in the interests 
of Anglo - French capitalism. To restore the 
Palestine state, these representatives of the 
Jewish bourgeoisie rely on reactionary 
forces, ranging from Tiutiunik and Petliura to 
such rapacious imperialists as Poincare, Lloye 
George, and the Pope. 
104. Ibid. 
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The court unanimously pronounced the defendants guilty 
and charged; Twelve were sentenced to two years' hard labour, 
and fifteen to one year. Ten were released, after thirteen 
months those sentenced to two years were permitted to leave 
the Soviet Union.^^^ 
In certain cases, the convicted Zionists were offered 
the tantalizing altennative of deportation to Palestine in 
return for a full recantation. This included an admission 
that the goals of Zionism were indeed anti-Soviet and/ or 
counter revolutionary. Those who signed such a statement 
were permitted to apply for the conversion of their sentence 
into a deportation order; they could them obtain an exit 
passport, valid for travel to Palestine. ^ "^ ^ 
The rationale for this opening of a tiny loophole was 
apparently two fold*, the Soviet authorities might have been 
eager to get rid of hundreds of Zionist devotees, and they 
also wanted to impress world Jewish opinion favourably by 
showing that Zionists were prosecuted not because of the 
immigrationary aspects of their programme, but only for 
their "counter-revolutionary" sympathies and activities 
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within the Soviet Union. This later consideration also 
seems to have accounted for the government's benevolent 
gesture towards the Histadruth (General Labour Federation in 
Palestine), which was invited to participate in the 
International Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow in the 
summer of 1924, The Palestine pavilion attracted tens of 
thousands of enthusiastic Jewish visitors from all parts of 
the Soviet Union. Special excursions came from four large 
cities. Emboldened by this impressive demonstration, 
Zionists Youths in Odessa marched in formation in the 
streets singing the 'Hatiq Va. They were dispersed by the 
mounted police and 32 of them were arrested. They declared a 
five - day hunger strike as a protect against their 
treatment by the prison authorities. 
On 25 August 1925 two Zionist leaders. Professor David 
Shor and Itzhak Rabinovich, submitted to Peter Smidovich, 
acting head of the Vtsik, a memorandum outlining Zionist 
aims and activities and asking for the release of all 
Zionist prisonrs, cessation of further arrests, and 
107. Ibid., p.108. 
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authorisation of emigration to Palestine. A special session 
of the Vtsik discussed the request at considerable length, 
but inconclusiveIF. The Zionist were advised to submit a 
project for a legalized emmigrationary society. This was 
done. But the Yevsektsia immediately intervened and urged 
the Poliburo of the Communist Party to reject any concession 
to the Zionits. A few days later Smidovich meaningfully told 
Rabinovich". "your own people are advancing all kinds of 
hindrances'. The attempt to establish agreement with the 
regime petered out. 
The very fact that the highest echelons of the Soviet 
regime were prepared to negotiate with the Zionists at that 
time, the repeated assertions that the Soviet Government was 
actually "not against Zionism" and that all the harassment 
of the Zionist was the work of the Yevsektsia only, may 
appear puzzling. A pajrtial answer to this puzzle may be that 
the Soviet Onion saw no real 'danger' in the existence of 
the Zionist movement. It did not belong to the mainstream of 
Russias political struggle, was in no way a challenge to 
tVieir power. Yielding to the Yevsektsia's pressure the 
110. J.B. Schechtman, n.86, p.108. 
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regime was willing to permit its Jewish communist section to 
denounce Zionism. But during the first decade of communist 
rule the Soviet Government was not prepared to make 
Yevsekasia's words and deeds the Governments official 
policy. 
The rationale for this restraint towards Zionism was 
governments' vague apprehension. The clearly enunciated 
anti-Zionist policy unfavorably affects Soviet Russia's 
image in the Jewish communities of the Western world. 
Contrary to the belief, Soviet Russia was at that time very 
sensitive to world public opinion and was loath to 
experience only adverse Jewish reaction to the clear - cut 
official persecution of Zionism. "It was in this spirit that 
communist leaders did not refuse to discuss some modus 
Vivendi with the non-legalised but also outlawed 
Zionists'.^^^ Negotiation to this effect proceeded inter-
mittently and inconclusively for more than half a year They 
ended abruptly on 16 March 1926, when more then 100 
Zionists, including the chief negotiator, Robinovich, were 
arrested and subsequently sentence to three year's exile in 
Kazakhastan.^^^ 
111. Ibid., p.110. 
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In the later part of the 1920s, Yevsektasia's position 
in the Soviet regime general structure started to 
deteriorate. The total liquidation of all Jewish national 
institutions (Kehitoth, Tarbut, O.R.T., O.S.E., etc., the 
actual disappearance of the Bund, Fareinikte and the Poale 
Zion, as well as the increasingly efficacious persecution of 
all forms of Zionist activities, throughout the U.S.S.R. for 
which the Yevsektsia claimed full credit, undermined its 
usefulness to the regime. By the end of the decade,the 
authorities apparently came to the conclusion that the 
Yevsektsia had outlived its usefulness: "The Moor has done 
his duty - the Moor can go". Neither in Yevsektsia nor the 
Yevkom which was dissolved early in 1924, together with the 
People's Commissariat for nationality affairs, of which it 
was a subdivision, were ever devised as permanent 
institutions to handle Jewish affairs in the communist 
spirit. The Communist Party and the governmental machinery 
took over. ^ 
However, hostility towards Zionism and persecution of 
Zionists continued Zionist activities were effectively 
crippled. The last citadels of organised underground Zionism 
113. J.B. Schechtman, n.86, pp.111-112. 
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the Moscow Central Executive Committee for Tseirei Zion 
and the Union of Zionist Youth were liquidated in September 
1934. ^^ In the years 1936-9, the government mounted an 
intensive, large-scale compaign against 'Zionist imperialist 
oppression of the Palestinian Arabs'. The Zionists wee 
denounced on the radio, in the communist press, and in the 
resolutions passed at factory meetings Zionism officially 
pronounced dead and buried, still occupied a prominent place 
in the regime's propaganda effort. 
By the end of the thirties the also visible vestiges of 
organised Zionism had been ruthlessly and efficaciously 
eradicated in the U.S.S.R. The regime considered 'the 
Zionist Chapter' fully and irretrievably closed. 
It was dramatically reopened in the early stages of 
the World War II. In September 1939 the Soviet Union annexed 
Poland's eastern and South - Eastern provinces with a Jewish 
population of about 1,200,000 - 1,250,000 (Some 300,000 Jews 
came later as refugees from the German occupied areas). In 
114. Teller, n.l08, p.55. 
115. In volume 51 of the first edition of the large Soviet 
Encyclopaedia, 1944, Zionism was summarily dismissed 
as 'moribund': the final ideological rout of Zionism 
came with the Victory of the Great Soviet Revolution 
of October 1917"'. 
?4i) 
June 1940 the Rumanian provinces of Bessarbia and Northern 
Bukovina were incorporated in the U.S.S.R. According to the 
Rumanian census of 1930, these had the Jewish population of 
277,949. The almost simultaneous annexation of Lalvia, 
Estonia, and Lithuania added a further 265,000 Jews. Within 
nine months, the Jewish community of the Soviet Union 
•J -I C 
increase by some two million. 
Zionists constituted a high percentage of this influx. 
Polish Jewry, was the 'backbone' of the World Zionist 
Organisation. The Soviet Union had once again with a two-
mill ion-strong, predominantly Zionist, 'new' Jewish 
minority. 
Soviet Onion and the Palestine Question: 
To the average Russian Orthodox Christian prior to the 
Russian Revolution of 1917, the possession of Constantinople 
(Istanbul), the cradle of Russian orthodoxy was merely a 
stepping-stone to the Holy Land of Palestine. Before World 
War I when the Russian spoke of Muslims, they meant the non-
Arab Muslims World, especially the Turks and Tatars. It was 
116. Schechtman, n.86, p.112. 
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the Bolshevik regime that made Russians cognizant of the 
Arab World' .^ '^^  
The Bolshevik regime that becamj victorious in World I 
was aware of its unpopularity in Europe. One of the early 
steps taken by this Bolshevik regime was its "Appeal to the 
Muslims of Russia -nd the East" (December 5, 1917), urging 
them to join forces with the Soviet revolution. This appeal, 
signed by Lenin and Stalin, repudiated in no uncertain terms 
the secret agreements entered into by the Tsarist regime in 
1915-16: 
W© declare that the secret treaties of 
the dethroned Tsar regarding the seizure of 
Constantinople, which was confirmed by the 
disposed Kerensky, now are null and void. The 
Russian Republic and its governments the 
Council of People's Commissars, are against 
the seizure of foreign territories. 
Constantinople must remein in the hands of the 
Muslims.^^^ 
Among the Muslims of the East, to whom the Bolsheviks, 
addressed this appeal were not only the Turks, Persians, 
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Tatars and Kirghz but also the Arabs, the "victims of 
rapacious European plunderers". 
One reason which must have motivated the Bolsheviks to 
include the Arabs, especially those of Palestine in their 
purview at this time was the Balfour Declaration of November 
2, 1917, issued just a few days prior to the Bolshevik 
seizure of power on November 7. The Balfour Declaration 
albeit un-intentionally served to divert a large part of the 
articulate Jewish population of Soviet Russia from communism 
to Zionism. The Jewish Bund, the Jewish counterpart of the 
Mensheviks (the right wing of the Russian Social Democrats), 
soon discovered that it constituted a minority in a sea of 
Zionists- The Bund had joined its Soviet comrades in a 
bitter and sustained anti-Zionist movement. This compaign 
was accentuated by the fact that Great Britain was the chief 
prompter of Allied intervention in Russia in the period 
1918-20.^^^ 
To the Bolsheviks, therefore Zionism became synonymous 
with treason. When the Jewish Bund, together with other 
moderate socialists, fell into disgrace and was disbanded. 
119. "Pis'mo Kamerikanskin rabochim" (A letter to American 
workers) (Pravada, August 22, 1918) in which Lenin 
associated England at one and the same time with 
seizing Palestine and begining to seize Russia (Lenin, 
Sochineniia [works], vii). As cited in Ivor Spector, 
n.ll5, p.415. 
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the small group of Jewish Communists remained the focal 
point of opposition to Zionism. 
With Zionism in disrepute in Soviet Russia, no Zionist 
was permitted to leave Soviet occupied territory, especially 
for Palestine. However toward the end of 1919, under the 
Denkin regime in Southern Russia, hundreds of Russian 
Zionists, in the guise of Palestinian refugees, did leave 
Russia, via Odessa, for Palestine. The first charter ship, 
which sailed for Palestine at the end of 1919 carrying 
1 20 
several hundred Zionists, was the Russian. When the 
Soviet government learned about this emigration permitted 
the departure of limited numbers of Zionists whose ranks 
were infiltrated with communists posing as Zionists. They 
formed the nucleus of the Party of Palestine, founded in 
1919 and admitted to the Comintern in 1924. 
The Inter War Period: Palestine became a close British 
Mandate on July 24, 1922 under the League of Nations pending 
such time as the country was ready for complete 
independence. The terms of the Mandate included the pledge 
120. Ivar Spector, n.ll7, p.416. 
3^1 
of the Balfour Declaration? obligating Great Britain to 
create a Jewish national hone in Palestine. The Soviet 
regime attacked the Mandate system as a mask for the seiaure 
of Turkish and German possessions by the Entente powers.""^ 
It refused to recognize the Palestine Mandate from its 
inception until its termination on May 15, 1948. The Soviet 
Union alleged that the Mandate system was one reason for its 
refusal to participate in the League of Nations. In 1934, 
when the U.S.S.R. did join the League, it specifically 
restated its negative position on the Mandate system. The 
bankruptcy of British policy in Palestine", according to 
Soviet interpretation, was revealed by a succession of Arab 
uprisings in 1920, 1921, 1929, 1933 and 1936-39. From the 
Soviet standpoint, England established in Palestine "an 
imperialist regime, a military police dictatorship, and 
transformed the country actually into a British colony".^ 
121. Mandate System has been discussed elaborately in 
earlier chapter. 
122. Izvestia, June 22, 1923 as cited in Ivor Spector, 
n.il7, p.416. 
123. Isvestia, September 20, 1934. As cited in Ivor 
Specter, n.ll7, p.416. 
124. Diplomatitcheskii Slovar [Diplomatic dictionary] 
{Moscow, 1950), 11, 98-99, as cited in Ivor Spector, 
n.ll5, p.406. 
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The Soviet government emerged from the civil wcir (1918-
20) with an intervention complex, to prevent a recurrence of 
this threat to its survival. It delegated to the newly-
created Third International (Comintern) in 1919 the conduct 
of an offensive or counter attack, against the colonial 
possessions or spheres of influence of England and France, 
with special emphasis on those in the Middle East adjacent 
to Soviet Russia. The first Soviet "Appeal to the Muslims of 
Russia and the East" was issued by the Bolshevik government 
in 1917. Fearing reprisals from the colonial powers, 
however, it caused the Second Appeal to be issued by the 
Comintern. On July 3, 1920, the Second Congress of the Third 
International invited the "enslaved peoples of the Middle 
East" to meet in Baku, the oil centre of the Caspian Sea. 
This same Congress passed a resolution condemning Zionist 
activities in Palestine. •*• 
The Baku assembly demonstrated that the Arabs were by 
no means the focus of Soviet concern. In 1920 of the 1,891 
delegates who attended, only three were Arabs. There were as 
yet no independent Arab states in the Middle East. The Arabs 
125. Minutes of the Second World Congress of the Communist 
International (Hamburg, 1921), pp.198, 204. 
34!) 
received occasional cursory merition in Soviet publications 
as the victims of British and French imperialism. However, 
for Moscow, Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan around the 
Soviet borders — all confronted by English or Anglo-French 
territorial encroachment that constituted "The East" which 
awaited Soviet liberation. It were these three Muslim 
states, with some support from the West which stemmed the 
tide of Soviet expansion into the Arab world and forced the 
Soviet goveimment to settle for non-aggression pacts with 
them early in 1921.^26 
For several years thereafter the Soviet foreign policy 
was diverted from the Muslim world of the Near East to other 
areas. The Soviet government sought to normalize its 
relations with its European neighbours and to spread 
revolution in the Far East, especially in China. After 
Soviets were expelled from China in 1927 by the Kuomintang 
under Chiang Kai Shek, the U.S.S.R. turned once again to the 
Arab world. Taking advantage of existing unrest among the 
Arab peoples against the English and French mandatory powers 
and of Arab resentment against Zionist immigration into 
Palestine, it played at least indirectly, a role in 
126. Ivor Spector, n.ll7, p.417. 
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fomenting and augmenting the disturbances in 1929 which 
spread rapidly throughout Palestine and to other Arab 
lands. ^ 2*^  
The Stalin regime, in 1929, was engrossed in the First 
Five Year Plan. Soviet leaders had little interest in events 
abroad including what was brewing in Palestine. The out 
break of riots in Jerusalem in August and their impact 
through out the Arab world reawakened Soviet interest in the 
progressive revolutionary movement' taking place in the 
Middle East.^28 
At the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (July 19-
September 1, 1928) a certain Haider, a Palestinian delegate 
criticised the Third International for its neglect of the 
Arab question. The Arab World, he insisted, was of great 
significance to the Comintern because of the confrontation 
in this small area of a large number of important problems 
and question, with different types of imperialist policy and 
1 pq 
all forms of colonial bondage. ^•''^ When the riots occurred 
127. A. Shami, The Palestine insurrection and the Arab East 
in Revolutionary East, no.8, 1930, pp.25-52. 
128. Ivar Spector, n.ll7, p.418. 
129. Stenographic account of the VI Comintern Congress, IV, 
pp.144-47. As cited in Ivar Spector, n.ll7, p.418. 
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in Palestine, the Comintern attributed them to the 
"dismemberment of Arabistan into numerous small countries", 
"disfranchisement of the basic mass of the population" (the 
Arabs), "violent Zionist colonisation", and the growing 
pressure of British and French imperialism" in the Arab 
countries. In this struggle, the Cominterri accused the 
"Zionist bourgeois colonizers and their lackeys" of playing 
the role of direct agents of British imperialism, in 
contrast to the fallahin (peasants) and beduin (normads) who 
provided the main driving force of the revolutionary 
movement. 
The Communist Party of Palestine, comprised 
predominantly of Jews, was caught by surprise by the 1929 
revolt. It was severely criticized by the Comintern for 
misunderstanding the revolutionary character of the Arab 
uprising as a "general national anti-imperialist peasant 
revolt," for its failure to make of the Palestinian 
Communist Party a Jewish-Arab movement, and for its lethargy 
130. "The Resolution of the Political Secretariat of the 
Executive Committee of the Communist International on 
'The Insurgent Movement in Arabistan", October 16, 
1629, in Xenia Jaukoff Fudin and Robert M. Slusser, 
Soviet Foreign Policy. 1926-1934: PQgmnentS and 
Materials (University Park, Pa, 1966), I, 210-19, 
Document 33. 
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in neglecting to support the movement. Its number one task 
for the future, as outlined by the Comintern, was the 
"Arabization of the party from top to bottom". This Included 
the creation of Arab or Joint Arab-Jewish trade-union 
organisation, the drafting of an agrarian program reflecting 
the demands of the follahin and beduin and the exposure of 
Zionism and Majlis Islam as agents of imperialist reaction. 
Majlis Islam was an organisation of Arab nobility and 
clergy.-^ ^^  
The record of Soviet participation in the Palestinian 
revolutionary movement of 1929 and their plans for the 
future of Palestine and the Arab lands are to be found in 
the secret documents on the Programmes of the Communist 
Party for the Arab Countries, published in 1928. These 
were followed by another secret programme on "The Tasks of 
the Communist Party of Palestine in the Countryside, 
published in 1931 in Arabic and Hebrew.*^ '^ *' This anti-Zionist 
document, intended for the Arabs, is still of major 
significance. Although it was written in a different time 
and against a different background, it represents, almost in 
131. Ivor Spector, n.ll7, pp.418-419 
132. Ibid., p.419. 
133. Ibid. 
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toto, the arguments used today in the Soviet press. These 
and other documents pertaining to the Middle East and 
Palestine, were published in 1934 by the Marx-Engels Lenin 
Institute of the Central Committee of the All-Riassian 
Communist Party (Bolshevik) under the title Doctaments of the 
Programms of the Communist Parties of the East. Except for a 
brief summation of one and on-half pages, this publication 
remained largely unkriown in the West until 1956, when on 
•lot 
English translation became available. 
These documents provided a guide for the Communist 
Parties of the Middle East as to how, with the aid of the 
Soviet Union, they could spread communism and Soviet 
influence in Palestine and other Arab lands. This purpose 
was to be translated into action in Three stages:(i) The 
colonising power must be exposed by means of an intensive 
national liberation movement, a compaign against colonialism 
which in their opinion, would create a United Front of all 
classes except the direct agents of imperialism, 
(2) Once national independence had been achieved, the 
local communists conduct a campaign among the workers and 
134. Ibid. 
135. Ibid. 
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peasant masses to the effect that political sovereignty was 
not enough, that complete liberation involved a social, as 
well as a political revolution, that the liberated state, 
therefore, must pass to the control of the workers and 
peasants. 
(3) The final stage was the selsure of power by the 
Communist Party. 
This guide became and has remained the basis of * Soviet 
Policy in the Middle East. 
However, during the decade of the thirties, there was 
no significant move in Palestine and the Near East-Soviet 
activity, for the most part was restricted according to the 
above written blueprint for communism. Instinictions and 
guidance were given to local Communist groups which were 
weak and inarticulate and which, in most instances, had been 
driven underground. The main reason for the comparative lull 
in Soviet-Arab relations was the rise of Fascism and Nazism 
in Europe and their impact on the Near and Middle East. The 
Arab rebellion of 1936-39, unlike that of 1929, invited 
little Soviet attention. This was due to tension abroad and 
the Stalin purges at home, which removed from the scene or 
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frightened into silence the remaining Soviet experts on the 
Middle East.^^® 
During these years, the anti-semitism of the Hitler 
regime evoked a sympathetic response among same 
nationalists, especially in Palestine. English officials in 
Palestine were inclined to tolerate the Nazis because they 
were anti-communist. At though, as a result, the Soviet 
govejmment may well have become disillusioned with the Arabs 
in the late thirties, it was in no position to assume an 
aggressive role in the Near East until the end of World War 
In June 1941 Hitler's armies invaded Soviet territory. 
In the face of new realities with its persistent anti-
zionist policy on the home front, the Soviet Government made 
a sustained effort to enlist the sympathy and support of 
world Jewry for its war effort by an appeal to Jewish 
solidarity. 
On 24 August 1941 the Jews the world over heard for the 
first time over the Radio a voice from Moscow, addressing 
136. Walter Z. Laquer, The Soviet Onion and the Middle East 
(New York, 1959), pp.115-18. 
137. Ivor Spector, n.ll5, p.420. 
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them as 'Brider Y.den' (Brother Jews). In this broadcast the 
pact Parets Markish said that all Jews were now one people 
and one army and that no longer the man would divide 
them.^^^ 
In April 1942 came the announcement of the formation in 
Moscow of a Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. The Committee's 
main purpose was to build up pro-Soviet public opinion among 
the Jews in the Western countries. The public opinion build-
up was headed by Solomon M. Mikhoels, the renowned actor, 
and Itzik Feffer, Red Army colonel, communist poet laureate. 
Earlier in his verses he had classified Mufti of Jerusalem. 
Feffer's wartime poem, "I am a Jew", had the ring of Zionist 
anthems, evoking the Maccabeans, heroes and symbols of the 
Jewish national revolt. ^ ^^ ^ 
In 1943, Mikhoels and Feffer went with Stalins 
personal blessing to the United States and England, to plead 
for active Jewish support of the Soviet war effort. They 
were understandably eager to secure Zionist understanding 
and sympathy for their mission. In London, Michoels declared 
138. Schechtman, n.86, p.114. 
139. Ibid. 
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that Zionism is a "great idea" though it was inapplicable to 
Soviet Jewry with its deep roots in Russia. On his return to 
Moscow in December 1944, he sent greetings on Dr. 
Weizmann's seventieth birthday. Interest in Palestine 
and Zionism was also shown by Ivan Maisky, the former Soviet 
envoy to London who visited Palestine in October 1943 and 
sent to Moscow a glowing account. In November 1944, Shachna 
Epstein, Secretary of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, 
wrote in the Committee organ, Aynikayt, that "the Jewish 
people has a right to political independence in Palestine 
and that no sensible and freedom loving person can have any 
objection to the Jews there continuing to develop in freedom 
the home they had set up through hard, constructive work, on 
the basis of self government". ^ '*^  The following April, the 
Palestine Communist Party, which during the bloody riots of 
1929 and 1939 had observed the Kremlins directives and 
glorified the "national revolutionary nature of Mufti's 
policies, received new instructions and announced its 
readiness to co-operate with the Histadrut in combating the 
infamous British White Paper. At the World Trade Union 
140. Benjamin West, Struggle of a generation- the Jews 
under Soviet Rule (Tel Aviv, 1959), pp.144-145. 
141. Sechtman, n.84, p.114. 
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Conference (W.T.U.C.) in London in February 1945, the Soviet 
delegation endorsed a resolution stating that "the Jewish 
people must be enabled to continue the rebuilding of 
Palestine as their National Home". It was also noted with 
satisfaction that the Moscow paper Red Star, the organ of 
the Red Army, published an article highly critical of the 
Arab League on 13 July 1945. Two days later its content was 
broadcast by Radio Moscow in Arabic. 
At the conclusion of World War II, the victorious 
U.S.S.R. confronted a number of military, political, and 
economic problems. These problem can be put in three major 
categories: domestic, regional and International. In the 
home front was the task of building the war-torn areas. No 
doubt, the gigantic task of postwar reconstruction was given 
top priority, since Moscow's claim to superpower status 
rested on the twin pillars of military and industrial 
strength. ^•*'^  
In regions adjacent to the Soviet frontiers -- Eastern 
Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East - U.S.S.R. in 
142. Ibid., n.84, pp.114-115. 
143. Oles M. Smolansky, 'The Soviet Role in the emergence 
of Israel; in W. Roger Louis and Robert W. Stookey 
( ©d. ), Tb^ En<il <?f thQ PaI«gStin^ Mandate (London, 
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order to counter "capitalist encirclement" and to protect 
the national security set out to consolidate and, in some 
instances, to expand the territorial gains made during the 
war. The three regions mentioned above have been ranked in 
accordance with their respective military, strategic and 
political importance to the U.S.S.R. The experiences of 
1930s and especially of the war still fresh in their minds, 
the Kremlin regarded Eastern and Central Europe as 
absolutely indispensable to the national security of the 
Soviet Union. ^*'* 
The territorial acquisitions on the shores of the 
Pacific, too, represented an important strategic asset. 
Japan had capitulated, China was weak and this had prompted 
the U.S.S.R. into a position of strength in the Far East. 
Relatively Middle EAst was less significant to Stalin than 
were the other two regions. However, this cannot be disputed 
that parts of the area, such as northern Iran and north-
eastern Turkey as well as the Turkish Straits were of 
considerable strategic importance to Moscow. At the minimum, 
they controlled access to Russia's "soft underbelly" - the 
Ukaraine and Transcausian area and the predominantly Muslim 
territories of Central Asia.^^ 
144. Ibid. 
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The situation that Stalin came acroaa in the post-war 
Middle East in at least two important respects. First, 
unlike the other regions the Middle East had long been a 
sphere of exclusively Western (mainly British) influence. 
For this reason with the exception of northern Iran, the 
Russiaxi Army made no move into the territory of the 
U.S-S.R.'s southernri neighbors. Secondly, according to the 
1941 agreement with Great Britain, Soviet troops were 
obliged to leave northern Iran no later than six months 
after the end of World War li. In view of these 
considerations, the Kremlin was left with no choice but to 
pursue its interest in the Middle East by means of 
diplomatic negotiations with its war time allies. Soon it 
was explicit to Stalin that neither London nor Washington 
was prepared to countenance Soviet aggrandizement since the 
Middle East was viewed by them as vital to western military, 
political, and economic interests. Refusal topermit Russian 
expansion applied not only to Turkey and Iran but also to 
the former Italian Colonies that Moscow had sought to 
t AC 
administer in the early post war period. 
146. Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origin of the Cold War in the 
Near East: grgat Power Conflict and Diplomacy in 
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After 1945, when it become obvious that the West had 
no intention of offering any such recognition, Moscow 
embarked upon a course of political competition vis-a-vis 
its former Allies. The main concentration was on three major 
areas contiguous to the Soviet Onion: Europe, the Far East, 
and the Middle East. Stalin's handling of the Palestine 
problem is an interesting example of such a process. 
Attempts of Cooperation'- Though at the Yalta Summit, the 
question of Palestine was not on the official agenda, it did 
come up in informal discussion. The most striking feature of 
these deliberations seems to have been a tacit agreement by 
the Allied heads of state "to hand over Palestine to the 
Jews and to continue Jewish immigration at least for the 
immediate future", * President Roosvelt subsequently 
reported being surprised by the fact that "Stalin had not 
appeared opposed to Zionism" Kremlin's conciliatory 
posture was probably influenced by a desire to demonstrate 
to the Western Allies it*^  flexibility at a juncture when it 
147. Yaacov Ro'i. Soviet Decision Making in Practic: The 
tJSSR and Israel. (New Jersey, 1947-1954), p. 16. 
148. Oles, M., n.l42, p.64. 
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was generally assumed that the question of the Palestine 
mandate would soon be submitted to the United Nations, whose 
establishment had been officially agreed upon at Yalta. *^ 
By being a prominent member in the United Nations and 
having veto power in the Security Council, the Soviet Union 
expected to play a prominent part in deciding the future 
status of Palestine. Since no vital Soviet interest were 
claimed to be at stake in Palestine, direct Russian 
involvement in the affairs of the former League of Nations 
mandate would have meant implicit Western recognition of the 
legitimacy of Moscow's role. 
Stalin's calculations at Yalta went awry. Prime 
Minister Churchill, in late February 1945, announced his 
governments decision not to submit the political problem to 
tVie United Nation. It was clearly evident that this move was 
to preclude Soviet Union in the affairs of the Mandate. This 
decision on the part of Churchill, "deprived ... [Stalin's 
conciliatory] stand on Palestine, including the support of 
the Jewist cause there, of its raison d'etre." 
149. Ibid. 
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The resolve of the Allied powers to keep Soviet Union 
away from the Palestinian question was well-taken by 
Kremlin. When, in in late fall of 1945, Great Britain set up 
the Anglo- American Committee of Inquiry to review the 
Jewish refugee problem in Europe as well as the situation in 
•J C p 
Palestine, ^ Stalin adversely reacted to the Committee and 
•ICO 
its reconnnendationa, ^ He was convinced that London and 
Washington had no intention to cooperate with Moscow. The 
U.S.S.R. was left with no choice but to develop its own 
approach to the political problem. The Kremlin endeavored to 
return the issue to the United Nations where they could be 
expected to play a prominent role. Whatever Stalin's 
original intentions may have been, it was obvious that 
thereafter, in Palestine and elsewhere, East-West relations 
would be marked not by cooperation but by confrontation. 
U.S.S.R. was not lacking in power with respect to 
Palestine. Soviet trump card was the issue of immigration to 
Palestine which it played in 1946-47. Soviet Union was not 
in a position to control events in Palestine directly. 
152. See J.C. Hurewitz:, The Struggle for Palestin. (New 
York, 1950). Chap. 18. 
153. Yaacov Ro'i, n.l47, pp.23-27. 
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However, it was in a position to deny emigration to the Jeva 
from Eastern Europe to counter the Western objections to its 
participation in the resolution of the Palestine problem 
Kremlin set out to facilitate their emigration to the 
Western Zones of Germany and Austria. It should be noted 
that earlier Soviet Union had taken a stance publicly that 
it was opposed to mass exodus of Jews of Eastern Europe as 
well as to Zionism.^^ The Soviet government did so in full 
awareness of the fact that most emigrants were determined to 
proceed to Palestine and to do what they could to ensure the 
1 C O 
establishment of a Jewish state. •*• As a result, the number 
of Jewish displaced persons (DPs) in West Germany and 
Austria swelled from "less than 100,000 in summer 1945 to 
approximately a quarter of a million early in 1947," making 
it impossible for the West to disregard "the Question of 
Palestine's political future". 
Initiation of this policy, on the part of Kremlin, 
seemed to have been serving related objectives. First, Great 
Britain was opposed to the mass immigration of Jews to 
155. Ibid. 
156. Yaacov Ro'i, n.l47, pp.25-33. 
157. Ibid., p.33. 
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Palestine and President Truman was in favour of it. Moreover 
large scale influx of Jewish DPs in the Allied zones of 
occupation could have been expected, at a minimum, to 
exacerbate Anglo-Amercian relations. Second, the influx of a 
large number of East European Jews into Palestine might well 
have resulted in a failure of Western efforts to resolve 
this ticklish problem independently of the larger 
international community. Either way, the chances of the 
Palestine issue being brought before the United Nations, 
Moscow's major political objective in 1946,47, did greatly 
improve. Stalin's gambit, followed by the Kremlin's support 
of the Jewish community's (Yishuv) political aspirations in 
Palestine did indeed lead to the desired results. The 
Soviet moves eventually contributed to the collapse of 
Anglo-Americsin attempts to settle the Palestine question 
outside the U.N. framework. Once that occurred Great Britain 
was forced in early 1947 to place the Palestine Question 
again on the United Nations agenda. It became virtually 
difficult to deny the U.S.S.R. active participation in the 
search for a resolution of the problem.^^ 
158. Oles M., n.l42, pp.65-66. 
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Stalin had come to the conclusion that cooperation 
between the U.S.S.R. and its war time Allies was impossible. 
Kremlin began actively searching for means to weaken the 
Western hold on the Middle East. Palestine represented a 
'weak link* in Great Britain's regional - imperial defence 
system'. It was vulnerable because of the existence in that 
country of two competing nationalisms - Jewish and Arab that 
worked not only to frustrate each other's ambitions but also 
to rid themselves of British tutelage. Therefore, in 
concentrating on Palestine, Moscow could have reasonably 
hoped to remove the British presence. This could have been 
the prelude for the withdrawl of imperialist presence from 
the whole of Middle East.^"*" It is an irony that for the 
attainment of these particular objectives Stalin's policies 
more readily facilitated Soviet backing of Zionists rather 
than Arab nationalist aspirations in Palestine. 
However, Kremlin, before it could commit itself openly 
to the Zionists, had to out maneuver Anglo-American moves to 
exclude Moscow from attempts to resolve the Palestine 
problem. Kremlin in 1946-47 did likewise by insisting that 
any change in "the status of dependent territories" should 
160. Ibid. 
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be decided by the United Nations. °^ Stalin's persistence 
paid off in February 1947 when the British Government 
expressed its inability to mediate the Arab-Jewish dispute 
referred and the Palestine problem to the UN. In the 
meantime Soviet ability to influence events in Palestine had 
considerably increased. The Jewish population had swollen on 
account of large-scale immigration of East European Jews. 
The situation in Palestine was deteriorating fast since the 
Jews and Arab Palestinian were locked in incessent 
conflagration and with the British. This offered a unique 
opportunity to U.S.S.R. to influence events by supporting 
Zionist aspirations for an independent Jewish state. 
The Kremlin welcomed the submission of the Palestine 
Question to the U.N. Andrei Gromyko Deputy Foreign Minister 
declared on May 8, 1947, that the U.S.S.R. was prepared 'to 
take upon itself, together with the United Nations as a 
whole, the responsibility not only for the final decisions 
that may be taken by our organization on the Palestine 
problem, but also for the preparation of the decision.' 
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THE UNITED NATIONS AND PARTITION EESOLOTION 
The Problem before the General Assenbly 
The negotiations of the British government with the 
two communities Arabs and Jews h ^ come to a dead lock and 
hostilities in Palestine had increased. The British 
government under these circumstances decided in February, 
1947 to place the problem before the United Nations. 
Mr.Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary explaining the 
reason behind this decision, told the House of Commons on 
Feb. 18, 1947: that: .ihl2 
His Majesty's Government have of themselves no 
power, under the terms of the Mandate, to 
award the country either to the Arabs or to 
the Jews or even to partition it between them. 
It is in these circumstances that we have 
decided that we are unable to accept the 
schemes put forward either by the Arabs or the 
Jews or not to impose ourselves a solution of 
our own. We have, therefore, reached the 
conclusion that the only course now open to us 
is to submit the problem to the judgment of 
the United Nations. 
On April 2, 1947 the British Government asked that the 
question of Palestine be placed on the agenda for the next 
1. I. Larry Leonard, The United Nations and Palestine (New 
York, 1949), p.613. 
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regular session of the United Nations General Assembly. In 
addition, Britain asked for the convening of a special 
session to appoint and instruct a special committee to 
prepare the ground for the General Assembly's study of the 
future government of Palestine. 
In a meeting held on April 17,1947 the Political 
Committee of the Arab League decided to oppose the creation 
of a committee of inquiry by the United Nations, and 
proposed the inclusion on the Agenda of the special session 
of an item calling for the termination of the mauidate over 
Palestine and declaring it an independent country. 
Further, if a committee of inquiry were to be set up against 
Arab wishes, they agreed to work toward the inclusion in the 
Mandate over Palestine and recognition of that country's 
independence. The delegations of the Arab states were asked 
to follow these guidelines during the deliberation of the 
Palestine problem by the coming special session of the 
United Nations. 
However before the special session got underway, the 
Arabs were confident that the other delegates would be aware 
2. U.N- Document A/364. "UNSCDP Report to the general 
Assembly" Vol.11, Annex 1, p.l. 
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of their side of the story and the final decision would be 
in their favour. The Jewish Agency began to make detailed 
plans to win support for the Zionists arrived in Palestine 
for conferences on future policy. The discussions of three 
weeks, and the resolutions adopted have not been disclosed; 
but six U.S. members of the Jewish Agency and Dr. Nahum 
•J 
Goldman were oppointed to organise the O.N. Compaign. 
The First special session of the General Assembly of 
opened at Lake Success on April 28, 1947 to consider the 
Palestine question. There were two proposals on the agenda, 
a British proposal that asked for "the constitution and 
instruction of a committee to investigate the Palestine 
question", and an Arab proposal submitted by Egypt, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia calling for the "termination 
of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its 
independence. This Arab item of the agenda was in 
accordance with the decision taken by the Political 
Committee of the Arab League on April 17,1947, as previously 
3. Robert John Sami Hadawi, The Palestine Diarv. Vol.11 
(Beirut, 1970), p.126. 
4. UN Dociiment A/364, Add 1 of September 9, 1947, "Report 
of UNSCOP", Vol.11, Anex I, p.l. 
5. Ibid., Annex 2, pp.1-2. 
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mentioned. The Arab states based their suggestions on the 
ground that the problem before the General Assembly was not 
that more facts needed to be found, but that self 
determination should be applied as setforth in the Charter 
of the United Nations. These principles, in the opinion of 
the Arab states, were inconsistent with the Palestine 
Mandate which was based on Power politics, rather than the 
right or wrong of the situation.° When the vote was taken on 
the Arab proposal the General Assembly decided by a vote of 
15 in favor, 24 against with 10 abstentions, not to 
recoDunend the inclusion of the Arab states proposal in the 
•7 
agenda. With the defeat of the Arab item of the agenda in 
6. Frank H. Epp. , Whose Land in Palestine? (L^ -i ngc, ) p. 175. 
7. General Assembly, Official Records, First Special 
Session 1947, Vol.11, pp.12, 81. 
Voted in favour: Afghanistan, Argentina, Byelorussion 
S.S.R-, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., 
Yugolavia. 
Against: Australia, Belgium, Braail, Cananda, Chile, 
China, Denmark, Equador, France, Greece, Honduras, 
Liberia, the Netherlands, Newzealand, Norway, Panama, 
Peru, Phillipino Republic Sweden, Union of South Africa, 
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
Abstentions: Bolivia, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, 
Dominican Republic of El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guetemala, 
Haiti, Maxico, Poland. 
Absent: Costa Rica Iceland, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Siam. 
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the Assembly, another procedural question was taken up that 
consumed much time, i.e. the representation on of the Arabs 
and Jews of Palestine before the organisation. It was 
ultimately decided that the Jewish Agency for Palestine and 
the Arab Higher Committee could appear before the First 
Committee. 
After setting the procedural questions before it, the 
General Assembly took up the main question of the 
constitution and instruction of the special committee to 
prepare the Palestine question for consideration at the 
second regiilar session. Before the assembly, there were two 
principal resolutions. One, submitted by the U.S. 
delegation, suggesting an investigation committee composed 
of Canada, C Czechoslovakia, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, 
Sweden and Uruguay. The other resolution was submitted by 
Argentina, calling for an investigation committee composed 
of sixteen states There would be China, France, U.S.S.R., 
United Kingdom, United States, one state chosen from among 
the Five Arab states, and five other states chosen by lot on 
a regional basis - one from Asia one from Africa, one from 
8. General Assembly, Official Records, First Special 
Session, 1947, Vol.Ill, pp.365-66. 
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the Pacific and three from the American continent. The 
basic difference between the two resolutions was in the 
attitude toward the participation of the Big Five. Wlriiie the 
Argentine resolution favored such participation, the 
American opposed it. Another point of difference was in the 
inclusion of one member of the Arab states on the special 
committee. The author of the Argentine proposal, considered 
Arab participation desirable because it would "place the 
problem in the hands of all those who have some interest in 
the problem." The Soviet Union Representative also 
supported the inclusion of one Arab representative on the 
committee. He saw no reason "for objecting to the inclusion 
in this committee of one of the Arab countries which, as we 
know seems particularly concerned with the Palestine 
problem. Mr. Gromyko also supported inclusion of 
representative of the permanent members of the security 
council in the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine. 
9, General Assembly, Official Records, First Special 
Session, 1947, Vol.Ill, pp.365-66. 
10. Jacob Robinson, Palestine and the United l!<4ti<?ns 
(Washington, 1947), p.156. 
71 
He informed the First Committee that: 
it is enough to ask ourselves the question in 
what circumstances will it be easier to reach 
agreement on the Palestine problem at the 
forth coming session of the General Assembly ? 
Will it be if the five great powers 
participate in the preparation of proposals 
and decisions, or if the Five great powers 
stand aside? It is obvious that there will be 
fewer difficulties in reaching agreement on 
the Palestine question at the next regular 
session of the General Assembly if the Five 
powers take part in the preparation of the 
relevant recommendations for the General 
Assembly".^^ 
The proposal of Soviet Union was supported by Poland 
and was opposed by U.K. At the close of the debate on the 
two resolutions, the First Committee at its fifty seventh 
meeting adopted the amended American Resolution. This 
excluded the permanent members of the security council and 
the membership of the committee swelled to eleven. The 
General Assembly on May 15, 1947, appointed the following 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid., Vol. Ill, pp.345-46. 
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states to the United Hations special committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP): Australia, Canada, CHechoslovakia, Guetemala, 
India, Iran, the Hetherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and 
Yugoslavia. •* After solving the problem of the composition 
of the special committee, the first committee turned its 
attention to the formulation of its terms of reference. 
Having failed to get their proposal Agenda item 
included on the agenda of the special Session and failing in 
the prevention of the creation of the committee of inquiry 
the Arabs concentrated their efforts on the terms of 
reference of the UNSCOP The Arabs strove to prevent UNSCOP 
from examining the Jewish displaced persons situation in 
Europe and Jewish immigration into Palestine, because these 
problems, the Arabs contended, had no connection with the 
Palestine problem. The Egyptian delegate, Mol-imoud Hassan 
Pasha told the committee: 
I do not see why we should complicate the 
question of Palestine by stepping on the 
rights of the original inhabitants of that 
country and allowing an invasion by an alien 
racial group. It is my belief.... that the 
question of Palestine is independent of the 
question of the displaced persons. 
14, Ibid., Vol.1, pp.176-77. 
15. Ibid., Vol. Ill, p.186. 
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On the question of independence of Palestine, 
Mr. Hassan informed the Committee that: 
It is most unjust and clearly opposed to the 
Charter of the United Nations, to single out 
Palestine from among all of the countries of 
the world and make its independence 
conditional upon the Jews becoming a majority 
against the wishes of the present majority of 
Palestinians. 
The Syrian delegation headed Mr. Faris EL khouri told 
the committee, "The question of Palestine is altogether 
independent and separate from the question of persecuted 
persons in Europe. The Arabs of Palestine are not 
responsible in any way for the persecution of the Jews in 
1 7 Europe." Mr, Charles Malik representing the Lebanese 
delegation shared the same feelings as those of Egypt and 
Syria. Mr, Malik observed: 
It is very unfortunate that we constantly link 
these two problems together,either by 
implication or by direct mention, namely, the 
problem of Palestine on the one hand and the 
problem of the refugees and displaced persons 
on the other. I think if we continue to do 
that, we are giving further indications to our 
committee beyond our terms of reference from 
the General Assembly. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Ibid., pp.184-85 
18. Ibid., p.285. 
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There views were opposed by the Jewish agency. The 
Jewish agency considered the problem of Jewish immigration 
to be the heart of the problem and as such it must be 
considered by the committee Mr. M. Shertok informed members 
of the First Committee that be favored the United States 
Government proposed for including the displaced persons 
situation on the agenda. According to Mr. Shertok the 
relevant paragraph should read, "That the committee shall 
bear in mind the principle that independence for the 
population of Palestine should be the ultimate purpose of 
any plan for the future of that country and shall study 
various other issues connected with the problem of 
19 Palestine. 
After the conclusion of the general debate before the 
first committee on the terms of reference of UNSCOP, voting 
began on the specific wording of these terms as included in 
the Unites States resolution. The other resolution submitted 
before the Committee by Argentina was withdrawn. 
TVie Vote taken on the paragraph that would permit the 
UNSCOP to visit refugee camps in Europe was adopted by a 
19. Ibid., p.180. 
20. Ibid., p.321. 
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vote of 36 in favor, 8 against and 4 obsetentions. The 
proposal of the Arab states that the question of Palestine 
was one in itself, did not receive the necessary vote for 
its passage. When the next paragraph, which read: "The 
special committee shall prepare a report to the general 
Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider 
appropriate for the solution of Palestine" was next brought 
to vote, the delegations from India and the Soviet Union 
submitted amendments that would add the words".... including 
a proposal on the question of establishing without delay the 
independent democratic state of Palestine. These 
amendments were defeated. Supporting the amended draft 
resolution were the Arab states, the Soviet block, 
Afghanistan, India and Turkey while 26 voted against it, 12 
abstained.^^ 
The Arab states reacting to the outcome of the vote in 
the General Assembly declared that they would vote in the 
General Assembly against the terms of reference of UNSCOP as 
adopted in the first committee. In a brief statement before 
the committee. El Khouri explained why the syrian delegation 
intended to vote against the terms of reference as adopted 
in the committee: 
21. Ibid., p.310. 
22. Ibid., pp.312-13. 
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The reason is that a definite proposal for the 
independence of Palestine was detected by a 
great majority, and that another proposal to 
the effect that the solution should be based 
on the preaunble of the charter of the United 
Nations, and the Covenant of the League of 
Nations was also over looked. 
In a nut shell, the first committee had not included 
the question of Palestine's independence in the instructions 
to ONSCOP and that group had complete freedom to go any 
where to study entire Palestine problem, specifically 
Zionist point of view. 
The General Assembly received the recommendations of 
the First Committee and before the vote on the 
recommendations was taken the delegate from Egypt expressed 
his opinion that he would vote against the committees 
report. He said, " The decisions reached by the First 
Committee are not in line with the legal and political 
remedies believed necessary by us to a just and lasting 
solution of the Palestine problem".^* The other Arab 
representatives supported Mr. Mohmoud Hassan Pasha of Egypt. 
23. Ibid., p.360. 
24. Ibid., Vol.1, p.145 
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When the delegates finished explaining the Arab position, 
the recommendations of the First Committee were put to a 
vote. It was adopted by a vote of 45 for, 7 against, 1 
abstention and 2 absent.*' 
The resolution adopted by the General Assembly provided 
that, (1) a committee of Inquiry composed of eleven states 
was to be established; (2) the committee was given the power 
to investigate ail issues connected with the Palestine 
problem and submit its recommendations to the General 
Assembly no later than Sept 1947; and (3) the committee was 
given Freedom to examine the problem of displaced persons in 
Europe and any other issues connected with the Palestine 
26 problem. 
25. Ibid, p.176. 
Voted in favour: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, 
Brasil, Byelorussion S.S.R., Cananda, Chile, China, 
Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
Dominicem Republic, Equador, El-Salvador, 
Ethiopia,France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, 
India, Iran, Liberia, Luxemburg, Mexico, the 
Netheralands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian S.S.R., 
U.S.S.R., Union of South Africa, U.K., U.S.A., Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Yugoslavia. 
Against: Afghanistan, Egupt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Turkey. 
Abstention: Siam. 
Absent: Haiti, Philipine Republic. 
26, Ibid., pp.175-76 Resolution 106 (S-I) May 15, 1947, 
Q 78 
Another resolution was put forward before closing of 
the session of General Assembly, It included an amendment 
proposed by the representative from EL Salvador that added 
the phrase "the inhabitants of Palestine". This resolution, 
which asked all the concerned parties in the region: 
to refrain, pending action by the General 
Assembly on the report of the Special 
Committee on Palestine from the threat or the 
use of force or any other action which might 
create an atmosphere prejudicial to an early 
27 
settlement of the question of Palestine." 
This was passed with no opposition, though the Arab 
states abstained. Following the vote on the resolution, 
governments of the eleven states which comprised the UNSCOP 
communicated the appointment of their representatives. The 
members of the UNSOP included the representative of 
Guatemala, Garcia Granados, who was considered to have a 
pro Zionist sympathy. In this regard he had the support of 
the representative of Uruguay. 
The Arabs had virtually lost every point in the first 
phase of the battle . The Arab frame of mind was reflected 
27. Ibid., pp.173-740. 
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in the newspapers throughout the Arab states. The Jordanian 
daily, Feiestin, wrote in its editorial: "Our defeat at the 
U.N.O. was complete but defeat here is a figure of 
speech; what was actually defeated was right and justice, 
while the Atlantic Charter failed and the consciences of 
pa 
Europe and America were bankrupted." 
Most of the Arabs press reflected the view that the 
defeat of the Arab proposals was a result of an Anglo-
American conspiracy in which the United States took active 
part. An editorial in Al- Difa said: " The Arabs fought very 
hard to explain to all world government the tragedy of 
Palestine, but Arab efforts were in vain in the face of the 
well contrived Anglo-Zionist (or rather Anglo American) 
conspiracy, because its foundation was established by the 
hated Balfour Declaration aod the Mandate. "^ ^ Ash-Sha'b 
commented that the greatest influence on the formation of 
the fact-finding committee was that of the British and 
28. Feiestin (Jordan), May 19, 1947. As cited by Z. 
Hamadan, A Study of the ARab Israeli Conflict in the 
Urtited Nations During the period between 1947 Untill 
1957 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Union Graduate School, 
1976). p.39-
29. Al-Difia (Jordan), May 16, 1947. As cited by Z. 
Hamadan no.28, p.51. 
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Americans. TViose same countries restricted the terms of 
"id 
reference. 
The Arab states had gone to the United Nations with the 
idea that the concepts and morals that were ingrained in the 
Charter of the United Nations would at least guarantee them 
a fair opportunity to persuade other nations that their 
cause was just. The Arab states attempted to dissuade the 
General Assembly of the necessity to have another fact 
finding commission and tried to get the point across that 
the real issue was whether or-not-the Arab inhabitants were 
to be deprived of their homeland in Palestine through 
increased Jewish immigration. Al-Difa said that the Arab 
states: 
were not surprised of Britain's attitude in 
preparing its own favorable atmosphere for the 
special session and then staying in a comer 
watching her plot hatch, nor the American 
attitude which had embraced the Zionist cause 
over since it ... saw an easy way for American 
power to penetrate the Arab would ...but what 
30. Ash-Shab, As cited by Z. Hamdan no.28, p.51. 
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did cause astonishment was the statement by 
Gromyko ... setting the principles of his 
country and the Nations at a cheap price 
to disturb the atmosphere of the Middle East, 
since disturbance serves the Russian 
interests. "^  And later, Gromyko... appeared to 
be exactly like the representatives of the 
32 imperialist states. 
The Arabs also emphasized that the fact of Jews being 
displaced persons in Europe was regrettable, but certainly 
was not relevant to a solution of the Palestine problem. 
They further drove the point home that if a fact finding 
body were appointed investigation of Jewish problems in any 
place other than Palestine was not appropriate. And 
certainly not the least important was the Arab attempt to 
have the General Assembly place their proposal that the 
British mandate be immediately ended on the agenda. 
The defeat on all counts at this first placement of the 
Arab problem before the United Nations gave the Arabs cause 
to feel that the United Nations was not a fair tribunal 
where principles above predominated, but was instead an 
organisation dominated by the Major powers. 
31. Al-Difa, May 16, 1947. As cited by Z. Hamadan, no.28, 
pp.51-52. 
32. Ibid-, May 20, 1947. 
33. Arab News Bulletin, 11.6 (Junezi, 1947), p.4. As cited 
by Z. Hamadan, n.28, p.53. 
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Vflnile "the Arabs had tried parliamentary procedures 
which could have gained them their legitimate support, they 
suffered from the lack of skilled diplomats serving on the 
delegation from the Arab states, and also from naivete. On 
the other hand, the Zionists had obviously mobilized 
sufficient support in the big countries which would 
subsequently influence the smaller countries, to win the 
extremely important first round. Had the Arabs succeeded in 
having the UNSCOP consider the question of immediate 
independence of Palestine, then the Arab majority would be 
able to make it an Arab state. Had the Arabs succeeded in 
having the UNSCOP from outside issues euad had them make 
their recommendations based on the facts relevant to 
Palestine alone, the result may not have ended as it did. 
However, the result of the first special session of the 
United Nations Organisations over held had been a complete 
victory for the Zionists. Every pointer that they had held 
out before the session had been followed. The terms of 
reference of UNSCOP did not include the issue of 
independence of Palestine; Britain and Arab States were not 
included in the composition of UNSCOP. The U.S.S.R. and its 
allies of the East European countries had underwritten the 
idea of partition and setting up a Jewish state; the posture 
of the U.S. delegation had met with their approval. 
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The very composition of UNSCOP was most favourable to 
the Zionists. 01 the twelve States represented, the 
governments of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia would follow 
Moscows lead; those of Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay were 
already sympathetic to Zionist state scheme; and Zionism was 
not without influence in the Netherlands and Sweden. 
The Onited Nations Special Committee On Palestine 
UNSCOP arrived in Jerusalem in mid June of 1947. Its 
first request was that the Government of Palestine and the 
Jewish Agency appoint liaison officers. Mr. D.C. 
MacGillivray was assigned to represent the while Aubrey 
S, Eban and David Horowitz served as liaison officers for 
the Jewish Agency. Concurrent with its arrival in 
Palestine, the UNSCOP body received a cable from the 
secretary General of the U.N. advising them of the decision 
of the Arab Higher Committee to abstain from collaboration 
with UNSCOP on the grounds that the committee from the U.N. 
was predisposed toward favoring a Zionist solution. The 
Higher Committee declared further that the natural rights of 
the Palestinian people were selfevident and based on the 
34. UN Document A/364, UNSCOP Report, 1947, Vol.11, p.5, 
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principles of the United Nations Charter ... as such they 
need not be subject to another investigation. Furthermore, 
the Arabs were angry that the UNSCOP had rejected to demands 
of other Arab states that the problems of Palestine and the 
Jewish refugees be separated. The Higher Committee even 
organised a general strike for the day of the arrival of 
UNSCOP in Palestine to show the profound feelings. The Arab 
League and governments of the Arab states tried to persuade 
the Higher Committee to change its contrary attitude, for 
the intractable position that the higher Committee was 
developing would be "poor propaganda" and would hurt the 
overall Arab cause. 
The Arab Higher Committee however refused to appear 
before UNSCOP, the Chairman of the UNSCOP appealed for full 
cooperation in a broadcast on June 16,1947: 
I cannot put it too strongly that this 
committee has come to Palestine with an open 
mind. Our membership represents eleven 
different countries elected by the General 
Assembly, no one of which has any concern with 
the Palestine Question, but each of which 
shares the general concern for its equitable 
Fred J. Khouri, The Arab Israeli Dil<sinma (S7»tt.c^ w,mt). 
pp.45-46. 
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solution. We are impartial on this problem and 
we intend to make an impartial report to the 
General Assembly . We come without bias. We 
have reached no conclusions in advance and we 
will reach none until we are in possession of 
the necessary information. Indeed, the work of 
this committee begins here.*' 
Three weeks later, ONSCOP decided to follow up the 
appeal by its chairman with a letter asking the Arab Higher 
Committee to reconsider its decision of non-cooperation.^ 
Jamal el-Husseini, Vice Chairman of the Arab Higher 
Committee on July 10, 1947, replied. He stated that the Arab 
Higher committee found no reason to change its previous 
decision. In contrast to the Palestinian Arab position, 
the other Arab states wanted to cooperate with UNSCOP as did 
the Jewish Agency. 
The UNSCOP interviewed the representatives of the 
Palestine Government in the hope of obtaining information 
that would be helpful in reaching some conclusions. In 
keeping with the a declar>^ .d British position, no official 
on 
recommendations for a solution were offered. 
36. UNSCOP Report, 1947, Vol. II, p.5 
37. Ibid.,p.6. 
38. Ibid. 
39. Ibid., Vol. IV, Annex B, pp.1-13. 
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After the representative of the Palestine Government 
there came the Jewish Agency. Its representatives gave their 
position to UNSCOP as follows: 
(a) That Palestine be established as a Jewish commonwealth 
integrated in the structure of the democratic world 
(b) That the gates of Palestine be opened to Jewish 
immigration. 
(c) That the Jewish Agency be vested with the control of 
immigration into Palestine and the necessary authority for 
the upbuilding of the country. 
Many Jewish organisation in Palestine and throughout 
the rest of the world submitted written or oral statements 
to the UNSCOP agreeing with the Jewish Agency for Palestine 
that the British mandate should be ended inimediately and a 
Jewish state created. There were, however, difference of 
opinion between those who demanded that the whole of 
Palestine become a Jewish state, and those who are prepared 
to accept partition provided the territory assigned to the 
Jewish State was large enough to permit the settlement of a 
40. Ibid., 1, p.40. 
387 
large number of new immigrants.- There was also a third 
faction which advocated a binational state with equal 
political rights for the two communities regardless of their 
respective sizes. Dr. Magnes, a leader of this faction, 
warned that partition would simply continue Arab claims on 
the land awarded to the Jews and result in war. He contended 
tViat: 
Upon the basis of experience of the past 
twenty five years ..., Arab-Jewish cooperation 
has never been made the chief objective of 
major policy, either by the mandatory 
government, by the Jewish Agency, or by those 
representing the Arabs. Arab-Jewish 
relationship is the main political problem 
which one has to face ...This is the Kernel of 
A 0 
the problem. 
UNSCOP could not hear the Arab point of view from the 
Arab Higher Committee, so it decided to invite the Arab 
States to a private meeting to express their views on the 
Palestine question. Before the committee arrived in Lebanon, 
a set of questions was forwarded to Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, 
41. Ibid. 
42. Ibid., IV, Annex B, pp.195-96. 
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Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen for a written answer. Since 
Jordan was not a member of the United Nations, she did not 
send a representative to the proposed meeting but instead 
welcomed the committee to visit Jordan to hear her views on 
the problem. 
UNSCOP met with the representatives of the Arab 
States in Lebanon on July 23, 1947. It is worth noting 
that the Arabs had held a preliminary meeting and had 
decided to submit one joint answer to each question asked 
them by UNSCOP. One of the questions asked which solution to 
the Palestine problem would be favored by the Arab States. 
It provided three choices: 
(a) A binational state with a limited immigration 
(b) A Federal state, comprising two or more part states, 
each having the power to determine whether or not 
immigration would take place 
(c) Partition, involving establishment of a new state, or 
the establishment of a bridgehead. 
The Arab States, as well as the Arab Higher Committee 
of Palestine rejected all these solutions because the 
establishment of a new state, or the establishment of a 
43. Ibid., IV, p.42 
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bridgehead, would be incompatible with their own rights. 
The Arab states informed UNSCOP that the creation of a 
Jewish State in Palestine would endanger the other Arab 
states. Mr. Hamid Frangie of Lebanon summarized the Arab 
fears for the creation of such a state in Palestine by 
informing the committee that: 
A Jewish state however small would constitute 
a danger for the Arab world both from the 
interior and the exterior. From the interior 
it would create friction, exert a certain 
economic pressure and would gradually 
infiltrate in order to create disorder. From 
the exterior a Jewish state would constitute a 
bridgehead against the Arab world.'*^  
In answering another question concerning the partition 
of Palestine by the United Nations, the Lebanese Foreign 
Minister, as the Arab spokesman, declared: " It was never 
the intention of the Charter to agree to a partition of the 
country I think this would be absolutely against all the 
principles of the Charter.' 
44. Ibid. 
45. Ibid., p.39. 
46. Ibid., p.41. 
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Ori July 25, seven members of the UNSCOP visited Amman, 
to talk with king Abdullah and his Prime Minister about the 
Palestine problem. The king's views and those of the 
Jordanian Government were essentially the same as those 
presented by the other Arab states in Lebanon. . 
The view of the Arab States that were given to UNSCOP 
were summarized as follows 
(a) Palestine should be a unitary state, with a 
democratic constitution and an elected assembly. 
(b) That the constitution should provide inter alia 
guarantee-^ for : 
(i) the sanctity of the holy place.6 and, subject to 
suitable safeguards, freedom of religious practice in 
accordance with the status ; (ii) full civil rights for 
all Palestine citizens, the naturalization requirement being 
ten years residence in the country ; (iii) protection of 
religions and cultural rights of the Jewish community, such 
safeguards to be altered only with the consent of the 
majority of the Jewish members in the legislative assembly. 
47. Jorge Garcia Grandos, The Birth of Israel (New York, 
1948), pp.190-91, pp.208-10. 
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(c) That the constitution should provide also for (i) 
adequate representation in the legislative assembly of all 
important communities, provided that the Jews would in no 
case exceed one third of the total number of members; (ii) 
the strict prohibition of Jewish immigration and the 
continuation of the existing restrictions on land transfer, 
any change in these matters requiring the consent of 
majority of the Arab members of the Legislative Assembly 
(iii) the establishment of a Supreme Court which would be 
empowered to determine whether any legislation was 
inconsistent with the constitution. In advance of its 
meeting in Geneva, UNSCOP dispatched a sub committee headed 
by Mr. Hood, the Australian Representative, to examine the 
conditions of the Jewish displaced persons in Austria and 
Germany. 
After four months of studying reports, documents and 
memoranda, holding hearings with individuals and groups, and 
making field trips to observe conditions, UNSCOP submitted 
its report on August 31, 1947.^'' Since the Committee could 
not agree among themselves on one solution to the Palestine 
48. Ibid., p.40. 
49. Ibid., pp.47-64, 42-46 
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problem, UNSCOP submitted both a majority and a minority 
report, with Australia not subscribing to either. 
Australia's position was that UNSCOPS task was not to back 
any specific proposal, but only to present the various 
alternatives with their advantages and disadvantages, and 
then leave the final decision to the General Assembly, based 
on the merits of the opposing solutions.^ 
Nevertheless, in addition to proposing a solution, 
UNSCOP made eleven recommendations upon which the members 
agreed unanimously, and a twelfth recommendation to which 
Guatemala and Uruguay dissented. Among other points, the 
twelfth recommendation proposed (1) the British mandate over 
Palestine be terminated as soon as possible and the country 
be given independence at the earliest practicable date, with 
the United Nations assuming responsibility for Palestine in 
the interim, (2) provision be made for safeguarding the Holy 
places; (3) the General Assembly find a solution to the 
Jewish refugees in Europe by international action which 
should be aimed toward immediate alleviation of the plight 
of the Palestine problem; (4) solution of the Palestine 
50. Khouri, n.35, p.47. 
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problem not to be considered as a solution to the entire 
Jewish problem. 
Following the twelve recommendations UNSCOP presented 
its majority plan for the Palestine state with economic 
union between the halves. The members supporting this 
solution were from Canada, Chechoslovakia, Guatemala, the 
Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay. The plan provided for 
the division of Palestine into an independent Arab State and 
an independent Jewish State. The Jerusalem Bethlehem enclave 
was to be placed under an international trusteeship 
administered by the U.N. The two states would be linked 
together by an economic union which would have common 
currency, custom union etc. The division would not take 
place until September I, 1949, and Britain would continue to 
administer the Mandate during the transition period. To 
gain Britains acquiescence, the majority plan provided that 
Britain should continue its administration "an such 
conditions sind subject to such supervision. " as might be 
51. UNSCOP Report, 1947, IV, pp.42-46. 
52. Ibid., pp.48-49. Britain had declared that she would 
terminate the mandate before September 1949, but the 
recommendation was made despite this. Moreover this was 
an indirect invitation to United States to share in the 
responsibility of implementing the partition plan, since 
the U.S. had on many occasion supported Zionist demands 
to admit 100,000 Jews to Palestine. 
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agreed upon between the United Kingdom and the United 
Nations" , and if so desired, with the assistance of one or 
more members of the United Nations"."* Another important 
point in the majprity report was that it called for the 
admission of 150,000 Jews during the transitional period. 
The boundaries of the proposed Arab State would include 
the coastal plain from Isdud to the line between Egypt and 
Palestine which existed during the Mandate period. The 
boundary would extend north to the hill country of Samaria 
and Judea, excluding Jerusalem, to Western Galilee. The 
proposal Jewish State would include eastern Galilee, the 
Esdraelon plain, most of the coastal plain, and the Negev. 
The distribution of population in the two proposed states 
had been recorded for UNSCOP'S purposes as follows: 
Jews Arabs and Total 
others 
The Jewish State 498,000 407,000 905,000 
The Arab State 10,000 725,000 735,000 
City of Jerusalem 100,000 105,000 205,000 
In addition there would be about 90,000 Bedouins in the 
Jewish State.^* 
53. Ibid., p.48-
54. Ibid., p.54. The Government of Palestine reported the 
total Jewish population in July 1947 to be 625,000. 
There also may have been a number of illegal, 
unregistered immigrants not included in this total. 
3.95 
The constitutions of both states were to include 
provision for the protection and free access to the Holy 
Places. Jewish inunigration would be permitted during the 
transition period, and for an additional period of three 
years, depending on the capacity of the country to absorb 
such refugees. The absorptive capacity would be determined 
by an international commission set up for a period of three 
years and would be composed of three Arabs, three Jews and 
three representative of the United Nations. 
The majority report did not take into consideration 
repeated Arab threats that they would oppose partition by 
all possible means. It also failed to indicate how the 
UNSCOP felt that the economic unity between the two states 
would be achieved in the face of the establishment of two 
political entities in the midst of a highly charged 
emotional atmosphere between the Arabs and the Jews. 
The minority plan suggested a single state with a 
federal structure. Supporting this plan were the 
representatives of India, Iran and Yugoslavia. The federal 
state would comprise an Arab State and a Jewish State, with 
Jerusalem as its capital. This federal state would be 
created over a transitional period of three years, during 
39f) 
which the responsibility for administering the country would 
repose in an authority designated by the United Nations. 
There would also be a federal legislature established for 
each of the Arab and Jewish states, each having control over 
all local affairs except immigration. Controls over 
immigration into the Jewish state was to be entrusted to an 
international commission composed of three representatives -
one a Palestinian Arab, one a Palestinian Jew, and third 
representing the United Nations. This commission would 
determine the absorptive capacity of the Jewish state 
"having due regard for the rights of the population then 
present within that state and for their anticipated natural 
rate of increase". ^  
It was assumed that the minority report, like the 
majority report would not be opposed by the concerned 
parties in Palestine. Consequently neither report made 
concrete suggestions for handing any violent opposition as 
the special session, and despite the recalcitrant attitude 
of the Arab Higher Committee. The Arabs apparently still 
thought that they would be able to persuade those 
55- Ibid., pp.60-64 
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responsible for making recommended solutions on the problem 
that their side was stronger and deserved a favourable 
response. 
After the recommendations of the UNSDOP were made 
public, the reaction of the Arab states was universal in 
denouncing the report. The Lebanese Prime Minister said: 
the logic evaded the true facts in the 
matter... Arab states will utilise all 
diplomatic means, whether inside the United 
Nations, or inside other interriational 
organisations, to convince Zionist supporters 
of the futility of their support. If 
international methods fails, the Arab states 
will not hesitate to use other means to 
eradicate this danger.... ' ° 
The Secretary General of the Arab League was reported 
to say "The Arab States refuse to accept the recommendations 
of the United Nations special committee....merely a decision 
twisting the facts of Palestine in favor of the Zionist 
minority. '"^ 
The Political Committee of the Arab League met in 
Lebanon and issued the following communique: 
56. Al-Ahram (Cairo), September 14, 1947 Quoted in 
Z. Hamadan, p.28, p.70. 
57. Al-Ahram September 16, 1947, Quoted in Z. Haunadan, 
n.28, p.70. 
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Th« Poli-fciaal Commi-ttee considers the 
recommendations of UNSCOP are contrary to the 
natural rights of the Palestinian Arabs.. 
implementation of the recommendations would 
endanger peace and security not only in 
Palestine, but in the other Arab States as 
well... Committee decided to fight 
implementation by all effective practical 
means, as well as any other solution that 
might be devised which did not ensure 
independence of Palestine as an Arab state ... 
Arabs of Palestine will never surrender to any 
solution which deprives them of their homeland 
or destroys its unity...they will fight a 
fierce, fight to defend them country 
especially when they know that the Arab states 
will stand behind them with men, money and 
ammunition.... 
The Arab leaders referred to preferably taking action 
through the United Nations or some other international body, 
and that the other threatened action will be taken only if 
the diplomatic attempts fail. It would seem that at this 
state the Arab states were still confident that they could 
gain their way through the medium of United Nations. 
58. Al-Ahram, September 21, 1947. As quoted in Z. Hamadan, 
p.n.28, p.71. 
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The DNSCOP Report before the Ad hoc CooBiiittee 
The General Assembly opened its session in September 
1947 with an agenda which included the UNSCOP report. The 
check question of Palestine which had been submitted to the 
first special session in April, and a new joint proposal of 
the Arab states for the "Termination of the Mandate over 
Palestine and the Recognition of its independence as one 
state." Before the General Assembly examined the Palestine 
question in detail, it referred it to the General Committee 
for recommendation. That Committee recommended the 
establishment of and AD HOC committee to study the 
recommendations of UNSCOP and report to the [Assembly its 
owri recommendations. WVien the General Assembly considered 
forming such an AD HOC committee delegations from two Arab 
States opposed the recommendation. The Arab opposition was 
based on their deeply felt apprehension that external 
pressure could be mobilized within the United Nations 
against such a committee and that their cause would be 
greatly endangered. The Iraqi delegate opposed the 
establisl-iment of an AD HOC committee and proposed instead 
that the Palestine problem be considered in the political 
59 
committee. ^^  Supporting his colleague, the delegate from 
Lebanon declared'. 
59- General Assembly Official Records, Second Session, 1947, 
Vol.1, pp.272-73. 
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I want to state frankly another consideration 
which wories us; that is, that if you set 
aside a special committee to consider this 
problem, we feel that it is more possible to 
have certain pressure groups exert their 
influence to the maximum upon such a special 
coRonittee than if the question were dealt with 
by the Political Committee which would, at the 
same time, be examining all the other 
important questions. 
But despite Arab opposition, the General Assembly on 
the same day set up an AD HOC committee on the Palestine 
question consisting of all members of the Assembly. AD HOC 
committee elected H.V. Evatt of Australia as its Chairman, 
and decided as one of the first orders of business to invite 
both the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency of 
Palestine to be present at its deliberations. On its agenda, 
the committee had three items; (1) question of Palestine as 
proposed by the United Kingdom (2) report of UNSCOP; (3) 
termination of the Mandate over Palestine and recognition of 
its independence as a unitary state, as proposed by Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia. 
The representative of the Arab Higher Committee was 
invited to give his views before the AD HOC committee, and 
61. Ibid., p.275, 
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he rejected both the majority and minority recommendations 
for a solution as unworkable and unacceptable to the Arabs 
of Palestine. Instead, he proposed a general plan for a 
CO 
unitary independent state of Palestine ....Arab of course." 
The delegation from the Arab States, themselves also 
rejected both the majority and minority solutions of the 
UNSCOP declaring that both such plans violated the Charter 
of the United Nations and the inherent right of a people to 
self determination. The Arab States also supported the 
demands of the Higher Committee on October 4, 1947, The 
Lebanese representative informed the committee that the 
British Government*. " Had no right to dispose of a country 
over which it had no jurisdiction. From the standpoint of 
international morality, the Balfour Declaration was 
completely without foundation and that the fact it had been 
incorporated into the mandate for Palestine did not give it 
e "J 
any added validity. The delegate from Lebanon also cited 
prior British statements that the British Government had not 
intended to create a Jewish state in Palestine.^* As f ar as 
62, Ad hoc Committee on the Palestine Question. Summary 
Records of the third meeting, A/Ac, 14/Ac. 14/SR 3 of 
September 30, 1947, p.7. 
63, Ad hoc Committee, Fourth meeting, October 4, 1947, p.4 
64, Command (Cmd) 1700, 1922. 
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the UNSCOP report went, the Lebanese delegate, Mr., Chamoun, 
said that the majority plan would create friction instead of 
bringing a solution to the Palestine problem. In particular, 
Chamoun, said that the the distribution of territories for 
the two proposed states was unequal, that the area of the 
proposed Jewish state was six thousand square miles, while 
that of the Arabs was only about four thousand square miles. 
He feet the figure 407,000 given for the Arab population in 
the proposed Jewish state should properly be 500,000" Mr. 
CViamoun continued by stating that according to the majority 
plan proposed by UNSCOP: 
In the Arab State, the Jewish minority would 
be small (8,000 to 10,000) while in the Jewish 
state the Arab population would be the same or 
even greater than that of Jews. In settling 
the frontiers and the compositions of the two 
proposed states, the majority of the Special 
Committee had given all the advantages to the 
Jews without thought of the subjection of the 
Arabs in the future Jewish state.^° 
65. Ad hoc Committee, fifth meeting, p.4. 
66. Ibid. 
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The Saudi-Arabian representative, Amir Faisal blamed 
Great Britain, the Unites States and the United Nations for 
complicating the Palestine problem. He declared that Great 
Britain was at fault over the turn of events in Palestine", 
"because of her encouragement of Jewish immigration and her 
67 failure to respect promises made to the Arabs." Regarding 
the United States, the Saudi Arabian representative asked 
why the American government would not allow the Jewish 
refuges into its own country. He also criticised those 
American congressmen and other officials who advocated the 
admission of an unlimited number of immigrants into 
Palestine without first taking into consideration and 
68 
consulting the Arab population." Amir Faisal also 
criticised those United Nations members who had declared 
that the partition would solve the Palestine problem, 
while such a solution "would create a grave precedent for 
religions minorities and political groups to make similar 
claims". 
Now all of this general debate was taking place before 
the General Assembly in its guise as the Ad Hoc Committee. 
67. Ibid., fifteenth meeting, p.l 
68. Ibid. 
69. Ibid. 
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Nevertheless, since the question was an emotional one, the 
chairman continued to h^ar testimony after testimony 
bearing on the issue. The United States, for example, 
announced her support of the majority report of UNSCOP, with 
certain modifications. These modifications included more 
constitutional guarantees and a few territorial 
modifications. Mr. Hershel V. Johnson stressed the United 
States' conviction that the responsibility for keeping law 
and order in Palestine still would reside in the Mandatory 
power. He briefly referred to the problem of implementing 
the majority view by asserting the American Government's 
willingness to participate in any effortrs initiated by the 
United Nations to solve the conflict that might arise, 
either through contributing money, or in meeting the need 
for keeping internal law and order during the transition 
period. Towards the latter end, Mr. Jolrmson suggested a 
special constabulary or police force recruited on a 
71 
volunteer basis by the United Nations Two days later the 
Soviet Union declared agreement with the United States on 
the proposed solution to the Palestine problem including 
70. Jaffa, for example, was proposed to be included in the 
Arab State. 
71. Ad hoc Committee, 11th meeting, p.3. 
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partition. Mr. Tsarapkin informed the AD HOC committee that 
because Arab-Jewish relations had greatly deteriorated, it 
"had become impossible to reconcile their points of view on 
the solution to this problem; and the minority's proposal 
therefore appeared impracticable. Thus the partition 
proposed by the majority offered more hope of realization" 
The Jewish Agency rejected the minority plan, and also, 
and announced its acceptance of UNSCOPS majority proposal, 
which provided for partition, subject to certain 
territorial and other modifications. Elaborating on the 
Jewish Agency's view point concerning the recommendation of 
UNSCOP, Rabbi Abba Hilie1 Silver told the AD HOC committee 
that on behalf of the Jewish Agency, he approved, with one 
exception the committees eleven unanimous 
73 
recommendations. The exception was recommendation six 
which had to do with Jewish displaced persons. Rabbi Silver 
stated that the Jewish Agency did not disapprove this 
recommendation, but it would like to call attention to the 
"intense urge" of the majority of these displaced persons to 
72. Ibid., 12th Meeting, p.2. 
73. Ad hoc Committee, 4th meeting, p.4 
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go to Palestine. Rabbi Silver said the Jewish Agency did not 
accept the solution advanced by the minority report 
because," though it called them States, it actually made 
provision only for semi-autonomous cantous or provinces. 
Palestine would be an Arab state with Jewish enclaves, the 
Jews-would be frozen in the position of a permanent minority 
in the federal state, and would not even have control over 
their own fiscal policies or immigration." 
Regarding the majority proposal of UNSCOP, the 
representative of the Jewish Agency declared that; 
The Majority proposals did not satisfy the 
Jewish people. The Balfour Declaration, 
according to Mr. Llyod George, the then Prime 
Minister, implied that the whole of Palestine, 
including Tranjordan, should ultimately 
because of Jewish state. Yet TransJordan was 
cut off from Palestine in 1922 and later set 
up as an Arab Kingdom, and now a second Arab 
state was to be carved out of the remainder of 
the country; finally, the Jewish National Home 
would represent less than one aside for it. 
Such a sacrifice should not be asked of the 
Jewish people. 
74. Ibid., p.5. 
75. Ibid. 
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However, Rabbi Silver told the committee that the 
Jewish Agency would accept the partition as recommended by 
the majority plan as a lesser evil, subject to further 
discussion of constitutional and territorial provisions. 
WVien the Ad HOC committee convened for its nineteenth 
session, it decided to close the general debate. The 
Chairman, Mr. Evatt, decided to create three sub committees 
to make a detailed study of the findings of UNSCOP and 
report on them. 
The first committee was composed of nine pro-partition 
states and was delegated the task of drawing up a detailed 
plan that would support the UNSCOP majority proposal. 
Because the Arab Higher Committee again refused an 
annotation to attend the sub-committees meetings, while the 
Jewish Agency accepted - the deliberation and final report 
77 of the sub-committee were biased and completely one-sided. 
The second sub-committee was composed of five Arab 
States, pro-Arab Pakistan and Afghanistan and neutral 
Colombia. This group was given the responsibility of drawing 
76. Ibid., p.6. 
77. EChouri, n.35, p. 48 
m 
up a scheme for a single, unified Palestine. Both Arab 
members and Colombia complained that the subcommittee only-
represented opposite view points and requested that 
uncommitted states be added to each group to help find some 
middle ground that might permit a compromise agreement. When 
the Chairman, Mr Evatt, ignored the requests Colombia 
withdrew from the sub-committee, leaving only the Arabs and 
78 Pro Arabs as members. 
The third subcommittee had the task of conciliating the 
two opponents, but it did not function at all. No group was 
set up to study the UNSCOP minority report, or any other 
possible solution at all. With the nonactivity of the third 
sub-committee,the General Assembly was to be advised by two 
prejudiced sub-committees representing the opposite poles of 
79 possible solution. 
The second sub-committee's report contained three 
proposals, and was perhaps not as one sided as the report of 
the first committee. The proposals were, first, that the 
General Assembly ask for an advisory opinion from the 
78. Ibid. 
79. Ibid., p.49. 
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international Court of Justice on the legal questions 
concerning the League of Nation's mandate and the United 
Nations competence to act in the case; the second proposal 
concerned the settlement of Jewish problem; and the third 
proposal called for the establishment of a unitary 
government in Palestine. 
The Ad-HOC committee first considered the proposals of 
the second sub-committee. At the thirty second meeting of 
the Ad Hoc committee on November 25, 1947, the votes were 
taken. The first draft resolution, or proposal, which asked 
for an advisory opinion from the International Court was 
voted upon in two parts. The first part was rejected by a 
vote of 18 for , 25 against, with 11 abstentions.°^ The 
second part was that which would ask the International Court 
of Justice to rule " whether the United Nations or any of 
its members, is competent to enforce or recommend the 
enforcement of any proposal concerning the constitution and 
in particular, any plan of partition which is contrary to 
the wishes, or adopted without the consent of the 
80. Ad hoc Committee, 23 Meeting, p.3 
81. Ibid., 32 meeting, pp.2-3. 
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inhabitants of Palestine," This proposal was also rejected 
by a vote of 21 to 20, with 13 abstentions.^^ 
The voting and the narrow margin on the last question 
reveals that those states voting for it doubted the legality 
of the partition plan. The second draft proposal was 
originally voted on paragraph by paragraph and failed. The 
proposal accordingly was amended and resubmitted for 
consideration. The amended draft proposal received 16 votes 
for, 16 against, and 26 abstentions. Because of the tie 
vote, they agreed to include the proposal in its report to 
83 the General Assembly. The third draft proposal concerning 
the independent unitary state of Palestine was defeated by a 
84 
vote of 13 to 29, with 14 abstentions. 
After disposing of the proposals that tended to favour 
the Arab-side, the Ad HOC committee moved to consider the 
recommendation of the first subcommittee, which called for 
the partition plan with economic union. The committee voted 
to adopted a series of amendment, the most important of 
which was to leave the decision to the General Assembly to 
82. Ibid., p.3. 
83. Ibid., pp.4-6. 
84. Ibid., p.6. 
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select the conunission to implement its recommendations, in 
place of the Five nation commission already designated. The 
amended draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 25 for, 13 
against, and 17 mabstentions. °^  This simple majority vote 
was sufficient to adopt the partition resolution in the Ad 
HOC committee, but for the resolution to pass in the 
General Assembly it would be necessary that it receive a two 
thirds majority vote. 
The outcome of the votes before the ad Hoc committee 
could only be viewed as another setback for the Arabs, at 
the same time representing a significant triumph for the 
Zionists and their supporters. The delegations from the Arab 
states protested against the partition resolution on the 
grounds that it was impractical, unjust and against the 
charter of the United Nations. The fact that the Ad Hoc 
committee adopted the partition resolution undoubtedly was 
the big step in achieving Zionist aims in Palestine, The 
first Zionist objective had been the recognition of the 
"National Home" in Palestine which in their view meant an 
independent state. The second objective was the recognition 
85. Ibid., p.3 
m 
of the Jewish Agency as the legal representative of the Jews 
in Palestine.?., Empowred to negotiate the attainment of the 
third objective ....an independent Jewish State in Palestine 
87 
recognized by the United Nations.° 
There were a number of occurrences unfavourable to the 
ARab cause. None of them were fatal of course but their 
cumulative effect certainly was enough to deal the Arabs a 
blow. This is necessary to review the actions of the Ad Hoc 
committee. In the first place, the formation of the Ad Hoc 
committee was in itself an extra ordinary occurrence, Had 
the question of the UNSCOF report been referred to the 
Political Committee, the Arabs would have had fared better. 
In the Political Committee there would have been a more 
reasoned, less emotional approach to the question than was 
the case in AD Hoc committee. In addition, the Arab states 
would not have had to face the fact of the two diametrically 
opposed subcommittees that did arise under the Ad Hoc 
committee. Further, the problem of personal feelings towards 
particular delegates influencing the opinion toward their 
parent states would not have been as likely if the Political 
86. John and Hadawi, n.3, p.247. 
87, Allan R. Tayler, Prelude to Israel: An Analysis of 
Zionist Diplomacy. 1897-1947 (London, 1981), p.102. 
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Committee were taking the action and making the 
recommendation. 
The Zionists were able to more favourably impress the 
delegates from the other nations than the Arabs were. The 
Jewish case was presented by only three members of the 
Jewish Agency, in contrast to the Arabs who had a large 
number of diverse individuals making supporting, but often 
contradictory speeches for their cause. As a result, the 
Jews were able to be direct and incisive, and put their case 
forward in a logical and reasonable manner. They based their 
claims not only the plea that Palestine had been 
historically inhabited by Jews, but also on the legal status 
of the Balfour Declaration and the British mandate. The 
Jewish spokesman made the best use of their limited time 
before the committee to impress the members that their cause 
was right. 
On the otherhand the Arabs were not more skilled as 
politicians and statesmen than they were or they would, 
perhaps, have recognized that they were belaboring their 
points and boring their listeners. In addition, had they 
been more seasoned the Arabs may have been able to avoid 
some of their blunders, such as giving an inaccurate version 
414 
of documents that were well known to many of the other 
delegates. Wlien the delegates from Egypt and Iraq stated 
that they had never accepted the British mandate as legal, 
it could be pointed out that both the countries joined the 
League of Nations and agreed to subscribe to all the 
requirements of membership, that the League of Nations had 
legally made. The British mandate ever Palestine was one 
such action that the League of Nation had legally committed. 
It was too late before either the Ad Hoc committee or the 
General Assembly for the two Arabs states to then say that 
they had registered reservations about seeing to uphold the 
mandate, for even if such reservation had been made and 
there was no evidence they had been .... it would have been 
necessary for the League of Nations to approve such 
88 
reservations before membership would be approved. 
General Assembly and the Adoption of Partition Resolution in 
its Second Session 
Inspite of serious setbacks earlier the Arabs were 
intent upon their attempt to avoid partition. Uptil now 
88. See Jacob Robinson, Pal^stjo^ and th^ Un4t^4 Nations 
(1947) Chapters XIII and XIV. 
While Jacob louds the Zionists the pinpoints every slip 
made by the Arabs in the O.N. The way the author 
portrayed the Arab action, it may be, it appeared, the 
same to the members of theU.N. at that time. 
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there had not yet been anyshow of power by the Zionists that 
would indicate that the two thirds majority required could 
be mustered by them to vote for participation. At the 
General Assembly active lobbying was on by both those 
favouring partition and by those against it. The Arab states 
needed only a few votes to prevent the decision from going 
against them. But this was perhaps the only point they could 
count on. The Zionists on the other hand, were backed by a 
substantial number of countries, including the United States 
and Russia, but had not yet gained an assured number of 
votes to win partition. 
The debate on the draft resolution passed by the Ad Hoc 
committee began on November 26,1977. The Arabs repeated 
their opposition, using generally the same arguments they 
had used before for the partition resolution not to be 
considered or adopted. Prince Saif EL Islam Abdullah of 
Yemen spoke in opposition, reminding the Assembly: 
The Arabs of Palestine have agreed to great 
the Jews in Palestine equal rights. They 
overlooked the fact that many of the Jews had 
immigrated into Palestine against the will of 
the inhabitants. They overlooked all that for 
the sake of cooperation and peace. Can anyone 
then accuse the Arabs of being unreasonable or 
arbitrarity causing a breach of peace? 
89. General Assembly, Official Records, second session, 
124th Plenary meeting, November 26, 1947, Vol. Ill, 
p.1316. 
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The Arabs seemed only to repeat the same words that had 
been used before on the floor of the General Assembly and 
make their primary move behind the scenes by trying to 
influence some of the uncommitted nations to vote against 
partition. They had yet not withdrawn from a parliamentary 
way of handling the issue. However they were beginning to 
realize the value of politicking and lobbied for votes while 
the debates were made. 
Britain, which had been quiescent during the entire 
issue, and had generally abstained from voting on all 
questions involving the Palestine problem, was willing to 
withdraw its troops and influence from Palestine in any 
event. Sir Alexander Cadgogan announced the British plan for 
withdrawl by August 1948. He further added: 
The Government of the United Kingdom does not 
consider that the Mandate required it to 
establish either the Jewish State or an Arab 
State in Palestine by force, or to coerce 
either people in the interest of the other, 
nor is it prepared now to accept suay 
responsibility which would involve the use of 
British troops as the means of enforcing a 
decision against either people. 
90. Ibid., pp.1323-24. 
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At, the penury meeting of the General Assembly, the 
attitude of the American delegation was strongly in favour 
of adopting the Ad Hoc committee resolution. The American 
delegate personally gave his support to the proposal in 
private, but not to the degree he displayed in the General 
Assembly. This luke warm support of partition may be 
attributed to the influence of the specialists in the State 
Department who emphaaiaed the American strategic . and 
economic interests in the Arab world. The Joint Chief of 
Staff were also against the partition plan for it appeared 
to them that it was most likely that the plan would result 
in armed conflict. 
With a lukewarm Ambassador to the U.N. influential 
members of the State Department being against pairtition as 
it was not supposed to be in the best interest of the 
United States in maintaining its position in the Middle 
East, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and military 
establishment against being against partition, it was 
important to know who was for it? 
91. The answer to this is that the Zionist Organisation 
mounted a spectacular propaganda effort which convinced 
the majority of American that the Jews were in right. 
m 
At the plenary meeting however Mr. Johnson stated that 
the partition plan was not "perfect in every detail", but 
that it offered" the best practical present opportunity and 
possibility of obtaining, in a future foreseeable to us now, 
a peaceful settlement in Palestine. '^  He defended the legal 
competence of the General Assembly to adopt the proposed 
resolution. He said, "the General Assembly has, in our view, 
the undoubted authority under Article 10 to discuss and make 
recommendations regarding any subject within the scope of 
the Charter, and under article 14 to recommend measures for 
the peaceful adjustment of any situation". Mr. Johnson 
explained further that although both the Arab and the Jewish 
satates clearly defined boundaries, these would be "as 
freely crossed as the boundaries which separfiite the 
individuals states and will be as friendly as the boundary 
which runs for three thousand miles between Canada and the 
United State"^^ 
The climax of the efforts coordinated between American 
officials and the Zionists began with the plenary meeting of 
92. General Assembly, Official Records, Second Session, 
124th Plenary Meeting Nov. 26, 1947, Vol. Ill, p.1325. 
93. Ibid., p.1326. 
94. Ibid., p.1327. 
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the General Assembly and culminated with the adoption of the 
partition resolution on November 29, 1947. During this 
period, "every clue was meticulously checked and pursued. 
Even the smallest or the remotest of nations was contacted 
and wooed. Nothing was left to chance." '^  The American 
delegate, with apparent instruction from White House, and 
the Zionists jointly exerted strong pressures to enlist the 
support of the majority of the UN members for the partition 
plan. To illustrate this pressure. Kermit Roosvelt wrote 
"what happened at the United Nations was a repeat 
performance of what had already happened in the United 
States. Using the same methods that had been so successful 
here, and having the United States Government to assist in 
their use there the Zionists succeeded in getting what they 
wanted." In explaining the role of the White House in the 
passage of the partition resolution, Sumner Wells, former 
Assistant Secretary of State, wrote: "By direct order of the 
WViite House, every form of pressure, direct or indirect, was 
brought to bear by American officials upon these countries 
outside of the Moslem world that were known to be either 
95. Emanuel Newman, American Zionist, February, 1953. 
96. Kermit Roosvelt, "The Partition of Palestine: A lesson 
in Pressure Politics", Middle East Journal. 11:1, 
(January, 1948), p.15. 
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uncertain or opposed to partition. Representatives or 
intermediaries were employed by the White House to make sure 
that the necessary majority would at length be secured". 
In his speech before the General Assembly, Mahmoud 
Fawzi referred to the pressure that had been put an members 
of the Ad-Hoc committee to vote in favour of the partition. 
Without mentioning the United States by name, he said: 
We have been told about the situation in which 
one of the great powers find itself, about the 
predicament in which it thinks, or perhaps 
feels, that it is entangled. We have been told 
concerning that great power, that being 
confronted with the imminence of a general 
national election, its candidates seeck the 
vote of a single component state, and that 
vote depends on the Jewish electorate of a 
single city. Thus is its policy dictated with 
regard to a Palestine which is more than five 
thousand miles away.^ 
The same day Lebanese delegate spoke in a more blunt 
fashion than his colleague from Egypt about the pressure and 
maneuvers to which United Nations members are subjected 
97. Welles Summer, We Need Not Fail. (Boston, 1948), p.63. 
98. General Assembly Official Records, second session, 124th 
meeting, November 26, 1947, Vol. Ill, p.1330. 
m 
"During the last thirty six hours". We declared further, 
that "if we were to abandon this for the tyrannical system 
of tackling delegation in a hotel room, to threaten them 
with economic sanctions or to tribe them with promises in 
order to compel them to vote one way or another, think of 
what our organization would become in the future". Later 
in his speech Mr. Camile Chamoun referred to the United 
States by name "which throughout its history has represented 
for all peoples the ideals of liberty, justice and equity. I 
am forced to note that unfortunately that giant, the United 
States,is putting on the fatal shirt of Nessus." 
The representative of Saudi Arabia Amir Faisal Al Saud, 
appealed for justice to the Palestinians and their struggle 
for independence," Prove, gentlemen ... that you are only 
for right and justice and that you are not subject to 
enticement. Prove that right, justice and the halting of 
aggression come before anything else. The small nations have 
depended on your organization to safeguard their rights and 
guarantee their safety their safety and security". ^ 
99. Ibid., p.1341. 
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m 
The Syrian delegate summed ul> Arab attitude, " We have 
voiced here the uneasiness of the Arabs in Palestine and in 
all the Arab countries. In their opinion, this plan is 
contrary to the principles of justice and to their natural 
rights, since their rights to independence are not 
questioned.^^ 
The occasion was rare when the U.S.and U.S.S.R. were to 
be on the same side in an issue. The Polish delegates paid 
tribute to their joint efforts, but when the Soviet 
delegate, Mr Gromyko, spoke, he strongly supported the 
partition plan and condemned the maneuvering behind the 
scenes for the passage of the partition proposal. 
He declared that the Soviet Union "has no inention of 
maneuvering and manipulating votes as unfortunately is done 
at the Assembly, especially in connection with the 
consideration of the Palestine question". Before the 
o^ -t General Assembly adjourned, Belgium, which had b ained from 
voting before the Ad Hoc committee announced that she would 
vote infavour of partition. Haiti, which had abstained 
102. Ibid. 
10.3. Ibid. , p. 1363. 
104. Ibid., p.1365. 
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105 before, announced her opposition to partition. General 
Romula the Philippine Foreign Minister, announced that his 
vote would be against paritition. 
TVie Arab States counted votes odt this time, and felt 
that if the vote were to be taken on -the Wednesday, November 
26, tlrt*t there was enough Arab support to prevent the two-
thirds majority needed to pass the partition resolution. 
Only one more vote in the Ad Hoc Committee would have 
constitMited the necessary number, but the Arabs were now 
confident that they had prevented the closing of that one-
vote margin and wanted an immediate vote on the issue. To 
their -iritter disappointment there was the announcement by 
the President of the Assembly that the plainned evening 
session would be cancelled and the Assembly would not meet 
on the next day, which was Thanksgiving day. Putting off the 
vote until Friday would give the American Zionist group the 
opportunity to pressure some more votes to their side, and 
the Arab delegates pleaded in vain for the planned session 
to be held. The proposal to adjourn until Friday, November 
28 was carried by a close vote, 24 to 21. The rejection 
105. Ibid., p.1354. 
106. Ibid., pp.1314-15-
107. Khouri,n.35, p.55. 
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of a vote on Partition at a session that night, was agreed 
upon after Zionist supporters found that they still lacked 
an assured two third majority, wrote Thomas J. Hamilton of 
t^ ew York Times on 13 March 1947. 
It was the United States delegation which was taking 
the lead in supporting partition and seeking to influence in 
favour of the Zionist position. The Soviet Union had, of 
course no problem in securing the solid support of the East 
European Communist governments for partititon. 
The General Assembly did adjourn, and when it 
reconvened on November 28, the Arabs guessed rightly that 
their strength diminished over the holiday. The Arabs tried 
to extend the time before the vote. Their proposal to 
consider the minority report and other alternatives which 
had not yet been considered and again on January 15, 1948, 
the report was not yet admitted, for the partition 
resolution had already been introduced and had to be voted 
on before any such proposal as they had made. Zafrullah 
Khan, the Pakistani delegate, gave a speech criticising the 
partition plan. He also referred to the pressure to which 
108. Ibid., p.56. 
n^ 
the UN members had been subjected and the inexplicable 
attitude of the American Government in not recommending that 
the Jews settle outside Palestine, and possibly in the 
United States. •'"^^ 
France proposed for a twenty four hour delay and it was 
accepted. The Arabs had a little more breathing time, but 
the next day the General Assembly convened to vote on the 
partition resolution. Before the vote was taken, more 
countries changed their positions. Belgium, luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Liberia and France, all of which 
had abstained in the AD Hoc committee vote, now opted for 
position. Paraguay, which had been absent before, decided to 
vote in favour of the resolution. Haiti and the Philippines, 
both of which were ready to side with the Arabs on 
Wednesday, now cast their votes for partition. Greece, which 
had previously abstained now voted against partition; Chile 
shifted its position from "in favour: to abstention. And, 
finally. Siam which had earlier voted with the Arab had its 
credentials withdrawn by a new government which had 
committed a coup et al in the country. 
109. General Assembly, Official Records, Second Session, 
124th Plenary Meeting, November 26, 1947, Vol.Ill, 
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When the final tally was made, the partition resolution 
was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 33 to 13 
with 10 attentions. ? The abstentions were almost as vital 
to assuring the necessary majority as were votes in favour, 
since they were not counted in the equation for a two third 
majority. 
After the partition resolution was adopted, the 
delegates of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen, 
rose in tixxm to say that their countries did not consider 
themselves bound by the vote in favour of the partition of 
Palestine, for such a decision was contrary to the letter 
and spirit of the Charter. As the bitter Arab delegates 
walked out f^ the Assembly Hall without waiting for the 
formal ending of the Assembly and the farewell speeches. 
110. Ibid., pp.1424-25. 
In Favour: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Byelorussian S.S.R., Cananada, Costa Rica, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Equador, 
France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxemburg, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philipines, Poland, Sweden, 
Ukrainian S.S.R., Onion of South Africa, U.S.S.R., 
U.S., Uruguay, Vene suela. 
Against: Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, 
Yemen. 
Abstained: Argentina, Chile, Columbia, El-Salvador, 
Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, U.K., Yugoslavia. 
111. John and Hadawi, n.3, p.266. 
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they solemnly announced that the United Nations had died. 
"Not died", said Faris el-Khouri, "Murdereci". They spoke of 
bloodshed to come and said the responsibility would not be 
their but would be on the shoulders of the countries that 
11? had pressed for partxtion. 
Dr. Chaim Weismann, hailed the decision as 'A victory 
for international equity and cooperation.' In contrast, Meir 
Grossman, president of the United Zionist Revisionists, 
(I.Z.L. now Herut) of America described the action clearly 
unjustifiable. He said, "It is with deep sorrow that we 
received the decision of the United Nations to partition 
Palestine into two states and reduce the Jewish national 
territory from 44,000 to 5,500 square miles." He announced 
that the Revisionist movement would fight for a Jewish state 
within 'the historic boundaries of Palestine' with 
•t -J o 
' international consent. ' "^ "^^  
The Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular did 
not accept the resolution for the partition of Palestine. 
Their attitude was is based on political, historical and 
juridical consideration. 
112. Ibid. 
113. Ibid., p.268. 
4^8 
The first ground of invalidity of the resolution was 
based on the incompetence of the General Assembly of the 
U.N. to recommend the partition of Palestine or to create a 
Jewish state in the country. 
The U.N. is an organisation of States which was formed 
for certain purposes defined in the Charter. At no time did 
this organisation possess any sovereignty or any other right 
on Palestine. The U.N. could not give what it did not 
possess. 
The General Assembly, however did not think alike. It 
argued that it could deal with the Palestine Question since 
it has placed on its agenda as a result of a request made by 
the mandatory Power for a recommendation to be made under 
Article 10 of the Charter concerning the future government 
of Palestine. Article 10 provides: 
The General Assembly may discuss any questions 
or any matters within the scope of the present 
Charter... and, except as provided in Article 
12, may make recommendations to the Members of 
the United Nations or to the Security Council 
or to both on any such questions or matters. 
However, the power given by Article 10 to the General 
Assembly to discuss any question or matter within the scope 
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of the Charter cannot be enlarged so as to imply a power to 
break up the territorial integrity of a state or to create 
new states. 
In 1947> the Arab States requested the General 
Assembljr to refer the legal issues affecting the Palestine 
Question, including the question of its competence to 
recommend or enforce any plan of partition of Palestine, to 
the International Court of Justice for an advisory 
opinion. But the political forces which were then 
attempting to secure a favourable vote on partition were not 
anxious to have their efforts hampered by an adverse 
judicial ruling. They were able each time to vote down every 
proposal to refer an issue to the International Court. ^"^  
It is no secret that the resolution for the partition 
of Palestine was obtained by means of Zionist influence and 
American political pressure. The Zionists gained to their 
114. Henry Cattan, Palestine and International Law (London, 
1973), p.47. 
115. For the several denials in 1947 by the General 
Assembly of requests of an advisory opinion by the 
International Court of Justice on the Palestine 
Question, see UN Documents A/Ac 14/21, 14 October 
1947; A/Ac 14/24, 16 October 1947; A/Ac 14/25, 16 
October 1947; and A/Ac 14/32, 11 November 1947. 
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cause President Truman, who put the weight of the U.S. 
Government in support of partition. In his Memoirs President 
Truman complains about Zionist pressure: 
The facts were that not only were these pressure 
movements around the United Nations unlike anything that had 
been seen there before but that the White House, too, was 
subjected to a constant barrage. I do not think I ever had 
as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as 
[ had in this instance ...Some of the extreme Zionist 
Leaders were even suggesting that we pressure sovereign 
nations into favourable votes in the General Assembly. ^  
However, President Truman does not disclose his own 
role and his own pressures in favour of Zionism and of the 
partition plan. He only briefly mentions. "I instructed the 
117 
atate Department to support the partition plan". 
In 1946, the total population of Palestine amounted to 
1,972,000 inhabitants comprising 1,203,000 Moslems, 145,000 
Christians and 608,000 Jews.^ Only one tenth of these Jews 
L16. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. Vol. II, (New York, 1965), 
p.158. 
L17. Ibid., P-155. 
L18. UN Document A/Ac 14/32, p.304, 11 November, 1947. 
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were part of the original inhabitants and belonged to the 
country. In fact, the original Jewish Palestinian Community 
did not, favour the partition of Palestine or creation of 
the Jewish state. The rest of the Jewish population was 
composed of foreign immigrants originating mostly from 
Poland, the U.S.S.R. and Central Europe. Only one third of 
these Jewish immigrants had acquired Palestinian 
119 
citisenship. 
In terms of land ownership, the Jews then owned, 
1,491,699 dunams of land exclusive of urban property out 
of a total area of 26,323,023 dunams in Palestine. Thus 
Jewish land ownership amounted to 5.66 per cent of the 
total area of the country. In contrast, the Palestine Arabs 
owned 12,574,774 dumans i.e. 47.77 percent of the area of 
the country. The rest was public property. 
The partition attributed to the Jews who were less than 
one third of the population and owned less than six percent 
119. Cattan, n.ll4, p.55. 
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of the land an area exceeding 14,500 square kilometers and 
representing 57 percent of the area of Palestine. This meant 
that the Jews were given a territory which was ten times the 
area owned by them in the whole of Palestine". ^ 
The partition resolution was basically a political 
decision which was conceived, engineered and adopted through 
the efforts and pressures of the Zionists and their friends 
in violation of principles of law, justice, and democracy. 
•The nullity of the partition resolution should not be 
rejected as a thing of past. What is happening in Palestine 
is a result of this unfortunate decision. 
122. Ibid 
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CONCLDSIOH 
Zionism and imperialism were the roots of the 
Palestine problem. The problem stands as a challenge to the 
principles of law and humanity in the post imperial age. It 
is remarkable that when after the World War II actual 
decolonization had started it was only in Palestine that a 
colonial settler state was established. The contradiction 
between the principles of Western liberalism and 
support for a colonizsing movement became obvious and 
resulted in the confirmation of Western duplicity and 
double standard. The powers involved in the question 
mainly U.K., U.S.A., coid U.S.S.R. not only failed to resolve 
the original contradiction but also actively confirmed it 
by supporting the Jewish colonization and expulsion of the 
Arabs from their own country effecting the establishment of 
a Zionist state in Palestine. This was the amazing 
achievement of Zionism in the second half of the 20th 
Century, supposed to be an enlightened and democratic part 
of the century. 
Zionism as a movement originated in the efforts of 
nineteenth century European Jews for creating a congenial 
atmosphere in which the Jews taking advantage of the modern 
ideas of emancipation and enlightenment attempted to retain 
at the beginning their own identity. This was however a 
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beginning but ultimately it culminated in the catastrophe 
for another people. From a Jewish point of view this was an 
essential endeavour and gave rise to many traditions. Among 
them the most important was the cultural renaissance which 
was based on the Jewish tradition and the Hebrew language. 
One of the results of this renaissance was the Jewish 
nationalism which contradicted the on going process of 
Jewish assimilation in the various West European 
nationalisms. 
The movement that Heral laid foundation of at Basle 
Congress in 1897 embraced a variety of Zionist 
interpretations: cultural, religious, socialist and 
political. The political "faction" remained dominant since 
its inception. It gathered added strength from religious and 
socialist faction. However Zionism gradually began to 
fashion itself as a settler movement with an aspiration of 
transforming Palestine into an exclusive Jewish state. It 
threw to winds the question of ethics, law and political 
realities to wrest for itself a political entity in 
Palestine. 
It would be a misnomer to regard Zionism as a 
democratic movement that the Jewish intellectuals developed 
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and acquired for it a popular support. It will not be in 
appropriate to describe Zionist movement as directive 
populism in the words of Allan R. Taylor. Theodor Hersl was 
the self appointed founder director of this popular 
movement. In this movement many so-called factions developed 
which formed themselves into different organisations within 
the Zionist Congress. Thus Zionism consolidated itself 
through divergent methods. It therefore allowed diverse 
factions to assert for themselves while retaining a 
central leadership for providing unity of direction and 
purpose. 
The establishment of the state of Israel was the 
culmination of a careful planning and organised activity 
for a "secular" national ideal. Long before anti-Semitism 
had reached its climax in Nazi Germany the Jewish national 
idea was formulated by the Zionist ideologies as the only 
effective programme for regeneration of the Jews as a 
modern people, though many Jewish thinkers and communities 
did not conform to this thesis. Though it was juxtaposed 
with the ideals of faith, the Zionist political leadership 
embarked on an intensive programme to convert the Jewish 
world to Zionism and to found a Jewish state in Palestine. 
One can discern the essential nature of Zionism by examining 
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the character of the movement in operation and by analysing 
its ideological foundations. 
Heral's vision and the search of its realisation led 
the Zionists to develop a premise that end justified the 
means. With the issuance of the Balfour Declaration the 
Zionists made up their mind and threw themselves resolutely 
into the cause of advancement of the establislriment of a 
Jevjish state. The Zionists who had promised to engender the 
humanistic renaissance among the Jews, by the very nature 
of contradictions and compulsions of the Zionist movement 
degenerated into a bitter struggle over real estate with the 
Arabs of Palestine who constituted an absolute majority. 
Inspite of objections from saner Jewish quarters and 
protests by the Arabs the narrower concept of Zionism 
prevailed. Political leaders and ideologists coloured the 
Zionist movement with intense Jewish nationalism and gave it 
over to lesser considerations and motivations. On this plane 
three leaders played the most crucial role. Weizmann was a 
past master as far as sophisticated manipulation was 
concerned. Ben Gurion was a genius at mass conversion to 
Zionism and settlement, and Jabotinsky, of expansionist 
designs and armed strategy. These three pragmatic approaches 
lay at the root of Zionism's evolution. 
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Weizmann adopted the policy of "gradualism" and 
developed it into a political technique, in which aims were 
concealed, adhoc compromises arrived, and various forms of 
pressure and persuasion applied. The problem with this 
political method stance was that it cast an aura of secrecy 
and duplicity about the movement. When Weismann accepted the 
Balfour Declaration, the Churchill White Paper. and the 
partition plan of the Royal Commission, he did not really 
agree to their terms or intend to abide by them. 
For Weismann the Balfour Declaration was only a 
beginning and from 1917 onwards he tried ceaselessly to 
circumvent its restrictive clauses without openly 
challenging their legality. His attitude towards the 
Churchill White Paper was also the same, and in the same 
vein he accepted the partition plan on the basis of its 
limited territorial concessions which could be expanded in 
time. Replying to the criticism for handing over Negev 
desert to Arabs he said that Negev would be there, and that 
it would not run away. Expansionism was also very much on 
the mind of Weizmann. The only thing was he always waited 
for the right moment to act. 
David Ben Gurion adhered intensely to the concept of 
"Ingathering". Gurion may be accused for encompassing the 
m 
vast horizons of Jewish vision and endeavour within a 
parochial national system. His insistence that Zionism 
demanded immigration to Israel and allegiance to a single 
Jewish nationality reflected a horizon too limited for the 
Jews of the world. His parochialism that Zionists in the 
Diaspora were under obligation to assist the State of Israel 
unconditionally was said to be reactionary. To an 
emancipated Jew and the modern man the premises of 
"ingathering" was retrogressive. 
However the Zionists like Weizmann, Ben Gurion, Juda 
Magnes and Abba Hi1lei Silver, who happened to be the 
pivotal actors on behalf of Zionism, activated other actors 
whom we may call the secondary actors particularly U.K., 
U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and ultimately through them the 
United Nations, 
The broad lines of struggle over Palestine had already 
emerged during World War I when the Western Allies, assuming 
that the Ottoman Empire would be dismembered upon its 
defeat, addressed the question of the fate of its non-
Turkish territories. Palestine was the object of rivalry 
between British and French aspirations. It was, moreover, 
the vital focus of the World Zionist Organisation, which 
m 
had already achieved considerable progress in rallying world 
wide support for the objective of establishing a Jewish 
state in Palestine. 
The British Government was prompted to take key actions 
affecting the future of Palestine under the exigencies of 
the World War I. The British calculated that a public 
expression of support for the principle of a Jewish national 
home in Palestine would enable the World Zionist 
Organisation to mobilize American Jews in support of the 
United States' entry into the war on the side of the Allied 
Powers. It would also influence the German Jews to shift 
Lheir allegiance to Great Britain and influence the Russian 
Jews to dissuade the new revolutionary regime in Russia from 
abandoning the conflict with the Allies. Above all, the 
British aimed to keep the French out of Palestine. Apart 
from supposedly assisting "God's will" as they believed to 
be fulfilling, the above were the main motives of the 
Balfour Declaration Balfour was no doubt an ardent convert 
to Zionism. Arnold Toynbee has remarked, "I will straight 
out declare Balfour was a wicked man", Fortunately for 
Balfour his Zionism and his serving of the British 
imperialist cause did not prove to be incompatible. 
W) 
Toynbee believed that Balfour and his colleagues knew 
the catastrophic implications for the Arabs of fostering a 
White settler community, yet nevertheless decided to support 
the Jews as a means of sustaining the British influence in 
the eastern Mediterranean region. This was the callousness 
of imperialism at its height. The Balfour Declaration, as a 
historical premise, it was calculated, could be used to 
develop an argument going in the some direction; from a 
Jewish 'national home' to the Zionist state. 
As part of the post-World War I settlement, Great 
Britain was awarded a League of Nations mandate over 
Palestine. 
The Balfour Declaration was written into the document 
as a charge on the mandatory power. The phraseology of the 
mandate failed to clarify the ambiguous term "national 
home". The mandate gave discretionary power to Britain to 
establish a separate administration in the mandatory 
territory east of the Jordan River, which later became 
Trans-Jordan. 
Animosity between the Jewish communities was probably a 
factor which prompted Winston Churchill, then Britain's 
Colonial Secretary, to issue a White Paper in June 1922. In 
this he asserted that the status of Jews in Palestine under 
u\ 
•the existing British administration in fact constituted the 
"national home" called for by the Balfour Declaration and 
the Mandate. 
Nonetheless, Churchill was a Zionist, though his 
Zionism was not religious or evangelical in origin as of 
many other Gentiles. He also believed that Zionism had to 
'go slow' so as not to arouse or offend the native Arabs. 
However he gave intermittent support; to it. There were two 
key elements supporting his good 'British' sense for his 
sponsorship of Zionism. First, he believed that the Zionist 
movement commanded powerful political and economic influence 
particularly in the United States. As late as in December 
1939, he lectured his cabinet colleagues on the important 
role the Zionists could play in mobilising American 
resources for the British war effort. He told them that it 
had not been for light or sentimental reasons that the 
Government had issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917, but 
in order to mobilise American support. In 1939 Churchill 
believed that history could repeat itself. He expected that 
the Zionists through their friends in America could exert 
considerable influence for an early American entry into the 
war. 
The second element was that the Zionist could be hired 
for some other purposes quite apart from the influence to be 
w. 
acquired in Washington, e.g. Zionist capital and technology 
could develop Palestine as an imperial outpost at a minimal 
cost to the British tax payer. In his imperial mould 
Churchill thought of the Zionists nothing more than the 
policemen in the region to safeguard and further the British 
imperial interests in Palestine. 
The British also attempted to refute the contention of 
Shariff Hussein and the Arab nationalists that the McMohan 
correspondence had promised Palestine independence as part 
of a fully sovereign Arab state. 
The period of the British administration may be summed 
up by stating that no common ground could be found for the 
accommodation of the two nationalisms, whether by the 
partition proposed by the Royal Commission report of 1937 
(the Peel Report), a by the "binational" solution of the 
White Paper of 1939; 
The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, sought 
the solution of a "binational state" in the hope that 
concerted action with the United States might guarantee the 
security of the Jewish minority in Palestine, thereby 
allowing Britain to remain on good terms with the Arab world 
in general. 
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The Labour Government's Palestine policy revolved round 
the role of Ernest Bevin, It all started with the initial 
effort to cling to Palestine that gave way to 
internationalizing the issue. Recent studies have shown that 
Bevin was not anti-seraitic as he was sometimes accused to be 
by the Zionists. He was only pro-British. The Labour's 
strategy in the Middle East may be summed up in "non 
intervention" and "conciliation". But the American President 
Truman's political behaviour was different. It depended 
completely on his electoral politics. This was exasperating 
to Bevin. This was the result of a seeming incomprehension, 
on the part of the British statesmen and diplomats, of the 
working of the American political system particularly in the 
making of the foreign policy. 
American political system, as we know, is dominated by 
the President. His Secretaries, who are members of his so 
called cabinet are only hand picked by him. Their 
departments do have expertise on the regions or the 
international scene as a whole. Therefore, their advice to 
the President is based on their expert knowledge. But the 
President can ignore this advice in the context of his 
domestic politics. On the crucial moments with reference to 
the Palestine issue the domestic compulsions proved to be 
444 
more compelling for the President than the almost objective 
advice of the Secretaries of State and Defense. Here came 
the Zionists. Through their influence mechanism and 
electoral weight they were able to influence the President's 
mind for their own end. 
American Presidents were at that time unfamiliar with 
the realities of the Hiddle East. The fantasies of President 
Roosvelt on 'peacefully' resolving the Arab Zionist dispute 
were shocking. Far more significant were Truman's decisions. 
There were erratic shifts in United States policies on 
Palestine, particularly after the question was placed on the 
agenda of the United Nations' General Assembly. The American 
position before the General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on 
Palestine in the fall of 1947 was developed essentially by 
the Department of State, and the pressures on friendly 
delegations before the final vote in the plenary Assembly 
session by the White House, thfiuxks to the Zionists and 
their access to Truman. The latter went all alone pulling 
his weight for partition resolution and never consulted the 
State Department. He could not afford to be inimical to his 
Jewish electorate and Zionist supporters. 
Like the policies of the United States, Soviet policies 
were deteimined by an interplay between an internal "Jewish 
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factor" and the perceived requirements of the Soviet 
interest in the Middle East as a whole in the context of the 
super power struggle. 
As the political and social ferment in Russia exploded 
in Revolution of 1917 Britain's support to the Jewish 
National Home in Palestine through the Balfour Declaration 
provided added impetus to Communist hostility toward 
Zionism. For not only did the Declaration threaten to 
deflect or subvert the support of Jews for the Revolution 
at a critical moment, but also seemed to reveal Zionism as a 
vehicle of British imperialism and as a means of keeping 
suppressed the presumably revolutionary toiling Arab masses. 
However, with the advent of World War II Stalin started 
to cultivating the Jews and the Zionists alike. Arab, 
especially the Palestinian leadership, fell from grace. 
Nonetheless, given the traditional Soviet hostility toward 
Zionism, it came as a surprise when in the fall of 1947 
Soviet spokesmen in the United Nations declared their 
support for the idea of partition and the creation of 
independent Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. Ideology 
took a back seat while political expediency ruled the roost. 
This more than benevolent attitude toward the Zionists seems 
surprising not only in the light of the previous Soviet 
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hostility to Zionisn but also in the perspective of 
sabsequent Soviet policies which continue to the pzresent 
days. 
As the Palestine issue came up for decision, the United 
Hations had before it three alteimatives. The first, 
recommended by the majority of its own special committee on 
Palestine urged partition; the second advanced by the 
minority of the Committee, advocated a federal Jewish-Arab 
state; and the third, pressed by the Arab delegations, 
insisted on independence for Palestine under the rule of 
its Arab majority. All these proposals envisaged the 
termination of the British Mandate, which was what the 
Soviets were interested in most. Moreover, the Soviets had 
already visualised that partition was the only proposal that 
had the chance of commanding the necessary two thirds 
majority, and was therefore the only proposal that promised 
to bring the end of the British rule in Palestine. 
Consequently, even though the Soviets would have 
intrinsically favored the federal proposal as Gromyko 
indicated in one of his speeches, they cast their vote and 
weight in favour of partition for the "practical reasons", 
that otherwise the United Nations would have reached a 
deadlock that would have allowed Britain to prolong its stay 
in Palestine. 
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In the context of the Soviet support for the Zionists, 
the Arabs could have thought of taking the support of the 
West vhich as a bloc was against the East, that is the 
Soviet Onion. However this would not have paid any 
dividends. The West at its best was divided (due to the 
British Labour Party's opposition to the American support to 
Zionism) and at its worst was basically united against them 
(Arabs). Despite the transient British policy under the 
Labour Government the British society was as pro sionist as 
the American one. 
Moscow knew that Britain was so strongly entrenched in 
the Arab world that the Soviet Onion would not be able to 
cash in on any pro-Arab itosition. In addition the real 
prospect, i.e. the ouster of the British would be 
j^eopardised for the sake of a an ungainful popularity. 
The Soviets had some other reasons also. They were 
resentful of the fact that Arab nationalist movements had 
taken a pro-axis orientation e.g. in Palestine it was led 
by the Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin Al-Husseini and in Egypt 
by Asis al-Masri. The argument generally advanced by some 
writer was that Stalin approved of the partition of 
Palestine in a fit of absent-mindedness. Them does not seem 
to be plausible. 
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Inspite of Soviet Union's support of partition the 
thrust of Arab anger was against the United States, which 
was seen as the architect of the partition plan. The Arab 
countries, ironically were staunchly "pro-Western " in the 
sense of being "anti Bolshevik" Half-hearted attempts to 
contact the Soviets were made only by some members of the 
Syrian delegation, though Haj Amin also might have been in 
contact with them. 
The signal achievement of the Zionist diplomacy was 
the U,H. partition resolution of November 19, 1947. The 
Zionists for the first time in the history of their 
movement got an international sanction for the 
establishment of their own state. 
The origins of the November resolution lay in the 
ONSCOF report, which at the end of August 1947 recommended 
British evacuation and termination of the Mandate. 
The Zionists had visualised that without the forthright 
American support, the solution reconusended by the UNSCOP 
majority report - partition - would not secure the required 
majority. The Zionists mounted both a widespread and 
intensive campaign, through Democratic Party channels and 
their supporters in the Congress. 
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Inspite of the declared support of both the American 
and the Soviet delegations the amended partition plan was 
adopted only narrowly on November 25, 1947, by the United 
Nations Ad hoc Committee on Palestine. There was just one 
vote short of the two third majority. The fact that the 
required majority was secured for the decisive vote just 
four days later was due to an unprecendently intensive 
Zionist campaigning that finally mobilized, at the eleventh 
hour, the support of the White House. 
Witnesses on both the American auad the Zionist side 
have nevertheless established that the White House, with or 
without the President's personal sanction, was involved in a 
pressure campaign to change the votes of those smaller 
countries that had either opposed or abstained from the vote 
on November 25. 
Three days after the decisive passage of the partition 
resolution, the incharge of the Jewish Agency's New York 
office, Michael Camay wrote to a friend that the President 
Truman has got upset and threw his personal weight behind 
the effort to secure a decision. It was only in the last 
forty eight hours on Friday and Saturday that they got the 
full backing of the United States. 
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However, it would be fallacious to think that the 
Zionists and their supporters held any monopoly on pressure 
tactics. Since the beginning of the General Assembly, the 
Arab delegates had warned the Americans frequently that they 
would defect to the Soviet camp if the Unites States voted 
for partition. The Arab warning was of no consequence 
however, when the Soviets themselves declared in favour of 
partition in October 1947. The domestic political 
influence of the Zionists in America also out smarted the 
threat of oil sanction by the Arabs. Ibn Saud himself had 
made it perfectly clear to American diplomats that, quite 
contrary to what the oil lobby in Washington was telling 
the State Department, he would not impose oil seunctions 
against the West due to any differences over Palestine. 
Whatever the oil lobby might have conceived of 
pressuring the Americans or whatever the Arab oil-rich 
countries might have thought of influencing the West using 
oil as a force, the stark fact was that in 1947 the Arabs 
had no oil power whatsoever which they came to acquiire 
only in 1973. Even in this latter year (1973) when they 
used oil as a political weapon they failed. Therefore to 
think of using oil as an instrument of pressure in 1947 was 
too transparent a bluff not to be called. 
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